

4 MARCH 1991

Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service



ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

JPRS Report—

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

19980113 367

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

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FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

Today the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provides its consumers throughout the federal government, according to their diverse official interests, with information from a broad range of foreign public media. FBIS information also is available to readers outside of the government, through the National Technical Information Service. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness are our production watchwords.

We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Soviet Union

Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-91-006

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Lushev Army, Navy Day 1991 Interview

91UM0411A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 23 Feb 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with General of the Army P.G. Lushev on his pre- Army and Navy Day tour by A. Orlov; place not given: "We Have Honor"]

[Text] The 18-year-old soldier was standing next to a general of the army for the first time. The boy was flustered. His gaze was fixed continuously on the big star on the shoulder boards. And the general was asking what his name was, where he hailed from, how long he had been serving and why he was without gloves in a fair February frost. The soldier justified himself and said something or other, pointing to an armored personnel carrier nearby.

The Rostock seaport "rumbled" and "sighed" all around. The arm of a gantry crane loomed over a Soviet transport ship. Equipment, accessories, and supplies and munitions were being loaded. Motorized infantrymen were preparing to embark for home—the Union.

"Good, but don't be embarrassed, son," the general smiled. "You are a soldier. Prepare the equipment for the journey well.... I do not promise a quick rendezvous with your own home but you'll be returning to the Motherland very soon...."

General of the Army P.G. Lushev, hero of the Soviet Union, first deputy USSR defense minister and commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, was at this time visiting many garrisons of the Western Group of Forces. The most varied issues were tackled here. One could only wonder how many things could be accommodated in just three days.

He got down to work religiously, with a kind of peasant thoroughness. He did not let slip an opportunity to strike up a conversation with a person even on a chance meeting. He did not wait for someone to address him. He would himself enter the men's mess halls, the officer's quarters, the motor pools, and stores and call on servicemen's families.... Even in just a matter of hours in the seaport he had time not only to discuss in detail the progress of the shipment of cargo with the captain of the Soviet ship, meet with representatives of the military transport communications service, and ascertain the position of the port's board of directors regarding a possible increase in the equipment-loading tariffs, but also to have a comprehensive discussion in the "duty room" with the leader of the team of German longshoremen. He even inquired about minor details: what was holding up the work, could the handling of the freight be speeded up, how could things be organized more economically?

This tour of the Western Group of Forces took place right on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day. It was

there that our interview began—on problems of the withdrawal of the forces, of the Army, of the attitude toward it in society.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, I have been watching you work and have at times, I confess, been puzzled: a multitude of concerns, and the first deputy defense minister is going into why a soldier does not have gloves. Or inquiring whether the daughter of an officer will take her finals here, in the group of forces....

[Lushev] Yes, to my great regret, I managed to get done on the trip far from all that I had intended. The people have a tremendous amount of work here, and one cannot be everywhere at once. We are withdrawing from our groups of forces—with a compressed timeframe—thousands of pieces of equipment and taking away hundreds of thousands of tons of accessories and supplies. It is hard to compare this operation with any other. With that involving, say, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. There has altogether been nothing on this scale since the war. And there are no trifling matters in this work either. All this means people's fate, that of military and nonmilitary personnel. And, consequently, their morale and civic feelings.

Take if only the question of servicemen's families in the new locations. It is being resolved with great difficulty as yet. The Defense Ministry now has a clear idea of how much in the way of houses, quarters, schools, kindergarten, stores, and such has to be built to establish a more or less tolerable life for people. Merely common action is needed. This problem has been discussed repeatedly. The extremely limited possibilities of our military construction organizations are particularly worrying. Another aspect of the difficulties is the shortfall in the supply of construction materials by the civilian departments. As far, however, as the local soviets and assistance on their part is concerned, nor are many local authorities in any hurry to comply with the corresponding decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers.

We have had to balance in the groups of forces what of the construction materials available here we may take with us. The problems are, as you can see, woven into a single ball. So far it is the military itself which is dealing with them, in the main. An all-state program connected with the withdrawal of our forces from East Europe is needed.

And concerning these meetings and conversations with people.... How can we manage without them? There is more in each meeting than can be accommodated in a single report. Life cannot be fit into a report....

[Orlov] You have mentioned people's morale and civic feelings. There is a particular atmosphere here, in the groups of forces, most likely. We are leaving, quitting East Europe. Like retreating, seemingly. This could be psychologically distressing.

[Lushev] What is distressing, I believe, is not that we are leaving. We ultimately did not intend to remain here

forever. Times change, the world changes. But, despite all these changes, our Army has no reason to wear sackcloth and ashes. It is not to blame for the fact that it is leaving. The Army has, I believe, accomplished its historic mission, accomplished it with honor. True, it is being sent off without flowers and will be met without music.... But the Soviet military abroad, and in the country itself, does not have the feeling that we are leaving as the vanquished. You yourself have most likely had a chance to see this.

[Orlov] The general's words reminded me of an episode which I happened to witness in Stendal, at a military base from which a motorized infantry unit was being withdrawn. I got into conversation with some young officers. And the talk got around to the route by which their unit would leave for home. The road first ran north of the FRG—to the ports of Rostock and Mukran [name as transliterated]. There they were to be loaded onto transport ships and ferries and from there by sea to Kaliningrad, Klaypeda, and Leningrad. From there they would make for the military district where they were to be stationed.

So, a roundabout route. It is by this route—with many transfers—that the Western Group of Forces is being withdrawn today. Although it is a stone's throw to the Soviet border by land, the troops are forced to make a detour of an extra 1,000 km. The reason for this situation is the position of Poland, whose government has imposed a ban on the transit through its territory of personnel and equipment of the Western Group of Forces. The official position of our neighbors is such: Not one Soviet military train from Germany will travel its railroad until an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from Polish territory has been reached.

"In '45 our Army did not come west as an aggressor," one of those with whom I was speaking at the Stendal Garrison said. "The peoples of Europe have not forgotten, I believe, how many of our soldiers gave their lives for their liberation from fascism. Certain politicians have forgotten or are trying to forget this. We will find a way out of the situation, of course...."

I could not help but understand these officers. Their unit was formed at the time of the Great Patriotic War. It crossed half of Europe to Berlin. And one of its regiments, which is today also returning home, stormed the Reichstag in victorious '45. This is remembered, not forgotten....

"Yes, we cannot forget these pages of history," General of the Army Lushev said. "Just as the glory of our most valiant guards and decorated units cannot be lost either."

[Orlov] The Army is today experiencing difficult times. Its fate excites everyone, it would seem. But excites them differently. Some see it as the defender of our borders and note its devotion to its constitutional duty. Others see it as a reactionary state institution....

[Lushev] For me this is a very painful subject also. I am myself, after all, of the generation of those whose youth coincided with the war. And the Army was the personification of patriotism and a readiness to give one's life for the liberation of one's native land from the aggressors. It was with this that we went westward and believed and do not now doubt that we trod this path as liberators. In the postwar years our Army and Navy were the country's pride. This is preserved among the people now also. We recall the Chernobyl disaster. Who was there in the first, most difficult days? Or peoples' rescue following the earthquake in Armenia? Nor did the Army lose its honor in Afghanistan....

The attitude toward the Armed Forces today is, I would say, a "litmus test" by which it is possible to judge how a person perceives such concepts as duty, patriotism, and service to one's fatherland. There are very many who would like to play the "army card," but the Armed Forces will remain true to their constitutional duty. They are being attacked for this also. Defamation of the Army is, I believe, a futile undertaking. The people are opposed to this. They are already protesting it. It does not need to be explained to ordinary people to what end which forces are accusing the Army of all sins. Lenin's words, which, it would seem, the radicals have adopted, incidentally: Any class, aspiring to domination, cannot achieve this domination other than by having demoralized the army... are well known.

[Orlov] A minor detail. I set myself the goal during this time in Germany of tracking in the FRG's mass media what the attitude is toward the Soviet Army here. Biased or not? It was interesting to compare whose journalists—ours or others'—were finding more shortcomings in the Soviet Armed Forces. I can share the result: I came across no malevolent attacks on the Western Group of Forces or the USSR Armed Forces in general in any articles. Except for one. It did the rounds of many publications. Beneath an expose article on the "mass violations of human rights in the so-called Western Group of Forces" was the name of Lyamin. Yes, a compatriot of ours! A "defender of human rights lawyer from Moscow," as he introduced himself. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent accredited with the Western Group of Forces whom I know later told me: until this "lawyer-cum-defender" makes visits to the FRG from Russia, the German press has no reason to reproach the "Russian Army."

About the Russian Army, incidentally. I asked my interviewee the following question in this connection:

"Previously on 23 February it was customary to recall the combat path of our Armed Forces in detail. But today we are more often looking to the future. Many people see it, this future of the Army, as the existence of individual republic army formations. There has been talk of a Russian army also. Do you share this idea?"

[Lushev] The past cannot be forgotten either. We are not some Joes of unknown ancestry. Unless we preserve our

history, we can have no future either. As far, however, as national formations are concerned, I remember the war: When soldiers went on the attack, I venture to assure you that no one thought about the nationality of his neighbor on his right or his left. The main thing was how dependable the person next to you was. This is no new revelation, but we won the victory because all peoples of the country fought for it, for our common freedom. As a military man, as a citizen of the country, I cannot go against my conscience: pulling the Armed Forces apart into national apartments would inevitably lead to the great state of today becoming a third-rate province. So let us choose the kind of army we need. And statements about the need for the creation of a Russian army are profoundly mistaken.

[Orlov] Such confrontation in the state cannot, surely, fail to have an effect on military people also. Could this lead to something worse, to a split in the army, say?

[Lushev] I am sure this will not happen. You need to know the Army and sense its mood and concern at the situation in the country to understand that the Army is becoming increasingly cohesive. I feel an urge to say that the Armed Forces are the healthiest part of our society, but I am afraid of unintentionally offending other people. A fitting view of the surrounding world has been returning to many people of late. And in order to understand the kind of moral pressure the Army is capable of confronting we should, perhaps, recall history once again. The very start of the Great Patriotic War. This was a surprise, whatever is written today. It was retreat. And, consequently, low spirits. There was the strongest moral pressure. There was disarray also. But was the fighting men's spirit broken? No. The national character of the Russian people and the other peoples of our country was reflected in it. We held out and became stronger.

Alas, some people continue not to understand this. Others, on the contrary, understand it only too well and are beginning to rearrange their tactics. I, as a person with a fair amount of experience, can sometimes see clearly how these tactics of the anti-Army campaign are changing. Today the middle and junior officer corps is being counterposed to the higher Army command personnel. Officers serving in the central machinery of the Defense Ministry, to those serving in the field. This is the plan. Very simple, as you can see. But there are fewer and fewer simpletons among our compatriots.

[Orlov] It would be incomprehensible if in conversation with you we failed to mention the Warsaw Pact. You, as commander of its Joint Armed Forces, did much to strengthen this alliance of friendly armies. But the Warsaw Pact's military structures are, apparently, living out their final days. What are your feelings in this connection?

[Lushev] We should not, most likely, be speaking about feelings. A decision was made at the Moscow meeting last year of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative

Committee on the transformation of this alliance from a military-political into a political-military alliance. Provision was made in this connection for a reconsideration of the missions and functions of its military structures and their reorganization. Now, however, representatives of a number of participants in the alliance are advocating the speediest disbandment of these structures. It has already been announced that there will be a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at foreign and defense minister level on 25 February in Budapest. It is planned to sign there a document terminating the military agreements concluded within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

I would like to mention that in the 35-plus years of its existence the Warsaw Pact has made an appreciable contribution to strengthening peace in Europe. It is appropriate to recall that all the positive processes occurring today on the European continent are connected with it. Including the steps pertaining to the creation of a collective security system—they were initiated precisely by the Warsaw Pact.

As far as the military aspect is concerned, the cooperation of the Warsaw Pact participants in the military sphere enabled them to create armed forces furnished with the requisite arms and equipment and also to master in full modern forms and methods of conducting combat operations. Each state undoubtedly has a right to decide questions of its security independently. It may be recalled that France, which left NATO's military organization, once went this route. But to do this it had to switch just about fully to furnishing its Armed Forces with weapons of its own manufacture. There is hardly any East European state which is today capable of tackling these questions in this way.

So it seems to me that common sense remains common sense. Further relations in the military sphere among the East European countries should, I believe, switch to the sphere of bilateral relations. The experience of our cooperation accumulated in the Joint Armed Forces could come in useful here. I intend to speak, incidentally, at the special Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest: I shall thank my military colleagues from the armies of the East European countries for the path which we have worthily trod together....

[Orlov] I will return once again to the meetings during our tour. I spoke with the most diverse people. Including Germans, the majority of whom approve of both Germany's unification and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gratitude to the USSR was invariably expressed in the conversations in this connection. Opinions were not divided in the discussions on another matter either: The USSR and Germany should no longer have historical contradictions. On the contrary, cooperation and common concern for the European home are essential. And this is what I heard also: uneasiness at the presence today in West Germany of American forces.

East Germans expressed the concern: Will not the U.S. Army want to lay claim to deployment and development in the eastern areas?

"We are opposed to the American military presence, particularly when Soviet soldiers are leaving for home," 50-year-old worker Klaus Heege, told me. "It is time that we all started to live differently...."

In fact, it was about this that the discussion with the first deputy defense minister continued. I sought his view: What would the world be like in terms of military-political alliances? The more so in that NATO is persistently speaking about itself as a "stabilizing factor" and "guarantor of peace" in Europe....

[Lushev] I believe it appropriate to recall today that the Soviet Union was originally opposed to the creation of military blocs. And the Warsaw Pact was only signed six years after NATO was formed. This was a retaliatory measure. Article 11 of the Warsaw Pact points out, incidentally, that it will cease to have effect the day an all-European collective security treaty comes into force. The West also, it is believed, aspires to a system of collective security. It is clear from statements of the NATO leadership and the decisions being adopted at its meetings that in the situation taking shape in Europe NATO has to explain the purpose of its continued existence. Whence the proposition concerning the guarantor of peace and stability on the European continent. Much is being said also about the need to preserve a "counterweight to the USSR's military potential" and about the danger of coming civil war in the Union. This is the overall picture. Measures aimed at upgrading the NATO military structures are also under way today under these covers....

In addition, it is no secret that the United States has always regarded Russia and the USSR as its geopolitical rival. And it is not inappropriate for us to recall this when it is a question of our country's defense capability. And the events in the Persian Gulf also show that the accomplishment of the tasks of preservation of peace by political means alone is, alas, not always possible today.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, judging from the editorial mailbag, people are excited by one further question: how to preserve what has been invested in the groups of forces?

[Lushev] We are trying to keep all material losses as few as possible. The military is no less concerned about this than the workers in our country. Everything possible will be saved: Some things have been sold for foreign currency, but much is already being taken out and returned to the country. All this is being specially monitored. There is one further point I would like to make. On how we comply with the terms of the agreement on the withdrawal of the forces we will be judged as to how serious a partner we are today. And we must pull our forces out of Europe, as befits us, in organized fashion.

[Orlov] A military base near Malvinkel [name as transliterated]. It was already half-empty when we drove up here. Equipment had gone, and the removal of accessories and supplies was being completed. But there were still people here.

A stairwell partitioned off by scaffolding. A few men were fiddling about with a radiator.

"What's the point? You are leaving, after all...," a warrant officer carrying an acetylene torch asked.

He said jokingly:

"So the Germans don't freeze. But, seriously, we will sell the building. We built it with our own hands, after all. And we should, in any case, leave in style...."

And there suddenly came to me something I had almost forgotten....

At the start of the 1980's the author of these lines was in Vietnam, visiting the locations from which not that long before American soldiers had departed. In Cam Ranh Bay, where there had previously been an American base, I noticed among the luxuriant green vegetation giant fuel tanks. Their sides resembled a sieve. My Vietnamese interpreter told me that the American military had not had time to dismantle these tanks and had before departure "done a job" on them with heavy-caliber machine guns.

Well, everyone arrives and departs in his own way....

"And the final question, Petr Georgiyevich. A great deal is being reassessed in our life currently. Much is being revised in the Army also. What, for all that, are its abiding spiritual values?"

[Lushev] It may seem pretentious, but what was for a long time beneath a bushel, as it were, is now coming to be revived in the Army, it seems to me. The main thing for a military man was, is, and always will be honor. And the purpose of his life was, is, and will be service of the Fatherland.

[Orlov] When I took my leave of the general, I congratulated him on behalf of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers on the impending holiday.

[Lushev] I also congratulate the newspaper's readers, today's fighting men, veterans of the Armed Forces and all who feel kinship with the Army and with our common holiday. Good feelings for all of them on this day and mental equilibrium for the future....

Shlyaga Army, Navy Day 1991 Interview

91UM0408A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 23 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, by Nikolay Panyukov, RABOCHAYA

TRIBUNA military commentator; place and date not given: "Reform on the March"]

[Text] *Whenever difficulties mount, whenever the Fatherland is in danger, the first ones to stand in its defense are the warriors of the Army and the Navy.*

This is the way it was at the time of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War... This is the way it was when it became necessary to enter the mortal battle with the "nuclear genie" of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.

The Army saves, and the Army helps, while all the time remembering its main function: to maintain constant combat readiness.

The problems that are part of the daily life of our Army and Navy in these uneasy times are described in our correspondent's interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Panyukov] Nikolay Ivanovich, many our readers ask whether reform is underway in the Army?

[Shlyaga] Of course, the reform is already being implemented. And not just for a year or two... The starting point in the process of practical implementation of the current reform's practical tasks should be considered the adoption by our country of a new military defense doctrine in 1987.

Gradually, the very structure of the Army and the Navy is changing. The legislation on military matters is being substantially updated. First steps have been undertaken towards the implementation of the program of social security for members of the military and their families, as well as persons retired from military service.

And what about large-scale transformations in military economy? And the transformation of political organs into military-political organs? Are not all of these, and many others, symptoms of the reform already underway? Now we have on the agenda the signing of a number of new international agreements and the adoption of a new Union treaty... All of that, naturally, will influence the course of the reform, add new nuances to it.

[Panyukov] By the way, some readers of our newspaper are especially interested in the defense aspect of the new Union treaty. What can you say about it?

[Shlyaga] The issue of the fate of the USSR has been placed at the center of increasingly bitter political battles. Figuratively speaking, political parties and movements crossed their "swords and pens" over it. Contrary to common sense, some people chose to push centrifugal tendencies and to harriedly search for ways to make the adoption of the Union treaty more difficult, including the excuse of the need to strengthen the sovereignty of the Union republics. In doing that, they put the very notion of sovereignty upside down. They ignore the fact that in the environment of existing economic and political ties the existence of the Union of Republics does not

nullify this sovereignty, but guarantees it. It is because only joint efforts by the republics can guarantee their safety that the main function in regard to the defense of the country should be, in my view, the prerogative of the center. It is necessary to clearly spell it out in the Union treaty.

[Panyukov] In this case, how should we treat persistent statements in some republics that they have a right to maintain their own armed forces? There are some people who would like to make this the main substance of the military reform.

[Shlyaga] What can I say in this regard? According to the existing USSR Constitution, the Union republics do not have such right. The building of the Armed Forces is the exclusive competence of the Union. Please note that the Ministry of Defense is an all-Union organization.

Going back to the beginning of your question, I would like to emphasize once again that the defense of the Union is too serious an aspect of the functioning of the state to build it along the axis of coordinates of republic sovereignty. At the same time, moving towards the renewal of the Union, it is, of course, necessary to increase the role of the republics in defense matters, taking into account their increased self-sufficiency. Today, however, it seems that the power organs of some Union republics are competing among themselves in the ignoble business of bringing the Armed Forces down.

Many of them, for all practical purposes, no longer fulfill their responsibility in preparing the youth for military service. They adopt laws and pass decisions that paralyze the draft, and create unconstitutional military detachments. In some regions the authorities have taken anti-human actions towards the military and their families. In addition to restrictions in residence permits and health care, there are now demands to pay substantial monetary sums for school education of the children from military families, and the refusal—under the conditions of market economy, I must note—to issue ration cards and coupons for food products.

Lately, particularly in the Baltic republics, it came to the point of threats to cut off electricity, water, and heat to the military and the military bases. Various political and public movements try increasingly often to get the Army and the Navy involved in political struggle.

[Panyukov] These are not simple problems...

[Shlyaga] Of course. But they can be solved if we use common sense and truly international interests, which require more and more the integration of efforts for the cause of national defense. In this respect—and I want especially to underscore this point—it is important and necessary to ensure the supremacy of the Union legislation on defense issues.

As to the formation of national military detachments, I will tell you straight: In addition to the potential danger of dragging us into the resolution of interethnic conflicts,

we will face an enormous absolute increase in the material and financial expenditures.

According to existing data, the supply of one 1000-men strong regiment of the national forces in Armenia in 1990 cost 35 million rubles [R]. It takes over R7 billion to create one motor infantry division, if we take into account the repair facilities, storage, housing, and barracks, etc. The creation of a separate army, naturally, will require education of the national officers corps—the backbone of any armed forces. The professional training of just one officer in a military education institute now costs the state over R50,000.

[Panyukov] There is much talk about depoliticization and de-party-ization of the Army...

[Shlyaga] Tell those who do not understand it that there is no such thing as a depolitized army. Only "play troops" can fall into this category. When it comes to a real army, it is hard to imagine it outside of politics. After all, in reality it exists as an attribute of politics.

As to de-party-ization, this is much simpler. The abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution affects the Army to the full extent. The Army is not the tool of the party. The Army is the tool of the people, the tool of the state.

As to my personal position on de-party-ization, I firmly believe that the Communists in the Army and the Navy are the golden reserve of its combat capability. They serve at the most responsible posts of the military organism, and they carry on their shoulders such burdens that others cannot even imagine. It is known to everybody that we only accept the best of the best in the CPSU ranks, no matter what some political turncoats say. Or those whom we, at some time, either have not accepted into the CPSU or have expelled them from its ranks. It is specifically the Communists who today cement the navy and army collectives, mobilizing them to carry out complicated tasks under incredibly hard conditions. As a member of the party Central Committee, I voted without hesitation to pass, at the recent joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the resolution "On Organization and Political Strengthening of the Party Organizations," which calls for resolute resistance to the ideas of depoliticization and de-party-ization, no matter where they emanate from.

I will especially emphasize that the CPSU structures in the Armed Forces will remain. This is in full compliance with the USSR Law "On Public Associations."

[Panyukov] In conclusion of this conversation—a question of a summarizing nature: What do you think will be the main result of the current military reform?

[Shlyaga] It will, without question, manifest itself in the continued strengthening of the defense capabilities of the country, in the creation of a legal mechanism for building the military, and in bringing the Armed Forces

in proportion to the level of real military danger, and new political, economic, and social conditions.

The accomplishment of these tasks is important for our entire society. This is why, as never before, we need social stability in all regions, and constant attention to the reliability of our defense and security of our country. Whether it is on the weekdays or the holidays, the Army has always been and will be with the people; it only serves the people's interests.

Baltic Army Association Issues Appeal to USSR Deputies

91UN0817A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
22 Dec 90 p 1

[“Appeal to the Fourth USSR Congress of People’s Deputies From Delegates of the Extraordinary Congress of the Army Community of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Kaliningrad Oblast”]

[Text] Esteemed People’s Deputies!

The sociopolitical and economic situation that has taken shape in the sixth year of perestroika in our country and its individual regions—particularly in the Baltic region—cannot be tolerated any longer! The progressive idea of a national rebirth of the peoples of the Baltic republics has been utilized by separatist forces to further their mercenary aims and has already put in jeopardy the rights and lives of hundreds of thousands of USSR citizens.

The constant calls of the extremists who forced their way to power: "Latvia for the Latvians!", "Lithuania for the Lithuanians!", "Estonia for the Estonians!", nonacceptance of others' way of thinking, imposition of what are in fact pro-fascist authoritarian regimes, attempts to resolve economic problems at the expense and to the detriment of the interests of workers—have exacerbated the environment of instability and led to an explosive situation in the region.

Especially alarming to us, professional military people, is the creation of militarized formations.

The Army community cannot simply observe these processes from the sidelines. Especially since the politicians of the Baltic governments continue their attacks on the Soviet Army and Navy, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR KGB, are adopting unconstitutional laws, and are grossly trampling upon the rights of servicemen and their family members, workers and other employees of the Soviet Army, and veterans of the USSR Armed Forces.

Events taking place in the country and in the Baltic region have forced us, representatives of the Army community, to assemble at our first extraordinary congress and announce formation of the Union of Baltic Servicemen, whose goals are:

- to defend the integrity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the form that we, having taken an oath to the Motherland, have sworn to defend with our lives;
- to defend and unwaveringly observe the USSR Constitution;
- to defend the lives, honor, dignity, social, and political rights of servicemen and veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, employees of the Soviet Army, and members of their families.

Our congress unanimously advocates the signing of a new Union treaty by all the Baltic republics.

In the event republic governments refuse to conclude a treaty, we entrust the signing of this historic document to the Baltic people's deputies, who stand on the position of a united Union and express our will and interests.

Rejecting groundless assertions accusing the USSR Armed Forces of striving to achieve a military dictatorship, we express our support for measures taken by the USSR president to strengthen executive power and to restore law and order in the country.

The First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region appeals to you, esteemed people's deputies, and calls upon you:

- to undertake decisive measures to sever the activities of separatist and nationalist forces directed towards the disintegration of the USSR, and to not permit the further escalation of ethnic strife, or deterioration of the lives and security of Soviet people;
- to resolutely condemn any defamation of or discrimination against the USSR Armed Forces.

We call upon you to keep in mind the fate of millions of Soviet citizens of the Baltics who might tomorrow be added to the ranks of refugees.

Do not believe the hypocritical statements of newly arisen leaders that they express the will and views of the majority of the people. The truth can be shown only through a referendum, the conduct of which we fervently support.

Our common mission is not to allow further bloodshed, a task that requires immediate decisions—for tomorrow will be too late!

The First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region asks you to take into account the fact that, in the event decisive, concrete actions are not taken to provide order and political stability in the country as a whole, you compel us in the Baltic region to undertake all measures, up to extraordinary measures, to defend our rights and human dignity.

Adopted at the First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region.

Mothers' Committee Objects to Misrepresentation by Urazhtsev

*9JUM0222A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Dec 90 First Edition p 2*

[Article by V. Melnikova, press secretary of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers: "From the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers"]

[Text] The Committee of Soldiers' Mothers would like to use the means of mass information to bring to the attention of Soviet organizations and citizens, who are participating in the movement for the social protection of the rights of military servicemen, that the statements made by RSFSR Deputy V. Urazhtsev regarding our committee's request that he help organize an emergency congress of the soldiers' mothers do not correspond with reality.

As the participants in the movement of soldiers' mothers understand it, the USSR president's 15 November 1990 directive "Regarding measures for carrying out the recommendations of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers," is based upon recommendations and requirements developed by dozens of representatives from union republics, autonomous republics and 20 RSFSR cities on 6 and 7 September at the All-Union Forum of Soldiers' Mothers, which was entitled "Mothers Against Violence" and "What Sort of Army Do We Need?"

The directive extended to all organizations and participants in our movement the opportunity to conduct active, multifaceted work and to assist military servicemen and their families in cooperation with the deputies to speed up the passing of laws which reliably protect the life and health of soldiers and sailors and the interests of our society.

The organizers of the new congress are planning to summon those families who complained to the commission that was created in accordance with the President's Directive and once again to reduce the entire matter to hysterics, outcry, empty talk and a battle for illusory power over the people who had sought help.

We believe that, having made a mess of the issue of protecting the rights of military servicemen within his organization, 'Shchit [Shield],' V. Urazhtsev is attempting to use the moral high ground of the civil non-violent women's movement to achieve his own self interests.

The address of the Committee [of Soldiers' Mothers] is: 117418, Moscow, Tsyurupa Street, Building 15, Room 2, Apartment 80, the Coordinating Council.

Officers Lose Control of Troops in Inter-Ethnic Battle

9JUM0222B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "From Lvov: Shots on the Parade Ground"]

[Text] In one of the units there was conflict between persons of different nationalities. Prior to retreat an excited group, in which there were troops armed with clubs, shovel handles, and pen knives, assembled on the parade ground of the military base and a clarification of attitudes got underway.

The commander of the railroad battalion, the chief of staff and other officers from the unit arrived at the site of the troubles and ordered their subordinates to disperse and put an end to the disorder. However, the troops did not obey the commands.

At that time guard units were passing by the parade ground. In order to calm things down, the chief of staff ordered that warning shots be fired. However, even this did not have the desired effect. The situation grew worse and the guard units had to fire several rounds into the ground. There were no fatalities. But as a result of the conflict nearly 20 servicemen were wounded and sent to medical facilities in the city of Chop.

An investigation is now underway and the causes of the problem are coming to light. But it is already clear that inter-ethnic feuds, which have been introduced into the military collectives, are more and more often becoming serious problems for everyone. This incident is yet another confirmation of that fact.

Response on Changing Name of Journal COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

*91UM0222C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Dec 90 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with N. Koshelev, chief editor of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Should the Name of the Journal COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES be Changed?"]

[Text] The editorial board has received many letters in which readers are asking whether or not the name of the journal, COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, will be changed in a multiparty system when in accordance with the directive of the USSR president there must be a division of functions between the political and party organs.

Our correspondent asked this question of the chief editor of the journal, General-Major N. Koshelev. And here is his reply.

[Koshelev] In meetings with readers I have had to answer this complex question on several occasions. I explained that the problem is not in the name and that the popularity of the journal depends upon the content; the editorial board will do everything possible to ensure that the materials are interesting. But the influx of letters, at times containing ultimatums such as if you do not change the name we will not subscribe, continues unabated right up to the present. The readers explain their demand in the following manner: since the political

organs are losing the function of party oversight, why should a military-political journal, which was established by the Chief Political Directorate, continue to "torment the goose" with its old name?

We have learned that servicemen and USSR peoples' deputies, in particular, V. Alksnis, E. Gams, N. Petrushenko and others, have appealed to the minister of defense and the chief of the Chief Political Directorate regarding this problem. As concerns the request to change the name of COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, they favor putting the journal on the retail market. This is a good idea and we support it. After all, at present only those in the military know about the journal. At the same time we are receiving complaints: at several locations, particularly in the Baltic republics and the Transcaucasus, the journal is not reaching subscribers. Some readers report that the journal is being destroyed in place: clearly the name irritates some people.

And so, in the interest of this problem it is possible to think about changing the name. This matter is being worked on. But, even if the name is changed, this will not be some sort of concession or retreat from our principal position. In any event it will remain as it was before: the maximum amount of truth, depth and constructiveness on behalf of the army.

By the way, in their many letters the readers are suggesting possible new names for the journal, such as: ARMY, BANNER [STYAG], COMRADE IN ARMS [SORATNIK], OFFICER, COLLEAGUE [SOSLUZHIVETS], OATH OF ALLEGIANCE [PRISYAGA], FRONTIER [RUBEZH], and others. We will appreciate new suggestions.

Baltic Army Association Congress Focuses on Political Role

*91UN0817B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
24 Dec 90 p 1*

[Article by V. Varlamov: "A Decisive Statement of the Military"]

[Text] The final accord of the First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic resounded, unfortunately, on a sad note. Several hours after the Congress closed, there rang out another in the series of explosions that have rocked Riga in recent weeks. This time an explosive device was detonated at the Higher Military-Political Institute imeni Marshal Biryuzov.

Major General A. Sidorenko, the director of this institute, was one of the 20 individuals who delivered a presentation to the Congress. And it is a curious thing that one of the points of his speech elicited an entirely disapproving reaction from the audience. This occurred when the director of the educational institution proposed that the Army Community Coordination Center established by the Congress of the Union of Baltic Servicemen operate just

about "under the roof" of the Military Council and Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District. Naturally this proposal did not go forward. The response resounded from the hall: "If we need assistance from the generals, we will ask them for it and they will not refuse." (Members of the Center—the highest leading organ of the Servicemen's Union during the period between congresses—comprise more than 30 individuals, none of whom are generals.)

The Servicemen's Union and its Coordination Center formed by the Congress are disposed towards specific, constructive work. What work? This, too, was discussed at the representative forum of servicemen.

Major V. Lukin delivered a detailed report on the complex sociopolitical situation that has taken shape in the Soviet Baltic republics. In particular, he stressed that one obstacle remained in the path of an actual change of regime in the territory of the Baltic republics—the Army. It is precisely for this reason that in final months of last year, taking into account nuances in the external and internal life of the country, the Armed Forces have taken center stage in the political game of the newly emerged politicians in the Baltic republics.

We must present things in their proper perspective—there is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a state, for which the Armed Forces exist to protect its territorial integrity. We demand that the USSR Government and those of the Union republics proceed from this. All matters involving the state structuring of the country must be resolved according to procedure as established by its laws. Only then will the Army and law enforcement organs be able to fulfill their duty obligations in accordance with the law. The Armed Forces do not interfere in the internal affairs of another state, but participate in the political life of their own country as citizens enjoying full rights. And the actions of legislators contrary not only to the USSR Constitution, but to normal, sound, human logic as well, have compelled them to actively engage in this.

An analysis of events in the region shows that we are heading straight for armed conflict. Explosions are ringing out in various regions of the country that, for the time being, are affecting people only in a moral sense. A hatred has arisen in a portion of the population of everything Soviet and communist. This has become the norm on the governmental level. It is our duty to prevent the further development of events in this direction, to demand in the interests of the entire population that the country's leadership, the president, establish law in the territory of the state. The Armed Forces are ready to act as guarantor of the tranquility and security of the entire population regardless of nationality, social origins, or religious beliefs.

The question of separation of the Baltic republics from the Union must be resolved by the people residing in the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and not by their Supreme Soviets.

The address of Senior Warrant Officer P. Ubelitis, which devoted central attention to the present situation in Latvia and characterized it as explosive, was received with great attention. The anti-Army hysteria we see today sets as its aim, in the final analysis, placement of the Army and the people in confrontation with one another. It is according to precisely this design that most of the Latvian mass media are presently operating. Journalists representing the media present their views as the absolute truth, the verdict of final instance. Any competing pronouncement is immediately met with obstruction. But the ordinary person is not always capable of delving into swift-moving events and may, under the influence of emotions, give in to those appeals, which turn out to be false in the final analysis, not bringing the people anything but disaster.

Major General A. Vodopyanov, first deputy director of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, noted especially in his address the fact that the Congress of the Army Community was not an ordinary, regular assembly of military servicemen, but a special form of political protest. The initiative for its convocation issued not from the district leadership, but from below—from officers and warrant officers, cadets and enlisted men. Things are so painful, so agitating, that we cannot be silent any longer. We must act. And not only to protect ourselves, but also to prevent the collapse of the state—the USSR.

One speaker after another took the podium. Captain A. Ganzhenko, Colonel V. Kostin, Lieutenant A. Talanov, Major General V. Filatov, Captain V. Degtyarev, and other officers were unanimous in one point—that today it has become evident that we are too close to the border beyond which the concept of "life" is to be understood in its absolute literal meaning. To further be silent—would be criminal.

Militia Colonel N. Goncharenko and OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment] Militia Captain Yu. Chigvintsev addressed the congress concerning the complex state of affairs Latvian Militia personnel find themselves in as a result of the splitting of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs.

Also among those speaking before the Congress of the Army Community were **I. Lopatin**, chairman of the Coordination Council of USSR Intermovement; retired Major General I. Osadovskiy; A. Kasmynina, former Hitler death camp prisoner; S. Marinkevich, Armed Forces veteran; and others. All these individuals expressed their solidarity with and support for the actions being taken by the Army community.

Congress participants adopted a resolution that, in particular, echoes the military's demand to the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia: to suspend all adopted anti-Army legislative enactments; to conscientiously fulfill all provisions and decisions previously adopted jointly with organs of the Army community; to put an immediate stop to the campaign underway in the

mass media of blackmail, defamation, and abuse directed towards the Army and Navy, MVD, and KGB troops, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and of the USSR Armed Forces; and to not discuss in the future acts and decisions that directly or indirectly affect the fate of servicemen, members of their families, workers and other employees, or veterans, without the participation of authorized representatives of the Army Community Coordination Center of the Union of Baltic Servicemen.

The Army Community also adopts Appeals to the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies (published in the 22 December issue of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA), to military servicemen of the USSR, and to the inhabitants of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

PVO Main Staff Party Conference on RSFSR Draft Constitution

*91UM0326A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Jan 91 First Edition p 4*

[V. Prokhorov: "The Broken Tie."]

[Text] The party meeting of the Main Staff of the Troops of the PVO discussed the draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation developed by the RSFSR Constitutional Commission. The participants of the meeting moved that the resolution adopted by them be sent to you with the request that you bring it to the attention of those communists who are People's Deputies of the USSR and RSFSR.

V. Prokhorov,
Secretary of the Party Committee of the Main Staff of
the Troops of the PVO

From the Resolution

It was resolved:

1. To define the position of communists with respect to the draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation developed by the Constitutional Commission of the RSFSR.

The position of communists of the Main Staff of the Troops of the PVO.

The communists of the Main Staff of the Troops of the PVO express their alarm and concern that in the course of the development of the socio-political processes in the country, no one has pointed out that dangerous boundary beyond which lies the possibilities of basic changes in the socio-national structure of the USSR that would have the most dire consequences. The draft of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, developed by a working group and a group of experts from the Constitutional Commission of the RSFSR, is viewed by us as an attempt to determine the character and direction of these changes.

The fact that they are, in essence, anti-socialist, anti-union, and anti-democratic is shown by a number of

articles in the draft which, by their terminology and content decisively break the tie with the past history of the Soviet Socialist State, announce that the basis will be the economy of the private employer, create grounds for an actual disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the break-up of its Armed Forces, and formulate a legal basis for refusing to adhere to the Soviet form of public ownership in favor of the establishment of a regime of personal power.

Adopting this kind of Constitution as the Basic Law of the RSFSR will bring an end to the Soviet socialist period of societal development and to the Union of SSR as an indivisible state. It will consolidate capitalist socio-economic relationships, with all the consequences that this would bring.

The authors of the draft and the powers that stand behind them, ignoring the socialist goals of perestroika that have been repeatedly confirmed by our country's leaders, are attempting to force upon the Soviet people their own concepts about our social structure.

While declaring that when the Constitution is adopted they will guarantee civil peace and national agreement, they are doing just the opposite. They are pushing this matter to a polarization of forces and further confrontation in society. This is especially dangerous at the present time, when a real consolidation of all strong forces is indispensable in order to lead the country out of the crisis blocking the path of perestroika, democratization, and socialism.

In turning to the People's Deputies of the RSFSR, we ask them to approach the examination of this draft with the full realization of their historic responsibility for the future of a great country and its people, who have endured so much suffering.

Supsov Committee's Sharin Talks to General Staff

*PM0402135591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Direct Line": "Meeting at General Staff"]

[Text] Moscow—Generals, admirals, and officers of the Armed Forces General Staff have had a meeting with L.V. Sharin, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions.

The upcoming fifth session of parliament, L.V. Sharin said, will examine several draft Laws connected with defense and the Army. These are the concept of the military reform, the Laws on the status of the serviceman and on defense, and a number of others. One of the most important questions whose resolution is monitored by the committee is the withdrawal of our troops from East European countries.

The questions put to Leonid Vasilyevich mainly concerned precisely these problems, and he answered them with the utmost frankness. It is no coincidence that it was decided to hold such meetings regularly.

Covert Demonstration Attendance 'Rumors'
*91UM0373A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 7, Feb 91 p 8*

[Report by A. Irinov]

[Text] Servicemen have been coming to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, and one of them has introduced himself as a senior officer at the USSR Ministry of Defense, asking us not to give his name. He reported the following: On 11 February, there was a meeting of the heads of all the military educational institutions of Moscow, summoned by General of the Army M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff. They were supposedly given an order obligating them to disguise the personnel subordinate to them in civilian clothing and on 23 February to send them out together with their families to a rally in support of the CPSU, the political orientation of the president of the USSR and the Union administration, and the military. General Moiseyev required the military commander of Moscow, as our anonymous source reported to us, to indicate the number of servicemen who would be able to attend the rally in civilian clothing. Supposedly because of this verbal order the personnel of the military educational institutes were refused the right to leave the capital during the holiday of Soviet Army and Navy Day.

According to rumors, the Moscow Soviet has not permitted the rally to be held on Manezhnaya Square, that is, near the Kremlin. The disguised "demonstrators" intend to assemble not far from the Central House of the Soviet Army.

Our source said of himself only that he has served many years in the military, occupies a command position, and is a member of the CPSU. But as a result of his convictions he considers such actions by the military leadership to be provocative.

What kind of slogans are being prepared for this rally, if the rumors correspond to reality? Does this correspond to the interests of the officers and other servicemen disguised in civilian clothing?

And if their demands (the "voice of the people") include "presidential rule or a state of emergency in the country," will they be heard in the Kremlin? And there is one more question without an answer—will this not be one more scheme attributable to the infamous "Committee of National Salvation?"

* * *

In order to dispel or confirm these rumors, we sought out official representatives of military departments.

Myasnikov, officer of the USSR Ministry of Defense news center:

"I have heard nothing about it. The rumors are so unexpected that I do not know how else to answer. Ask at the Main Political Directorate. They should be able to answer you more clearly. Why should the chief of the General Staff conduct such meetings?"

Major General N. Rumyantsev, chief of the department of mass media of the Main Political Directorate:

"I do not know anything about it. I was not at any such meeting, and I have not heard of it. True, there has already been mention of it in the press. I believe that you should go to the USSR Ministry of Defense news center."

Major General G. Kashuba, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense news center:

"I do not have such information at my disposal. I can neither confirm nor deny it because I have heard nothing about it. It happens that newspapers print information from anonymous sources that later turns out to be unsubstantiated, and as a result they are discredited..."

We will see.

Working Groups To Support Union Referendum

*91UM0373B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "People in Uniform for Preserving the Union"]

[Text] A working group has been created in the Moscow Military District to prepare and conduct a referendum on the preservation of a union of soviet socialist republics. The group is headed by Major General A. Dudko, deputy chief of the district's military-political directorate. Members of the group have begun work publicizing the USSR law on universal suffrage in the country and organizing interaction between the Armed Forces and the local organs of power.

Similar working groups have been created in the district's military units.

Prosecutor Comments on Soldiers' Deaths

*91UM0338B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 5 Feb 91 First Edition p 2*

[Comments by Colonel of Justice L. Smertin, assistant chief military procurator; date not given: "Emotions Aside, Are the Complaints Against the Military Procuracy Legitimate?"]

[Text] The special commission created in keeping with the ukase of the USSR president of 15 November 1990 for verifying the objectivity and completeness of the investigation of the causes of the deaths and injuries of military

servicemen and military construction workers during peace time completed its work recently.

The results have not yet been made public, but certain conclusions and evaluations have appeared in the press. In particular the commission's chairman, USSR People's Deputy Yu. Kalmykov, reproached the military procuracy for "operating poorly."

The editors asked Colonel of the Justice Department L. Smertin, assistant chief military procurator, to comment on this.

"The sorrow of parents who have lost their sons is boundless, and there can be no compensation for this loss. As fellow humans we can understand their desire to know the circumstances and causes of the tragedies as well as their unwillingness to believe the official explanations of what happened. Therefore, workers of the military procuracy were grateful for the ukase of the USSR president concerning the creation of a special commission, and they counted on its objectivity. But, moreover, they hoped that it would delve not only into the legal issues of the investigations of specific cases but would also go into the conditions under which organs of the military procuracy operate. Alas, it would seem that the commission set different tasks for itself.

"Thus, judging from the interview for the newspaper *TRUD* by the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Yu. Kalmykov, it all boils down to the fact that the 'military procuracy is operating poorly.'

"Of course, everyone has the right to his own opinion regarding any issue, but in order to express it publicly, especially when it is so categorical, one must be concerned about arguments and facts, and also about evidence. Unfortunately, nothing was said about this in the interview.

"I can report that commission members demanded for study 107 criminal files which gave them doubts about the substantiation for decisions on them adopted previously. Having studied 72 of them by the time of the interview, they came to the conclusion that the decisions made regarding 14 of the cases should be overridden. Let us say that after further investigation some of them were changed. Nobody is immune from mistakes. But even then, to assert that the military procuracy is operating poorly is unfair, to say the least. And this is why.

"The cases that were studied were taken from a period of several years when the military procuracy had to investigate tens of thousands of criminal cases involving less dangerous and complicated crimes. And this was with the clearly imperfect inquiry system that exists in the Armed Forces, the complete absence of operational search services, and a chronic shortage of personnel. Moreover, the investigation is only one of the areas of the activity of the procurator organs. Monitoring military officials' obedience of the law, protecting the rights of military servicemen, and the fight against arbitrary

command—these are the priorities in our activity. Is it possible to make such a categorical generalization without taking these aspects of the activity of the military procuracy into account?

"I am convinced that the majority of the commission members, within the limits of their training, level of legal knowledge, and their own ideas of justice, tried to perform the work entrusted to them conscientiously. But I cannot but note that in order to make a competent judgment about the completeness of the investigation of a specific criminal case and the legality and justification for the decision that was made, it is still necessary to be a legal expert. But it seems that there were not very many legal experts on the commission, and representatives of the USSR Procuracy, including the military procuracy, had practically no votes.

"Of course, the requirements of the legal procedure do not apply to the commission's activity, but still one should probably take elementary considerations of objectivity into account when selecting its members. In any case, if the commission includes the parents of deceased servicemen and the legal experts recommended by them, it is difficult to speak about a lack of prejudice. In this connection one is also alarmed by the proposal made by the commission to create such a situation on a permanent basis. In a rule-of-law state, such a thing is simply impossible in principle.

"I think everyone can see the positive results of the committee's activity for the soldiers' mothers at whose request the commission was created. If we set emotions aside, this movement contains within it a good deal of constructive energy. The only thing that is a pity is that the commission did not protect itself from the influence of those who are trying to take advantage of the mothers' sorrow for purposes that have little to do with clarification of the truth."

'Shchit' Pursues Ties With NATO Officers

*91UM0338A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Feb 91 First Edition p 2*

[Article by N. Komov: "How Will the Acquaintanceship End?"]

[Text] The cold war is receding into the past. Trust is becoming a more and more appreciable factor in relations between NATO countries and countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In addition to contacts between official military representatives, informal ties have been developing more and more rapidly. In December of last year the leaders of the international alliance of organizations of military servicemen of European countries, Euromil, visited the second congress of Shchit, the union for the social protection of military servicemen, armed formations, and their families. The result of the meeting was a resolution for Shchit to become a part of Euromil.

How will the acquaintanceship started between Euromil and Shchit end? And who stands to gain more from it? Of course, it is a business matter whether or not the NATO military servicemen's union will accept our informal organization as a part of it. Shchit, of course, would like that. The more so since the proposed cooperation could also promise significant financial gains. But it is known that the only place to find free cheese is in a mousetrap.

At the congress the opponents of Shchit said that it is being transformed into a "military-political party." Perhaps many of the signs indicate this. Moreover, this "party" is not completely legal. In the words of Shchit Chairman V. Urazhtsev, a certain number of military servicemen (it is not known exactly how many of the 22,000 members) belong to the organization with the status of "secret members." Of course, one can assume that the "military and political ambitions" of the Shchit leaders and the recognition of the existence of "secret members" will cool the desire of the Euromil leadership to accept this organization into its union, but what if this were to happen? Perhaps some people would be interested in precisely this?...

Statistics on Servicemen Leaving the CPSU

91UM0346B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

[Information obtained from the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy: "The Armed Forces: Party Statistics"]

[Text] *How many communist servicemen, workers, and employees of the Soviet Army left the ranks of the CPSU, and how many joined the party in 1990?*

[Signed] YU. ZORIN, serviceman.

As is known, questions concerning party building are transmitted by party organs to the party committees. Thus, the year that just transpired was the latest that information of this kind was summarized. In 1990, 41,474 persons were admitted to membership in the CPSU. The number of those admitted to the party in comparison with those who left it voluntarily exceeds 19.8 percent.

Of the party replenishment, 35.4 percent are officers, 6.3 percent are warrant officers, petty officers, and extended service servicemen, and about 45 percent are military training school cadets.

Among those admitted into the ranks of the CPSU, 99.4 percent have a higher, unfinished higher, and secondary education, and 96.7 percent are up to 30 years of age.

In 1990, in the USSR Armed Forces, 3.8 percent more were accepted in the ranks of the CPSU than was the case in the previous year.

New Kinds of Expertise Needed by Political Officers

91UM0346A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Nelyubov: "Military-Political Organs: The Kinds of Specialists That Are Expected in the Regiment"]

[Text] There are quite a few letters about military-political organs in the editorial mail. And most of all about personnel.

"New work will require people with new knowledge and new skills," writes Major V. Romashchenko. "There is a need for psychologists and sociologists, and for lawyers and information specialists. But where do you get them?"

"Military-political schools are undergoing a respecialization, and new courses are being introduced in the VPA [Military Political Academy] imeni Lenin. All of this is fine. But when will they graduate specialists? And these sociologists are needed in the troops now," Lieutenant Colonel A. Berdyaga echoes him.

Difficult questions. The author of the correspondence presented for your consideration reflects on the capabilities of the universities of Marxism-Leninism to resolve the personnel problems.

The political directorate of our military district was among the first to propose a reorganization of the universities of Marxism-Leninism (UML) in educational centers for the retraining of officers-political workers in new specialties.

The first such center was established on the basis of the Tashkent UML. It will train psychologists and specialists in sociolegal problems and relations with public organizations and movements.

The retraining program is designed for one month. It includes a basic subject, to which 70 percent of the training time is devoted, and additional subjects that will examine topical problems in the development of Soviet society, the Armed Forces, the fundamentals of Soviet military legislation, and questions on the theory and practice of international relations.

It has already become apparent in the preparations: There is a need for radical revision of our approaches to educational, methodological, and personnel work. And, most of all, of the attitude toward educational programs. Fresh ideas are needed.

We were helped by scholars and prominent specialists of the higher educational institutions of Tashkent. Thus, the program for the training of practical psychologists was compiled with the participation of Candidate of Psychological Sciences Docent L. Kokhlova, vice president of the association of practical psychologists of the Uzbek SSR. After assimilating this program, our graduate will be able to conduct career testing of servicemen

and psychological consultation, and, if necessary, he will be able to conduct psychological correction.

Members of the association are helping us in the development of methodological aids for the military psychologists. The system of subjects they proposed can become an important constituent part of the reformation of the system of training of military personnel.

The approach was also the same in the development of plans for the retraining of officers in other specialties. An active part in this was taken by Major General I. Furmanov, Colonel N. Leuchev, Lieutenant Colonel A. Shilov, and other officers of the political directorate of the district. A discussion on this subject is going on in the pages of the district newspaper FRUNZEVETS. As a result, a determination has been made of the concepts and directions of work of the district educational center under conditions of conducting military reform.

It is supposed that, along with the retraining of officers-political workers, the educational center, working as a structural part of the military-political directorate of the district, would be able to take part in increasing the qualification of the political staff, conducting training of candidates for advancement, carrying out methodological and theoretical training of group leaders of all forms of political training, and participating in the organization and conduct of various assemblies with all categories of servicemen.

Our center is taking the first steps. I think that the switch of the UML's to new programs is one of the means by which it will be possible to satisfy the requirement of military collectives for personnel with new qualification profiles. At least, for a start.

Tula Workers Reject Georgian Arms Deal

91US0316A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91
Second Edition p 6

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent N. Kireyev:
"Exchanging Mandarin Oranges for Rifles"]

[Text] Tula—Exchanging mandarin oranges for rifles—this is what the chairman of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers has proposed to the people of Tula.

The people of Tula have their own sort of anthem, with the words: "Tula has forged weapons over the centuries, she has herself come to resemble a rifle..." The author of these lines may turn out to be a prophet—the city of gun smiths, samovar-makers, gingerbread bakers, masters of all trades is coming more and more to look like the rifle in a Chekhov play that must be fired in the second act.

But the patience even of the "iron workers" has reached its limit. Can a normal, healthy man live for a month on 800 grams of so-called meat products, 200 grams of animal and vegetable oil, a half kilogram of macaroni and groats, a dozen eggs? The fact that the oblast was at one time loaded to the bursting point with defense and

chemical industry enterprises and not capable of feeding itself is a secret to no one. Many times the leadership here has turned to Moscow for help, but the "cry from the heart" has yet to be heard in Union circles.

But reaction was instantaneous to the private telegram sent to the president of the country, recently published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, by oblast soviet deputy N. Matveyev, foreman of a team of weapons plant sanitary engineers and a Social-Democrat: "The food problem in Tula is near-critical... The situation compels us to propose an initiative on the sale of Tula weapons to other regions of the country in exchange for food..."

I will refrain from commenting on this message. What is important is what happened afterwards. The plant and the deputy himself were flooded with letters and telegrams with proposals on "cooperation." Offered in exchange for arms were meat and dried mushrooms, furs and cognac, cranberries and salmon... But the hunters, fishermen, members of cooperatives, and lessees are no comparison whatsoever to Chairman of the Georgian Republic Council of Ministers T. Sigua, who, as has already been reported, officially requisitioned from N. Maslennikov, general director of the scientific-production association Tula Weapons Plant, 10,000 rifled sports weapons, 500 pistols, and 500 Kalashnikov automatic weapons with cartridges, "to protect state facilities of the republic."

"In exchange for the above-mentioned weapons," the Council of Ministers chairman writes, "we are offering an amount equal in value of foodstuffs, including meat, sausage, canned stew meat, condensed milk, canned fish, tobacco products, tea, fruits, and juices. Upon your assent, the above-mentioned products will be shipped immediately. We guarantee settlement of any price difference."

It is not a bad idea, of course, to provide canned stew meat and condensed milk to our fellow countrymen. But really—our weapons plants have not yet turned into a private concern!

The reaction of weapons manufacturers to the message from Tbilisi was dual in nature at first. Some felt the transaction was entirely apropos, especially in view of empty store shelves. Others stated categorically that although they were half starving, they did not want people "in hot spots" to die from their weapons. All the same, common sense prevailed. Not a single weapon made it to Georgia in response to T. Sigua's letter.

Tula residents were also disturbed at the fact that the Georgian Council of Ministers had decided to acquire an arsenal...out of the Union fund, from which the republic receives hundreds of thousands of tons of food products (except for tobacco, tea, fruits, and juices).

Georgian Legislation on National Guard

*91US0314A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
21 Feb 91 p 4*

[Article by V. Simonenkov: "Deserters Will Go Into the Guard?"]

[Text] The newspaper VESTNIK GRUZII—the publication of the republic's Supreme Soviet—has published a law on the introduction of amendments to the republic's Constitution. It deals in particular with the creation of military formations and the service to be carried out in them. In Article 30 it says that national military formations are obligated to defend the interests of the republic and repulse any aggression and civil war. A series of Supreme Soviet decrees have been adopted concerning conscription and the system for serving in the republic's internal forces-national guard.

The decree on conscription of youth in 1991 notes: "To satisfy the request of servicemen who have voluntarily left the ranks of the Soviet Army and to enlist them into

the ranks of the internal forces-national guard of Georgia." Citizens who have reached the age of 18 by the day of conscription and who do not have any right to an exemption will be conscripted into active service in these forces. The republic's television has already broadcast a report from an induction center where work has already begun. Training of the recruits will be conducted by militia employees and former servicemen.

It is believed that the president of the USSR will give an evaluation of the legislative acts adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia. As for the decision to enlist servicemen into the new formations who have voluntarily left their units, criminal proceedings will be brought against every instance of desertion from the ranks of the Soviet Army, we were informed at the Main Military Procuracy. In the event that they voluntarily return to their units, military commissariats, or military headquarters, the servicemen will be cleared of criminal charges.

Is that not worth considering?

Arbatov Writings on USSR Arms Spending Hit

*91UF0492A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Feb 91 First Edition p 5*

[Article by Captain First Rank Anatoliy Andreyev: "The Use of 'Public' Protests Against the Army or the Think Tank Director's Restructuring Hobby"]

[Text] While on an official overseas trip to Canada, G. Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute (ISKAN), had published in the newspaper OTTAWA CITIZEN (the issue for 13 December 1990) an article entitled "Obsolete Soviet Military Power Is Dangerously Draining the Economy." From the text it would seem that it dealt with the economy of the Soviet Union, but in spirit—take a broader look, reader. The venerable man of learning is well versed in the art of hints and half-tones. His wealth of experience accumulated at different times under different policies is reflected. We see him today in the ranks of those who constitute the "intellectual power" of the Russian leadership. But in recent times he shone among the retinue of the party and state elite, moved in a "narrow circle of particular persons," so to speak, and did a great deal of advising. A strict watch was kept over there on what he had to say in general. And none of it would have mattered had it not been for the excessive conceit and immodesty of the author of the above-mentioned publication in the Canadian press. Soviet people will undoubtedly familiarize themselves with this article of G. Arbatov's sooner or later. The trouble is, frankly, that foreign publications take so long to reach us! It makes sense, I believe, to keep those who are interested abreast of events.

G. Arbatov maintains that, thanks to his speech in the USSR Supreme Soviet a year ago proposing deeper cuts in the Soviet Union's military spending and the subsequent debate, Soviet citizens learned many things for the first time. I quote: "...Soviet people finally understood that it is we (the USSR—A.A.) who have superiority in the majority of types of conventional arms and a perfectly obvious superiority in strategic weapons." Further: "The Soviet public also learned for the first time that the Soviet Union's defensive doctrine is not necessarily correlated with the numbers and deployment of our armed forces." Continuing these at times categorical, at times nebulous premises, G. Arbatov extracts a sigh of relief from the Western reader with the confidential: "I do not wish to say that we intended or now intend to perpetrate aggression" and goes on to calm his soul: "I have not seen any reason why anyone would want to attack and conquer us."

After these "revelations," G. Arbatov draws the sacramental conclusion: "I never saw this clearly until I began to publicly oppose excessive military spending."

Academician G. Arbatov has chosen as his main scientific method getting at the truth by way of pronouncements in the foreign and Soviet press. It is immaterial that both the formulation of the problem and the

attempts to participate in its solution imply a command of the subject and reliable source information, the appropriate methodology, competence and, finally, ethics. It is hard to find many of these elements in the hypothetical one-sided overcounting of G. Arbatov on such a complex issue as the military spending of a great power.

Unfortunately, certain military comrades have found themselves pulled into the debate with G. Arbatov. Each speech of G. Arbatov, in which he wittingly or unwittingly makes essentially unsubstantiated attacks on the Soviet Armed Forces, is necessarily followed by a response, most often from Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, former chief of the General Staff and now military adviser to the president of the USSR. It is necessary, of course, in the name of the truth to set right, explain, bring to the notice of.... But it seems that G. Arbatov has long been astride his "favorite steed" and that for him this confrontation has become a mode of self-assertion and constant reminders of himself. The Arbatov-military slanging match is assuming a chronic nature.

It would seem to me and my service colleagues expedient to terminate the altercation with this academician. If he cares about the interests of the cause, not about the number of publications, G. Arbatov could defend his views in committees of the Supreme Soviet and the government and in the Ministry of Defense. Neither glasnost nor democracy have anything in common with groundless attacks on the Army. For my military comrades, on the other hand, the newspaper and journal duel with G. Arbatov cannot be deemed a successful application of defensive strategy.

Indeed, is it not a great honor—such constant attention to a doctor of historical sciences who has manifestly taken up what is not his field? Does anyone seriously believe it possible to solve many of our country's problems, economic primarily, at the expense of the security of the people and the state? The Armed Forces are a mold of society. Society's ills make a mark on the Army which is aggravated by the specific "ailments" of the latter. Much needs to be cured both in society and in the Army, cured by criticism, not carping, and, what is most important, specific action.

And, further. G. Arbatov is not alone, unfortunately, in his attacks on the Army. As a result of the vogue, inconceivable in civilized countries, for censuring the Armed Forces in one's own fatherland, a whole clan of abusers has formed. Some kind of "Army criticism specialists" and home-grown military reformers, who have imagined themselves adequately prepared for solving most complex questions of military organizational development. They are not probing but worming their way into military affairs and proposing, pointing out, advising, and demanding, but not ordering (yet!), thank God. We remember that there were times in our country in which there was the same abundance of agricultural specialists.

When one frequently encounters sweeping attacks on the Army and Navy, one has the impression that the illusion that "any cook could run the state" has been insufficiently debunked. It is a pity, incidentally, that our "conservative" press (according to G. Arbatov's classification, that which publishes the speeches of his opponents, like the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, for example) and the "most popular" publications (according to Arbatov) of the OGONEK type (which kindly and without restrictions makes its pages available for the compositions of G. Arbatov himself) rarely find room for a dialogue with ordinary people. But in letters to the leaders of the Union and the command of the USSR Armed Forces these citizens are demanding a halt to the disintegration of the Army and the attacks on it and demanding a high level of professionalism, fighting capability, and combat readiness of the Army and Navy.

Finally, I suggest an end to the correspondence with G. Arbatov for the reason that it is inspiring the academician to newer and newer works against the Army. Elements of self-publicity and disinformation are encountered in this stream of information being hurled at the readers. Sometimes G. Arbatov will attribute to himself credit for having torn down the "veil of secrecy" around the Soviet military-industrial complex in having initiated open discussion of questions of the USSR's military doctrine, military strategy, and military spending. Sometimes he will impose the Christian formula of a positive influence on one's opponents by the example of unilateral disarmament....

Soviet Academician G. Arbatov has resorted to the role of enlightener of the Soviet people, addressing it from the pages of the Western press in English with explanations on military issues. For the formulation of questions and the submittal of proposals it would have been logical to have expected G. Arbatov to have availed himself of the platform of the Soviet parliament and other mechanisms of the legislature and executive of his own country, as is done by other people's deputies. This would have been comprehensible to and would only have been welcomed by the Armed Forces. Our Army and its officer corps are no less interested than G. Arbatov in the speediest extrication of the country from the crisis and realization of the principle of a reasonable sufficiency for defense. But the academician prefers other methods.

In the majority of his publications on military problems G. Arbatov employs Western data on the Soviet Armed Forces. The absurdity of such a method is obvious. The result is criticism of our Army in a foreign voice, but with the signature of a Soviet scholar. The West has always been distinguished by the artificial spurring of the so-called "Soviet military threat," proportionate to which there has been a growth in its military spending and on the pretext of which it has not as of this time abandoned major programs of the qualitative modernization of its arms.

The institute which G. Arbatov heads is frequently called in the West a "leading Soviet brains trust" (literally,

"think tank"). Perhaps it is this "tank" which inspires the scholar—historian, political scientist, economist—to speeches on military matters, on which he cannot, even stretching the point, be considered a competent specialist. It is risky to associate the institute director wholly with the research institution itself, but G. Arbatov is published not as a private individual and not as a people's deputy of the USSR even but as director of the ISKAN. For this reason I have a desire at times to call G. Arbatov the director of the "American-Canadian Institute Incorporated" in the Soviet Union.

G. Arbatov's above-mentioned article in a Canadian newspaper presents a table on the numbers of arms of the Soviet Army and Navy and on the military spending of the Soviet Union (without reference to the source). If we take G. Arbatov's article at face value, we get the wrong impression of the "significant military superiority" of the USSR. Upon examination, it transpired that the table was filled mainly with figures taken from "The Military Balance. 1989- 1990" (a publication of the London International Strategic Studies Institute).

"The Military Balance" appeared practically simultaneously with the publication in the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (No. 288 of 16 December 1989) of a report of the USSR Defense Ministry which presents spending on defense in 1990 in general and by item, the numbers of the Armed Forces and the number of strategic nuclear weapons and the main types of conventional arms of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Both publications contain coincidences and differences in style, for which there are perfectly understandable reasons. It should be noted that, as distinct from the table in "The Military Balance" article, G. Arbatov provides more detailed and balanced information in respect of the list of arms. True, given the rounding up of individual components into a whole and into summary estimates, shape and color are confused, and apples and oranges are mixed together.

G. Arbatov prefers to avail himself not of the official data of the USSR Defense Ministry but of other sources. Although he had recently been complaining about the concealment of information on military matters from the people's deputies. See what the result of this is.

According to the report of the USSR Defense Ministry and in accordance with "The Military Balance," the Soviet Union's total military spending in 1990 constituted approximately 70 billion rubles, according to Arbatov, 138 billion dollars. Is there a difference, if we do not confine ourselves to the conversion of rubles into dollars at the official USSR State Planning Committee rate aimed at simpletons? I will show the present ruble situation by way of an example. To perform its assigned functions it is essential that a subunit of the General Staff (the "Army brain") purchase 20 new-generation computers. The order was given to industry. However, budget appropriations under the heading of purchases of this type of equipment have been halved as a consequence of the reduction in defense spending, and the

manufacturing enterprise has raised the prices of each such product threefold and does not guarantee delivery times. Instead of 20 new-type computers, the General Staff may acquire only three machines. The urgent need for the modernization of a crucial component of the safeguarding of the state's security is in danger of falling through. A mass of such examples could be cited. For what kind of economies is G. Arbatov campaigning? Who needs this and why?

The elementary decency of a citizen of one's country and of a scholar well provided for by this country presupposes that one would, if embarking on so crucial an issue, be punctilious to a degree and take account of the phenomenon's development trends. And the trends of the USSR's defense spending are diminishing. Compared with the preceding year, in 1990 this spending declined by more than R6 billion (8.2 percent). It is contemplated reducing the country's military budget in 1991 by R5-R7 billion (in real terms) (from the speech of the president of the USSR at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 27 December 1990). A boundless (according to Arbatov) reduction in Defense Ministry appropriations would not only complicate military organizational development based on the priority of qualitative parameters but would also hit painfully at the personnel. "Perhaps the Army should be disbanded altogether?" USSR President M.S. Gorbachev asked rhetorically at the congress. It seemed to me that this question was addressed primarily to G. Arbatov and his supporters.

Reading G. Arbatov's opus in the Canadian newspaper, I wanted to shout out: Don't believe it! The USSR's strategic bombers are not 630 but only 162, 97 aircraft of which are long-range cruise missile carriers (compared with 589 and 289 American bombers respectively). Whoever is interested in the real indicators of the correlation of forces, kindly take a look at the article by V.V. Korobushin, doctor of military sciences, in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for 9 January of this year. The highly qualified specialist in military affairs and honest individual shows convincingly that the oceans are not churning from the propellers of Soviet submarines and that armadas of our bombers are not covering the skies.

Other factors need to be seen behind the figures of the military balance also. A reduction in strategic and conventional arms is predetermined by agreements which are being drawn up and which have been reached between the USSR and the United States and the USSR and NATO. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact military organization has left the Soviet Union in the singular in the current balance of forces with Western countries. Behind the arithmetical correlation of forces and the quantities of arms we need to see and correctly evaluate the particular features of the military-geographic and military-strategic situation of the sides and other qualitative differences.

The USSR is the world's biggest continental power. There were until recently many who wished to test its

strength, mainly in continental military theaters. Whence the Soviet ground forces and their arms, which have traditionally been developed on a priority basis. In the sea theaters our Navy's operations are fettered by numerous antisubmarine barriers and narrows controlled by the U.S. Navy and the NATO Joint Naval Forces and their superior ship groupings. Our strategic aviation lacks forward air bases on foreign territory and does not have the fleet of heavy strategic bombers and tankers necessary for offensive operations.

It is in vain that G. Arbatov attributes to himself the pioneer's laurels. The Soviet defensive military doctrine was made public and the principle of a reasonable sufficiency for defense was advanced long before his speech in the Supreme Soviet. Military doctrine, as the system officially adopted in a given state of scientifically substantiated views on the nature of possible wars of the contemporary era and the forms and methods of fighting them and also on the preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for such wars, may be amplified and formulated even more specifically in a compressed timeframe, as was the case in 1987. The more so in that serious reworking was not required. Soviet military doctrine has always been defensive in nature. Restructuring individual components of the military organism with its human and material resources just as promptly is simply inconceivable. Everything has its own timeframe and its own conditions and, once again, enormous expenditure. It is easy to criticize this and to try to be clever with unbalanced proposals.

I somehow cannot call to mind an occasion when G. Arbatov or his institute proposed any version, not an optimum one even, of the solution of the socioeconomic and other problems arising upon reductions in the Armed Forces. If only they were to share the American experience.

Defensive doctrine does not in itself serve as a panacea for all threats and dangers. Defensive doctrine complicates and in certain periods of time increases the costs of military organizational development. This might be incomprehensible merely to the schoolboy, perhaps. Military science, incidentally, has in all countries long known that any adjustments to doctrine require a restructuring of many components of the military mechanism; the real and potential threats and dangers have to be taken into consideration to the maximum extent in strategic planning. The criterion of the maximum possible danger is the sole dependable criterion for an approximation of all surprises and uncertainties and the timely preparation of the country and the Army for warding off aggression. The immediate threat of war is, to all appearances, becoming a thing of the past. But the danger of aggression and the unleashing of a war by individual states and the involvement in it of other countries persists. There is no alternative to the new political thinking. But history teaches vigilance. The events in the Persian Gulf have taught an entirely fresh lesson.

It makes no sense going on, these are axioms of warfare. Were Academician G. Arbatov to scientifically prove the size of the military budget sufficient for the USSR, find and substantiate potential for a reduction in military spending, and advocate the elimination of obsolete arms, he would surely be paid close heed in the Army. Unspecific and unsubstantiated proposals and the indiscriminate criticism of his sympathizers in general are not allowed in the military milieu. Officers of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and of all components of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union have drained in full the entire bitterness of the service difficulties and day-to-day disarray ensuing from the shortage of funds. With interest. We are individually and all together opposed to a return to the times of "cold" and "hot" war. But we are first and foremost for a situation in which we do not have to feel sorry for the state. For a strong, prosperous, independent, and peaceable state, but one that is also capable of standing up for itself, if necessary.

P.S. In the event of publication, the author asks that his fee be given to the Afghan Veterans Assistance Fund.

Reassignment: Lt-Gen Grekov

*91UM0218A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 90
(Signed to press 23 Aug 90) p 67*

[Unattributed report: "Lt Gen Grekov Designated First Deputy Commander, Transcaucasus Military District"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Yuriy Pavlovich Grekov has been assigned to the position of first deputy commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District.

He was born on 13 September 1943 into a white collar worker's family in the settlement of Kulotino, Okulovskiy Rayon, Novgorod Oblast. After completing his secondary education, he worked as a lathe operator in a plant located in Leningrad Oblast. He subsequently graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Combined Arms School imeni S. M. Kirov (1966), Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze (1974), and the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

He served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (Western Group of Forces), and in the Transbaykal, Transcaucasus, Leningrad, Baltic, and Turkestan Military Districts. For more than 30 months he performed his internationalist duty in the Republic of Afghanistan.

He has served as motorized rifle platoon leader and company commander; deputy commander and chief of staff of a motorized rifle regiment; commander of a motorized rifle training regiment; motorized rifle division chief of staff and commander; chief of staff and first deputy commander of an army, including the 40th Army. For more than two years he commanded a guards army.

Russian in nationality, he has been a member of the CPSU for more than 23 years.

He has been awarded the Red Banner Order; Order of the Red Star (twice); Red Banner Order, Republic of Afghanistan; and many other Soviet and foreign medals.

He was promoted to the ranks of major (1975); lieutenant-colonel (1976); colonel (1980), all sooner than the normal progression. He stepped up to the rank of major-general in February 1983 and lieutenant-general in October 1989.

He is married. His wife, Vera Nikolayevna, was born in 1946. She is Russian in nationality, a native of the town of Petrodvorets, Leningrad Oblast. Their daughter works as a nurse in a polyclinic; their son is a cadet in the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni M. V. Frunze.

Replies to KVS Questions

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What do you think is the cause of the attacks being made on the Armed Forces?

[Grekov] On the one hand, this is due to our often inviting critical attacks by virtue of our thoughtless behavior, decisions, and acts. What is required here is for everyone, from ordinary soldier to general, to avoid taking any kind of thoughtless action, to hold himself more accountable. On the other hand, one cannot fail to notice a trend in attitude toward the Army and Navy. There are people who wish to exaggerate the negative and ignore the good that the Armed Forces are doing in the interests of society. To put it briefly, someone sees a clear advantage to waging an antiarmy campaign.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What to you is the best kind of friendship?

[Grekov] That formed during combat, the kind that is forged by frontline tests. For me this means Afghanistan. But I value friendships I made in my youth, also. They are more pure, selfless, open; their strength does not wane with the years. Friends one acquires in one's youth are true friends.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] If you had not taken up a military career, what other career would you have followed?

[Grekov] That is hard to say—so much time has passed. As a child I dreamed of becoming an explorer. I liked the idea of travelling, of wandering from place to place. I could say that my dreams have fully come true in the form of my Army service.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What is your favorite song?

[Grekov] There are many. They are songs of my youth, of the Civil War, the Great Patriotic War. Some of them are in I. Kobzon's repertoire. I like listening to him very much.

ARMED FORCES

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[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What would you like to see happen to you as a person?

[Grekov] In my personal life, for my children to grow up to be good, honest, and sincere. In my official life, for success in managing tasks with which I am charged, and in this post for being of utmost usefulness to people in defending our Fatherland.

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Reassignment: Lt-Gen Kurinnyy

*91UM0218B Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19,
Oct 90 p 69*

[Unattributed report: "Lt Gen Kurinnyy Designated Chief of Space Units Political Directorate"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Igor Ivanovich Kurinnyy has been designated a member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate for Space Units of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was born on 6 June 1938 into a white collar worker's family in the settlement of Bannoye, Slavyanskiy Rayon, Donetsk Oblast. He graduated from the First Leningrad Artillery School (1958) and the Military Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin (1967). After graduation from the school, for 12 months he commanded a gun platoon in the Belorussian Military District and was elected secretary of the regimental Komsomol organization. He subsequently served as assistant political section chief for Komsomol work, senior instructor of the Komsomol work section, and first deputy chief of the Political Directorate, Strategic Missile Forces, for Komsomol work.

In 1971 he was assigned as chief of a divisional political section; in 1975, first deputy chief of an army political section; in 1978, he was designated a military council member and assigned as army political section chief. For more than five years he performed party political work in space units.

Ukrainian in nationality, he has been a CPSU member for 30 years. He was elected a member of a gorkom bureau and CPSU obkom; a delegate to the 27th and 28th party congresses, 19th All-Union Party Conference, and Inaugural Congress (Communist Party) of the RSFSR. He was a deputy at a republic soviet of people's deputies.

He was awarded the Order of the October Revolution (1986); Order of Labor Red Banner (1974); the order For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, 3rd Class (1981); and many Soviet and foreign medals.

He was promoted to the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and colonel sooner than the normal progression. He assumed the rank of major-general in 1979; lieutenant-general, in 1984.

He is married. His wife, Andzhela Nikolayevna, was born in 1942. Russian in nationality and a CPSU member, she is trained as a pharmacist.

Replies to KVS Questions

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What qualities in people do you value the most?

[Kurinnyy] Decency, devotion to work, and a willingness to render assistance without hesitation. I do not like people who make a show of their official position and act so rudely as to humiliate subordinates.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What question do you ask yourself most often?

[Kurinnyy] I am constantly bothered by two questions. The first is: Am I satisfied with how I handled the particular problem? The answer more often than not is "no." I could do better. The second is: Why have people become so cruel and inhuman?

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What kind of progress do you think perestroyka is making in the Armed Forces?

[Kurinnyy] Perestroyka is associated with military reform, and within that framework much has already been accomplished. Nevertheless, there is cause for criticism. Specifically, there still are some conservative people hanging onto their formidable positions. They feed their chiefs the old dogmas and do not keep their word. That kind of person is an obstacle to progress.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In your view, should anything in the structure of political organs be changed?

[Kurinnyy] That question was answered at the 28th CPSU Congress. Since the CPSU pursues its policies in the Armed Forces via elective party organizations, they should be removed from the structure of the political organs. The political organs should be endowed with state status, with their functions defined so that they are fully capable of dealing with problems of moral, legal, and psychological education and social protection of servicemen. In their system, there is an apparent advantage to retaining accountability of lower organs to those higher, while rendering the Main Political Directories of the Soviet Army and Navy accountable to the President or Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What is your favorite form of relaxation?

[Kurinnyy] I like books, fishing, and sports very much, and am a big fan of my son, who is a master of sports in sambo. He is a champion of the Soviet Union; he performs often in major competitions.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How do you feel about being the object of personal criticism?

[Kurinny] To tell you the truth, I take it very hard. Although I do not like criticism, I realize that it is a driving force and, if ignored, we will not be able to get rid of our mistakes.

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Reassignment: Lt-Gen Lopata

91UM0218C Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19,
Oct 90 p 69

[Unattributed report: "Lt Gen Lopata Designated First Deputy Commander in Chief, Northern Group of Forces"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Anatoliy Vasilyevich Lopata has been assigned to the position of first deputy commander in chief of the Northern Group of Forces.

He was born on 23 March 1940 into a worker's family in the village of Rozhev, Makarovskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast. (His father was killed in action at the front.) He went to work immediately after completing his secondary education, as a parquet installer in a specialized construction administration of Glavkievstroy. In October 1959 he was called up for military service, attending an ordnance artificer school for a year and then serving another year as a senior ordnance artificer. He subsequently was admitted into the second year of study at the Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School. Graduating with a gold medal, he was then assigned to the GSFG (Western Group of Forces). He served as rifle platoon leader, senior adjutant to an army commander, then as motorized rifle company commander.

After graduating from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, he served in the Odessa Military District, in the positions of motorized rifle battalion commander; chief of staff, then commander of a motorized rifle training regiment; motorized rifle division deputy commander. He subsequently attended the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, after which he took command of a motorized rifle division, subsequently an army corps.

A Ukrainian in nationality, he became a CPSU member in March 1963. He was elected a deputy to city and rayon soviets of people's deputies.

He was awarded the Red Star Order (1989) and the order For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces, 2nd Class (1982) and 3rd Class (1975), and many medals.

He was promoted to the ranks of major, lieutenant-colonel and colonel sooner than the normal progression. Assuming the rank of major-general in October 1986, he stepped up to the rank of lieutenant-general in June 1990.

He was married in 1965. Nadezhda Andreyevna, his wife, was born in 1942. A Ukrainian, she comes from a large family. Their son is an officer in the Soviet Army. Their daughter is studying in the Foreign Language Department of the Khabarovsk Pedagogical Institute. They have a grandson.

Replies to KVS Questions

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What do you like about army service?

[Lopata] The fact that its purpose is to defend our people, our nation. That is a noble mission.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What do you do when you encounter difficulty handling a particular problem?

[Lopata] I ask the people with whom I work for advice. I do not hesitate, asking straightway: What shall we do? Let us put our heads together on this. I have never had this approach fail.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What can you do without as a person?

[Lopata] Quite a bit. Mostly anything that infringes upon those close to me: relatives, friends, comrades, fellow servicemen. I attune my wishes to their needs.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] When do you work with the periodical press?

[Lopata] Mostly at home, after work. If I have time, in the car, since I must travel quite a bit.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Do you tell your wife about your successes and failures?

[Lopata] As a rule, I tell her about my successes, while the shortcomings and errors I may suffer I try to keep to myself, so as not to upset her.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] What do you do for entertainment?

[Lopata] I like very much to make things with my hands, do carpentry work, and tinker with machinery. Sometimes I write poetry. Mostly for friends.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] For the wife, too?

[Lopata] For her, also.

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Lt-Gen Katusev Interviewed on Social Protection, Criminality

*91UM0217A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20,
Oct 90 pp 34-45*

[Article by Lieutenant General of Justice Aleksandr Filippovich Katusev, main military procurator and USSR deputy procurator general, under the rubric: "A Reader Conducts an Interview": "The Law Must Work"]

[Text] About the Author: Katusev, Aleksandr Filippovich. Born in Belorussia in 1939. Graduated from a law institute. He has been working in procuracy organs since 1964. Class rank: State adviser of justice first class.

The crime growth rate in the country and in the army, lack of social protection of people, including servicemen, and interethnic conflicts.... As letters to the editor demonstrate, the readers of our magazine are quite alarmed by these and many other negative phenomena. Their letters contain quite a few questions that relate to the jurisdiction of organs tasked to insure the rule of law. Lieutenant General of Justice Aleksandr Filippovich Katusev, main military procurator and USSR deputy procurator general, answers these questions.

How can we assess the crime situation in the country and in the Armed Forces today? What is most characteristic of it?

Colonel A. Alekseyev, Moscow

The total number of crimes, group and recidivist crime, and violations of the law among minors in the country is increasing. Work to solve crimes and to reeducate law-breakers is unsatisfactory. Without going into particulars, let us say that in 1989 nearly 1.9 million people committed crimes but only 0.3 million were sentenced to actual imprisonment or to suspended sentences with mandatory work. Consequently, over 80 percent of the total number of individuals who committed crimes remained free. The situation is similar this year. I will point out that the criminal environment is actively using interethnic conflicts and the difficulties of the economic and political transformation of society for its own purposes.

Crime in the Armed Forces fundamentally differs in nature but these same trends are inherent to its dynamics although they are being manifested with a certain delay. Crime growth rates in the state were higher in the first half of last year but are now slowing down. The number of law-breakers in the Armed Forces had begun to increase by the end of 1989 and the growth rates are still relatively high at the present time. At the same time, we need to point out that if the level of crime among servicemen was almost equal to the level of crime in the country and totaled 94 percent of it in 1985, by the end of last year it was more than 1.5 times lower. And still more. Ninety five percent of the growth in the number of

law-breakers is due to conscripted servicemen mainly through whom negative trends from civilian life are introduced into the Army.

Absence without leave accompanied by theft of state and personnel property, weapons, and crimes against civilians predominate among the crimes [committed]. The number of violations of regulations in the performance of sentry duty, cases of careless handling of firearms, careless performance of duty, and abuse of job position have increased among purely military crimes.

Statements have been made more than once at the highest level about the fact that we will put an end to dedovshchina [hazing of conscripts] in the army and in the navy, but.... Why is this hideous phenomenon so hard to change? In your opinion, what effective ways do we have to combat it?

Major D. Kushnir, Transcaucasus Military District

I think we need to search for answers to both questions in the determination of what we usually call dedovshchina and in legal language "violations of regulations of interrelations among servicemen in the absence of subordinate relations between them." This phenomenon is the activities of soldiers that are directed at creating a system of unfounded privileges for themselves at the expense of others. And this is not necessarily associated with soldiers' differences based on service experience, ethnic origin, or with clannishness. Simply speaking, the power of the fist and oppression of coworkers exists where the force of normal regulators of relations has been weakened: Laws, regulations, and commanders' fairness. Therefore, the opportunity also arises to distribute the load of daily military labor according to the whims of the most impudent informal authority, physically strong person, or the one who enjoys the support of others.

It is no secret that in recent years troops are increasingly being diverted from military training and service to all manner of economic, utility, and construction work. Here the force of regulations as regulators of relations is being weakened and some economic stimuli and work legislation are absent.

The sergeants corps' loss of part of its role and the qualities of young commanders is another factor here. Many years of verbal harangues on this subject have not restored their key position in maintaining military order to sergeants, first sergeants, and warrant officers. We need to immediately reexamine the justly criticized procedures for selecting candidates at training subunits that train young commanders. Judging by military press articles, a new effective system has not been developed.

In my opinion, dedovshchina's ability to survive is also caused by formal-bureaucratic approaches when measures are taken against commanders for their subordinates' offenses. Hence the attempt of certain commanders to assign an occurrence to the minor conflict category and to remove it without official publicity. Here the commander's distinctive psychological dependence on the violator arises and even preserves [conditions] for recidivism.

This year the number of criminal violations of regulations of mutual relations among servicemen continues to be reduced but it still totals a weighty part—9.7 percent—in the total structure of violations of the law. Elimination of the factors mentioned above would promote the establishment of military order.

Effective methods to combat dedovshchina are open investigation in the collective of each incident of a violation of the law and the preconditions to it and also active use of the right to needed defense.

The latter is not altogether easy. During the first six months of 1990, 10 persons who offended someone were killed in response for their criminal encroachments. Each case provided an identical assessment. A serviceman is justified in defending himself and others and is not held responsible for an active rebuff which naturally should not have anything in common with mob law or revenge.

What I have said does not settle the issue because only the issues have been touched upon but not the causes of this disgraceful phenomenon. The army does not give rise to this or transfer it to schools and PTU's [vocational and technical schools] or to educational and remedial colonies. On the contrary, the army is forced to help many young men to rid themselves of unattractive qualities that are ingrained in them prior to conscription for military service: Dishonesty, self-interest, lack of respect for labor, tendencies toward a free-ride mentality, nationalism, and moral and legal nihilism. We do not always succeed in reeducating such people. A personality is formed from childhood and here compulsory military service is only a small and not very important stage. Consequently, only our common efforts can bring about radical changes.

The army and navy suffer losses even during peacetime. Young people become invalids and die as a result of accidents and crimes. These are not only great misfortunes but also perceptible attacks on the prestige of the Armed Forces. What does the military procuracy intend to do about this?

Major S. Porokhov, Leningrad Military District

I assume that Major Porokhov is interested not in information about sentencing guilty parties or in procurators' verification of fulfillment of the law on protection of life and health although the procuracy functions are legally exhaustive in the prevention of so-called "non-combat losses" of Armed Forces personnel. The procuracy is doing everything necessary because we really are talking about insuring man's most basic right—the right to life. But we are not satisfied with the results.

I know that the USSR Minister of Defense personally reviews each message about the death of a serviceman and requires military commanders to provide detailed explanations and to eliminate the circumstances that facilitated the tragic event. And steps are being taken. However, the overall picture has only slightly changed. I will cite some data for a brief characterization but not in

absolute numbers because I am obliged to observe prescribed limitations on summarized information about military forces.

During the first half of 1990, the number of deaths in contrast to last year has been reduced by one percent. A third of all losses are victims of criminal activities, 26.6 percent are cases of suicide, and the remaining servicemen died as a result of accidents with equipment, during explosions or fires, during construction or economic work, while swimming alone, or in other situations.

Not long ago the Main Military Procuracy Collegium, with the participation of representatives of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and a number of USSR Ministry of Defense directorates, reviewed the results of an investigation into the causes of servicemen's injuries and deaths. We were forced to point out the unsatisfactory training of young men for service in a number of regions, conscription of individuals with psychiatric illnesses, violations of regulations on handling firearms and equipment by personnel, dangerous work conditions, and as previously a significant ratio of road-transportation vehicle accidents among the causes of people's deaths and injuries.

I will point out that the number of accidents with military transport vehicles is being reduced for the second year in a row. This year, it was reduced by nine percent. At the same time, servicemen—drivers of individual transport vehicles, increasingly find themselves among the victims or perpetrators of road-transportation vehicle accidents. Here the increase totaled 25 percent.

We can name the overall reduction of discipline, diversion of troops to construction and other work whose safety regulations are unsatisfactorily taught to personnel, the small number of special inspections (boiler inspections, electrical safety inspections, and others) with serious discrepancies in the work of additional duty inspectors and accident and injury prevention commissions.

The General Staff used our material to develop a system of preventive measures. It is not possible to enumerate them all within the framework of the answer to the question. In my opinion, the requirement to change the content and work methods of military district and garrison accident prevention commissions is quite promising. They must assess the situation in large and small units and effectively and flexibly find the form of prevention. Let us say if an injury occurs in a specific large unit while handling firearms, this means that personnel have not had enough training to develop the skills to service and use these firearms. Adequate modifications to the combat training system precisely in this large unit and not general measures on a military-district-wide scale which could also not entirely coincide with the requirements of a specific military collective will help to correct the situation.

The suicide problem deserves the painstaking study of experts in the fields of medicine, psychology, and sociology. Their number in the army is less than among school students and pre-conscription age youth, but they do occur and prevention is required that is outside the framework of the army and navy.

The so-called "dacha issue" was raised recently in a number of central press publications. Why is the military procuracy silent about it?

Reserve Colonel V. Pronka, Tbilisi

The majority of these publications have "a tinge of political goals" that are far from the establishment of social justice. Both previously and right now the military procuracy has decisively stopped abuse during construction of personal and official dachas, garages, commanders illegally directing their subordinates to work, and the theft of building materials. Reports have been repeatedly published about procurator verifications of such cases and about cases being investigated. It is sufficient to recall the dachas of the Shchelokov family and those similar to them.

The latter publications have touched upon only the so-called "generals" dachas from the large circle of official dachas. The appearance of official dachas among the leading employees of civilian departments, just like among military leaders, date back to the already long-held privileges prescribed by government decisions. The USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges has not yet made a specific decision but the USSR Council of Ministers has not granted the procuracy the already promulgated right to appeal acts. Therefore we are reacting only in the event of a violation of the law when attention in the press is being directed to the issue about the validity of the entire system of official dachas and their cost. In my opinion, official dachas can exist only for official receptions, post-operative rehabilitation or preventive treatment of servicemen, or for other similar purposes. But as a procurator, I am obliged to deal with the government's competence. The ultimate decision rests with the legislative authority.

Incidentally, an official answer on the publications' cases of "generals' dachas" was received by the USSR Procuracy from the USSR Ministry of Defense within the prescribed time period. As far as I know, these answers have been sent to the USSR Committee for People's Control and to the OGONEK Magazine editorial offices (they have not been published). I must also add that the USSR Council of Ministers decision on these dachas was already made in May of this year. The issue continues to simmer. Why? Obviously someone is interested in this.

Even today, the army continues to be involved in carrying out tasks that are uncharacteristic to it. As a result, it suffers losses and receives entirely undeserved rebukes which undermines its prestige. Do you consider it necessary to once and for all legally define the functions of the Armed Forces?

Lieutenant Colonel V. Donskoy, Odessa Military District

I can say that, within the authority and therefore within the framework of the laws that are in force, the military procuracy opposes the transfer of tasks to the army that do not belong to it. While conducting this policy, we find the support of the USSR Procurator General's Office, USSR People's Deputies, and mutual understanding with the command authority and political organs. At the same time, a sort of inertia is being maintained not only at the level of government departments but also in public opinion—to assign the resolution of the most varied problems to the army.

It seems urgently necessary to me for a USSR Supreme Soviet session to approve the military reform concept and to include its basic principles in the content of the Union Treaty and in the treaties already being discussed at the republic level between the union republics. I think that the army and navy must concentrate exclusively on carrying out missions of a defensive nature. The appropriate organizations, enterprises, services, and departments must be involved with eliminating the aftermath of natural disasters, restoring law and order, constructing roads and various structures, and transporting national economic cargoes via air and ground transportation.

The current degree of the army's involvement in carrying out national economic tasks, supplying themselves with food, and reassessing the meaning of conversion of the defense industry are fraught with elements that hamper perestroika. Really in those places where they are counting on material, resource, and technological injections from the defense complex and where they depend on masses of soldiers for labor, there are no searches for progressive domestic technologies without which true economic renewal cannot occur.

I am convinced that we cannot trade places of activities while carrying out perestroika in the Armed Forces. Consistency is needed. At first, a scientific model of military reform must be developed. Then its consolidation must occur through a political decision at the highest organs of state power. And only then must legislation be formulated on the Armed Forces.

What can you say at this moment about the "Tbilisi Affair"?

Major V. Yastreba, Siberian Military District

From the very beginning, the Georgian Procuracy has investigated the criminal case with regard to civilians who were involved as participants in the rally that confronted the republic government and law enforcement forces. According to my information, the case has been dropped despite the conclusion of the commission created by the 1st USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

The case regarding servicemen was transferred to the USSR Procuracy Investigatory Group in January. The investigation has not been completed at this point but, in accordance with procedural standards, only those people who are conducting the investigation and those who are

directly supervising the investigation's legality are authorized to report information about its progress. For this reason, I do not have the ability to provide an answer to that question.

Information about the presence of arms among the population of various regions of the country that has been presented in the mass media literally causes shock. It is no secret that some of these weapons are army weapons. How did they end up in the hands of civilians?

Captain 3rd Rank V. Georgitsa, Baltic Fleet

Weapons are being seized or stolen from military departments of educational institutions, DOSAAF organizations, internal affairs and militarized guard organs, and safes, are being acquired as contraband, and are being bought from workers at defense enterprises and from unscrupulous servicemen. During the first half of this year, 168 cases of the theft of firearms, explosives, ammunition have been disclosed that were committed by servicemen.

Recently, the participation of major bandit gangs in attacks against military depots, arsenals, and against sentry and patrol subunits causes special alarm. In this situation, high vigilance and strict compliance with the requirements of regulations are required from the military man. According to the situation on July 1, 1990, of the total number of weapons stolen throughout the country, 17.6 percent have been stolen from Armed Forces's facilities.

One could say that the Law on Universal Military Obligation is being violated nearly everywhere today. But really it has not been repealed. What steps are being taken by the military procuracy against draft evaders [otkazniks] and deserters?

Major O. Krivchenkov, Far Eastern Military District

Legal proceedings are being instituted against servicemen who desert, are absent without leave, or avoid military service in any other way.

Investigation and detention of law-breakers in a number of locations has been impeded by the passivity of internal affairs organs (the army does not have its own investigatory organ) and through the direct opposition of local authorities in some regions who support anti-army actions. Here at least the incentives are clear—separatist aspirations. A way out of the situation is also obvious—appropriate political decisions are required.

The situation with the application of criminal law against civilians who avoid conscription for military service is not so simple. In contrast with 1988, the number of such offenders increased by a factor of six last year, but criminal punishment through sentences of people's courts were handed down to only four percent of the draft evaders. The reason for this is not only that employees of some local law enforcement organs are not fulfilling their duty but also in the contradictions of legal processes and practices in a number of regions. Laws of individual union republics on alternative (extra-military

or work) service have appeared. Attempts are being made to extend draft deferments that have been granted to daytime VUZ [higher educational institution] students to night school and even to correspondence school students. There is grounds to say that the pendulum of public opinion has swung sharply toward illusory pacifism, the priority of personal over public interests, and doubts about the principle of universal military obligation. The actions of young people who are refusing to serve also correspond to that mood.

The military procuracy is raising these questions to the leadership of civilian law enforcement agencies and to representatives of the legislative and executive authorities. I also think that a political assessment of these negative processes, coordination of new union and republic legislation, and the activity of healthy public forces to combat extreme pacifist moods are necessary.

Today, do we need a law on the social and legal status of servicemen?

V. Shcherbakova, Ryazan

A law on the legal status of the military man in society is urgently needed. And not only it. We need to find a place for a chapter, section, or article on how to implement their requirements in the defense sphere and how they should apply or to what degree they should be extended to servicemen in all laws being adopted.

How do you personally feel about the rehabilitation of former Afghan servicemen who ended up as prisoners for some reason or other. Is this legitimate?

Major A. Murachev, Kiev Military District

For me or for any employee of the procuracy, the law is sacred and subject to strict compliance. As is a decision about amnesty for those servicemen who committed some sort of crime during our troops presence in the Republic of Afghanistan. This amnesty is a pardon but it is not rehabilitation which we understand as an acquittal.

We all know that the decision on amnesty reflected the will of the majority of USSR people's deputies and the mood in society and pursued the goal of promoting the return to the Homeland of servicemen who ended up as prisoners for some reason or other.

Personally I am close to the position of judges who think that the practice of amnesties is an anachronism that does not correspond to the true division of power and the supremacy of the courts in administering justice. Let us ponder this: By the date of some anniversary or, as it sometimes occurred, as a result of the overflow of some locations for incarceration, a legislator announced the immediate release of many convicted criminals from punishment or the reduction of their prison terms. Not individually for a person, no, simply by categories of law-breakers. This is somewhat disdainful of the individual and has an attitude about him as a part of a faceless mass.

I know that mothers of warrior internationalists who in no way dishonored themselves have negatively perceived amnesty for all former Afghan vets. We can understand the noble purpose of this step from the humane standpoint. But at the same time we recognize that the fate of specific people has once again been decided not only for their own sake but has become a policy tool.

The incident with the violation of our airspace near Batumi once again reminded me of Rust's overflight. Do military procuracy employees become involved in these cases?

Captain 3rd Rank V. Brits, Baltic Fleet

These incidents are quite different. In the case of Rust, some officials manifested passiveness and did not exercise their authority to stop the overflight. They were charged with violating regulations concerning performance of combat alert duty, including a number of them who were held criminally responsible.

The crossing of the Soviet-Turkish border by a light engined Cessna aircraft in the area of Batumi in June 1990 was not associated with any violations whatsoever by servicemen.

Recently, cases of attacks against officers and warrant officers and even their murders have increased. Have criminal charges been filed against the criminals? And, in your opinion, what do we need to do so that there are no such outrageous cases?

O. Yushkevich, Minsk

Special verification tasked by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Issues and by an order of the USSR Procurator General's Office reaffirmed the filing of criminal charges in all of these cases. The absolute majority of them were investigated and criminal charges were filed against the offenders. Several crimes that were not discovered by territorial organs in individual locations with an unstable socio-political situation are a distressing exception.

Increased cases of infringements on the lives and health of servicemen are a consequence of the overall increase of crime in the country. Assumptions about the selected direction of these acts against the army as a whole are not being confirmed. They are justified only for individual periods of mass disorders in several regions and locations where martial law has been declared.

The elimination of the causes of the overall increase of crime and normalization of the situation in "hot" spots—is the primary path to overcome negative trends.

Is the military procuracy participating in the rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repression? Precisely how?

Lieutenant P. Pilipenko, Baltic Military District

From 1954 through 1968, the military procuracy has insured the rehabilitation of 288,834 innocently repressed servicemen and civilians. During the period from July 1988 until July 1990, the good names of

another 80,736 individuals have been restored. At the same time, rehabilitation has been rejected for 912 traitors of the Homeland, storm troopers and their accomplices, and former state security organ agents who were caught falsifying criminal cases and committing other crimes.

I need to say that traitors of their own people—former polizei [politsai—German for policeman] and Vlasovites are not simply attempting to slip through into the stream of rehabilitation but are quite impudently soliciting vindication and striving to present themselves as prophets and high disciples of perestroika and fighters against Stalinism. Some modern researchers of the G. Kumanev type, who vainly attempt to "wash clean" the false-hero and Fascist Polizei Dobrobabu, do not have an aversion to unearth them in the trash bin of history. Information has appeared about the organization of a propagandistic tour through the USSR for former Vlasovite Spiritual Pastor Archpriest A. Kiselev. Scientific and cultural associates have organized powerful pressure on procuracy organs to achieve the unfounded total rehabilitation of the rather well-known Timofeyev-Resovskiy. Here emphasis is being made on his scientific achievements. Those who are forcing the worthless class approach to rehabilitation on us obviously have forgotten that there were not only people with little education on the side of the Fascist occupiers of our Homeland but also quite a number of representatives of science who attended the idea of Nazi supremacy. While defending the historical truth, military procuracy employees, in cooperation with journalists, have published a series of articles on this theme. This year's series of articles in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL will certainly be of interest to our military readers.

The military procuracy has taken all available materials on the repressions of the 1930's-40's and 1950's from the archives. We are reviewing them regardless of the presence or absence of citizens' requests. When necessary, we are renewing work based on newly discovered facts. Jointly with USSR KGB organs, we are seeking out living eyewitnesses, including abroad.

Nearly 300,000 criminal cases remain to be examined. Several individuals at once were convicted based on the majority of them. So, there is a great deal of work ahead of us.

Today how do military procurators live and work—in both the material and moral context? Have there recently been attempts to settle accounts or reprisals against them? Senior Warrant Officer V. Lobazny, Baltic Fleet

The moods and emotional experiences of the officers of the military procuracy are the same as those in the troops. Movements to relieve or to replace cadre are unfortunately frequent and unavoidable. The following rule is in force: One cannot be in the position of a specific garrison military procurator for more than two terms in a row (a 5 year period) as prescribed by law. The territorial dispersal of troops served is significant and

operational personnel are permanently attached to USSR Main Military Procuracy and USSR Procuracy investigatory groups. All of this entails prolonged temporary duty assignments, frequent trips, and problems with housing, job placement for wives, and educating and raising children.

You need to really love your work and be sympathetic toward someone else's misfortune and intolerant of injustice in order to wear the rank of a military lawyer in a worthy manner. The majority of our officers are precisely such people who promote a healthy atmosphere in military procuracy collectives.

Attempts to take revenge by individuals who have violated the law practically never occur. A competent inquiry or an efficient investigation during the course of a procuracy verification often bring an offender to the realization that he has only himself to blame.

Omissions occur which are used by unscrupulous individuals for slander and abusive letters and articles. But they are a rarity. A manifestation of dissatisfaction is being encountered from some politically immature official when lapses and omissions are discovered in his supervision. We need to convince these people through the joint efforts of higher echelon commanders and procurators. It is difficult to overcome the opposition of local organs in "hot spots" and the hostility of individual citizens toward military lawyers and toward representatives of law enforcement organs and the army.

Recently it has become more difficult to not pay attention to the substantial salary increases in the civilian procuracy and to the enticing proposals of enterprises and cooperatives. Reports have also arisen among us about early release into the reserve. But there are also already requests that request authorization to return to the military. One can understand why they have become disillusioned with the recently desirable civilian life since not only the size of one's salary determines the meaning of our existence.

Incidentally, in contrast with army and navy officers in similar ranks, salaries in the military procuracy are somewhat higher. The law provides for a priority to receive housing, telephone installation, and other benefits. The main thing is the responsible, independent, and creative nature of the work and its high moral content.

Is there a concept for perestroyka of military procuracy organs? What is its goal?

Major N. Kainbekov, Western Group of Forces

We see the procuracy oversight turning toward protection of servicemen's legal interests as the goal of the changes. Unfortunately, this is producing uneven results in various directions of activity at the present time. So, in our professional work this is what we call surveillance of the execution of laws and prevention and cessation of violations that have not yet reached the level of crimes. We managed to raise a number of major problems of the

life of the army and navy, the legal position of servicemen, military builders, and the military obligated reserve based on the results of overall procuracy supervisory verifications.

Jointly with experts from other professions, last year alone the loss of nearly one billion rubles worth of equipment was prevented, compensation was received for more than R20 million of criminal damages, and steps have been taken to sue for another more than R35 million.

As I already stated, a significant amount of work is associated with the verification of archive materials and the rehabilitation of illegally repressed individuals. Creating a special structural subunit in the Main Military Procuracy and supplementing staffs of some military-district level military procuracies has been required to do this.

The return on measures to consolidate the law in personal activity has been noticeable. Errors in bringing suits and arrests of individuals who have committed crimes are much more rare. A series of preventive and explanatory measures is conducted in connection with each judicial proceeding. There has begun to be more openness [okrytost] in the work of military procuracies. The operational staff actively participates in the dissemination of legal knowledge.

But this entire process of changes is proceeding in a contradictory manner. Gaps in legislation and the lack of legal protection of the military man in our rapidly changing society are becoming increasingly apparent. Not only laws on defense, the legal status of servicemen, and others are inadequate. We are sensing a shortage in the execution of existing laws and on some conscription and service problems in a number of regions—and also weighty political decisions.

Unfortunately, in many military procuracies, we have to conduct a change in work style and a search for new approaches to insure the protection of servicemen's and civilians' legal rights in the background of a sharp increase in crime. The operational situation is compelling our cadres to postpone realization of the good plans they already have on other sectors of activity and to concentrate on solving and investigating crimes. For example, in July 1990, we found two times as many criminal cases in the work of investigators than they are capable of solving per month. Such are the consequences of the unfavorable criminal situation in the country as a whole.

From what has been said, one can conclude that the state of affairs in military procuracies is changing in the general direction of perestroyka of the law enforcement system and reflects the difficulties and uniqueness of the current stage of judicial-legal and military reform.

Your department is subordinate only to the USSR Procurator General. But what are your interrelations with the Ministry of Defense? Does it not seem to you that you in

fact are not defending legality but the notorious "honor of the uniform" that the mass media frequently writes about?

Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kislyy, Moscow

Military procuracies and tribunals are also independent from the command authority and are not subordinate to anyone other than the law during investigations and judicial reviews of cases. But military law enforcement organs operate directly among the troops, travel with them during redeployments, receive financial and material support from the Armed Forces, and coordinate changes to unit manning documents with the General Staff. Military procurators resolve dozens of everyday issues through military officials. From a unit commander allocating a motor vehicle to go to the site of an accident to sentries guarding buildings. There is nothing contradictory in this. We live with the troops and for the troops.

I specially mentioned here the military tribunals associated with the USSR Ministry of Justice in order to stress: The "uniforms" the command authority, military procurators, and judges have are different in a professional context. But the interests are common—reinforcing military discipline and protecting the rights of the military man. Both the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Main Military Procuracy, the USSR Supreme Court Military Collegium Chairman, and the USSR Ministry of Justice Military Tribunals Directorate commander need to defend the honor of the serviceman, and the honor and dignity of the Armed Forces from violations of the law and unfounded verbal attacks. Yes and who will first of all do this? In this sense, defending the honor of the uniform is a sacred cause. Well, but shielding violators through caste signs, concealing the misfortunes of military collectives or one's own miscalculations—is a futile and despicable occupation. There are no legal, material, organizational, or moral grounds to do this. We encounter unprincipled agents, window dressers, and careerists. If we do not manage to reeducate such people in time, we ruthlessly drive them from our ranks.

In your opinion, how can one attain an increase in the effectiveness of the force of our laws? Why is it so hard to resolve the issue of the advisability of the utilization of video and photo equipment and also of various recording devices as objective evidence of a criminal's guilt?

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kotlyarov, Volga-Ural Military District

It is better to answer the theoretical part of the question with the words of K. Marx: "... Society is not based on the law. That is the fantasy of judges. On the contrary, the law must be based on society, it must be the expression of its common interests and the requirements that proceed from the material means of production in opposition to the tyranny of the separate individual." Hence the primary conditions of the force of the law: Its objective need, material support, and the desire of society to follow the law. Systems of economic and political control and coercion to execute the law are secondary, although also necessary circumstances.

As for the employment of technical means of gathering evidence of a criminal's guilt, the discussion surrounding their use has been conducted mainly by theorists and has primarily affected already resolved issues. For example, based on Articles 83 and 88 of the RSFSR UPK [Code of Criminal Procedures] and the appropriate UPK's of other union republics, film and photo documents, sound and video recordings, tabulated forms, and other materials have always been recognized as evidence if they contained any factual information that have significance for proper resolution of a case.

During the discussion, we talked about the fact that currently criminals use technical surveillance and monitoring systems to support planned [activities] but law enforcement organs in defense of citizens have found themselves [limited] by the associated requirements of Article 56 of the USSR Constitution that guarantees the secrecy of personal life, recordings, telephone conversations, and telegraph messages. Some judges have broadly interpreted this standard which plays into the hands of criminals.

Beyond the external side of the discussion on technical systems actually stood the issues on the permissibility of monitoring telephone conversations. A video recording is nothing here since, you will agree, it sees and records only that which is not hidden from view from the side.

Opponents of the authorization to monitor conversations have feared the transformation of this step into a means of tracking honest citizens. Common sense prevailed in the end. The July 12, 1990 Law in the Fundamentals of Criminal Jurisprudence of the USSR and the union republics amended the text of Article 29 and added an additional Article 35. Now this is authorized during investigation of a case with the authorization of the procurator or through a decision of the court to monitor conversations if this will help to expose criminals or to prevent a crime based on sound information.

The military procuracy primarily deals with cases and events that have already occurred. What place does educational and preventive work occupy in your activities?
Senior Warrant Officer O. Ilyasov, Transcaucasus Military District

Last year, officers of military procuracies delivered cautions on the inadmissibility of violating the law to 14,137 servicemen whose conduct was approaching the limit beyond which it would have been a crime. Nearly 63,000 individual conversations were conducted with individuals who have been prone to violations of discipline, more than 78,000 reports and lectures were delivered, 6,000 topical and film lecture evenings were organized, more than 1,400 addresses and performances were prepared in the press, on radio, and on television. All of this helped servicemen and citizens to better understand the law, to extract lessons from violations of the law, and to see ways to prevent them.

At the same time, I do not share the aspiration to increase this "wave" of measures that has set root in a

number of procuracies. It would be naive to see in each highly professional investigator and procurator a still more talented teacher or sociologist. Yes and not all causes of offenses are eliminated through propaganda work. The author of the question will certainly agree that specific actions are more weighty than words. The military procuracy is nevertheless rendering its main preventive impact through the real employment of the force of the law against guilty individuals, that is, on cases that have already been committed. And if other organs, officials, and military collectives can and are obliged to conduct the remaining preventive and educational work, the role of procuracy organs, investigations and the courts is exclusive in the application of the law to offenders.

At the same time, we also see our task in the comprehensive reinforcement of the preventive direction of our own activities and decisions and in extracting a socially significant lesson from negative events. Military procurators and investigators send messages to assemblies of military collectives in almost 61 percent of completed criminal cases and submit representations to competent military commanders on the elimination of the conditions that gave rise to the crime.

The opinion exists that people with "big stars" and high positions are beyond the law. Is this so?

N. Gorenko, Kiev

No, if the question is posed about responsibility for a crime. Both privates and generals appear before the court. A commander punishes a subordinate even more strictly on cases about jointly committed crimes because the subordinate is also responsible for being involved in a violation of the law or for tolerating it.

However in other regards it is easy to point out the imbalance of rights and responsibilities about which the reader is talking. Our rather obsolete regulations do not define the obligations of officials higher than a regimental or garrison commander. And other representatives of higher headquarters suggest that they are entrusted with only rights. Or another factor. In a regimental element, a majority of issues has been submitted for the commander's review without pointing out the precise regulations to resolve them. Hence, there are no single cases of injustice, let us say, during assignments and relocations. But the procurator cannot get involved here because the resolution of these issues by law is not regulated or decided by command alone.

On one hand, adoption of modern military law, including new regulations, must change the situation. On the other hand, increasing the role of Officers Assemblies, warrant officer soviets, and other institutes of army and navy society to resolve issues of life of military collectives and the fates of specific servicemen [must change the situation].

I am convinced that many of our problems stem from legal illiteracy of both rank and file and command personnel.

Will the elimination of universal compulsory legal education help it?

Major V. Kazakov, Transcaucasus Military District

I believe in the benefit of universal compulsory legal education because I have frequently become convinced: The analysis of errors of characteristic violations of the law prepared by the military procuracy jointly with headquarters have helped commanders to avoid repetitions of violations. I see the urgent need for universal compulsory legal education. Does not the fact that 87 percent of the military units covered by procurator verifications during the last year detected violations of laws and regulations really point to this? More than 7,000 illegal orders were rescinded in accordance with procurators' demands.

Universal compulsory legal education is taking its first steps in the army and in the navy. There is a shortage of qualified class leaders, training materials, and pamphlets on rapidly changing laws. Having overcome the disease of formation, training "will occur" if it satisfies true requirements for knowledge of legal methods to resolve vital problems.

Recently, our magazine has been attempting to pay more attention to the legal theme. In your opinion, how will we manage to do this? What is your opinion on the magazine's current appearance and about its future appearance?

Question from the Editor

The magazine is becoming more weighty and more interesting. I hope that the legal subject matter will be more saturated with normative materials and topical collections of excerpts from legislative acts, including in special pages that can be torn out—inserts. I have already noted the transition from talking about the significance of laws to the explanation of their content. The magazine will be even more popular and more useful if it manages to include the mass of potential readers from the soldier (seamen) medium in the conversation on the place of politics in the army. To do this, some time needs to pass to see the future of service of officers and warrant officers on contract and the generation of the volunteer manning principle by servicemen of certain positions and even military units (ships). Political workers already need sound practical advice on the psychology of military education and the realization of sociologists' data. Military personnel's mastery of the principles of economic thinking in military activities is becoming a vital political issue. Commanders at all levels are interested in knowledge of the bases of mutual relations with local organs of power, enterprises, workers collectives, and owners of various types under conditions of the transition to a regulated market economy. Armed Forces property, land utilization, and many other problems are urgent during the impending transition period and will find readers' interest if they are presented through the specifics of a military unit's or subunit's everyday existence. In my opinion, we need to think about the magazine's title. I wish the editorial collective and readers' activists creative success.

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Ministry Permits Carrying of Personal Weapons

*91UM0237B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 90 First Edition p 1*

[Unattributed article: "In the World": "Minister of Defense Permits the Carrying of Personal Weapons"]

[Text] As announced by the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center, this decision pertains to commissioned officers and warrant officers of the Army and Navy stationed in areas where servicemen have been the targets of increasing attacks and insults to honor and dignity. It must be assumed that the possibility of encountering armed resistance would cool the passions of extremist and criminal elements that have lately declared open season on men wearing the uniform.

Implementation of German-Funded Housing Program

*91UM0236B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jan 91
Union Edition p 2*

[Interview with Col Yu. Ogurtsov, section chief in the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by N. Medvedev; "Currency-Funded Housing for the Soviet Military"]

[Text] As reported in IZVESTIYA the government of the FRG has allocated 7.8 billion marks for housing construction in the Soviet Union for the families of servicemen in the Western Group of Forces. Col Yu. Ogurtsov, section chief in the Main Billeting Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, tells how these funds will be used.

[Ogurtsov] There are presently around 200,000 families of regular servicemen without housing in the army and navy (counting troops withdrawn from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Mongolia). A wave of "immigrants" will soon sweep over us from the Western Group of Forces. They include 63,000 families without housing in the Union, and 13,000 single men—young officers, warrant officers and extended-duty personnel—will also have to establish a life for themselves.

A total of 57,000 apartments were built in 1990 by military construction organizations alone, and we shall build another 64,000 in the new year. The assistance from the FRG comes in very handy. It is planned to build 36,000 apartments and four housing construction combines with the funds allocated by the Federal Government. And they are to be built by dates coinciding with the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany.

[Medvedev] So the Ministry of Defense will soon receive additional currency?

[Ogurtsov] We will not receive a single West German mark. This is a special program. The government of the FRG has designated the Kreditanstalt bank to finance the program, and it is also vested with authority to

monitor the use of the allocated funds. A joint Soviet-West German administrative committee is charged with overseeing the planning and implementation of the construction program. A consortium has also been set up, consisting of the following Soviet organizations along with West German firms: Soyuzvneshstroyimport [All-Union Administration for the Import of Foreign Construction Materials?], Tekhnoeksport [Main Administration for the Export and Import of Machinery and Equipment] and the Main Technical Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which have extensive experience in organizing construction by contract. The Administration for Contract Construction set up within our main directorate for the period of the program's implementation is acting as the client.

It is planned to build not just housing, but housing complexes with the proper infrastructure: health clinics, stores, kindergartens, schools, clubs and boiler-houses. The firms capable of carrying out the most economical projects most rapidly will be determined on a competitive basis within the next few months. And not just from the FRG, but also from other Western nations. Dozens of foreign firms are ready to sign contracts, including firms from France, Greece, Finland, Turkey, Yugoslavia.... And so, in a certain sense this will also be an international program.

[Medvedev] Why is this housing to be built by foreign firms and not by our workers. Are ours not as good?

[Ogurtsov] It is not a matter of who is better and who is worse. It was specially stipulated by the Germans that the housing be built on a contract basis precisely by foreign firms. They plan to turn these apartments over to us ready for occupancy.

[Medvedev] When and where is the construction to begin?

[Ogurtsov] I believe it will begin as soon as this spring. There is a settlement named Shaykovka in Kaluga Oblast. It is planned to build 1,020 apartments with a total area of 59,220 square meters there. There is a site near Vladikavkaz. A total of 1,110 apartments will be built there. Two housing complexes are to be started immediately in Minsk Oblast: in Borisov and at the Marina Gorka garrison (740 and 790 apartments respectively). Housing will be built in eight military districts in the European part of the nation. By the end of 1994 it is planned to build a total of 37 housing complexes for the families of servicemen in the Western Group of Forces.

With respect to the housing construction combines, it is planned to build one in the Moscow area, one in Leningrad Oblast and two more in Pskov Oblast.

[Medvedev] But will the apartments built not be occupied by someone else?

[Ogurtsov] That has been ruled out. The agreement states that the housing is designated exclusively for those returning from Germany. The Germans—a meticulous

people, as you know—will monitor the matter. Our side too must be particularly punctilious. The "German houses" must be occupied by those for whom they are intended.

Servicemen's Insurance Instituted

91UM0236A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Col V. Korolenko, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, by TRUD correspondent V. Badurkin: "Protection for the Soldier: State Insurance for Servicemen Is Being Instituted as of 1 January"]

[Text] Young men die in the army and navy every year. They number in the thousands. Even more return home early, wounded or crippled. The great sorrow has united their mothers and inspired them to fight for their sons' rights. Their just demands have been vigorously taken up by the press. Many newspapers, including TRUD, have repeatedly brought up the matters of providing social protection for servicemen and the need to establish state insurance for the military service and pay monetary compensation to the parents of those who have died in the army.

The President of the USSR issued ukases instructing the national government to consider and resolve these matters by the end of last year.

The year has ended. What has been done? TRUD correspondent V. Badurkin addressed this question to Col V. Korolenko, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

[Korolenko] On 30 December the USSR Council of Ministers passed a decree instituting mandatory state individual insurance for servicemen. I can say without exaggeration that this was preceded by an enormous amount of work. Within a short period of time the entire group of questions pertaining to the establishment of this new type of social protection for servicemen was discussed jointly with Gosstrakh [State Insurance Committee], the Ministry of Finance and other ministries and departments. They discussed various amounts of insurance and ways to implement the presidential ukase.

The proposal that insurance payments be made not through Gosstrakh agencies but directly in the military units where the enlisted man or officer works was not withdrawn until the last minute. It was still decided to establish precisely state insurance conforming to all the rules, however, as directed by the president.

[V. Badurkin] Vladimir Ivanovich, explain in detail who is eligible for this insurance, the amounts and the procedure.

[Korolenko] The insurance will cover all servicemen, all personnel of internal affairs agencies and reservists while attending assemblies. It will take effect automatically

from the day of induction for military duty. No agreements will be concluded and no payments will be made by either the servicemen or the military units. All accounts will be paid by those ministries and departments whose personnel include servicemen, at their own expense. Incidentally, the draft 1991 budget of the Ministry of Defense already provides 0.3 billion rubles for this purposes.

With respect to the amounts of insurance payments, they depend upon the severity of the conditions covered by the insurance. In the case of the death of an insured person while that individual is performing military service (or attending an assembly), for example, or within one year following his discharge, his heirs are paid 25,000 rubles. Disabled individuals will be paid 15,000, 10,000 or 5,000 rubles, depending upon their disability category. I would point out that, regardless of the amount of this payment, when servicemen die or their disability is established in accordance with the USSR Law on Pensions, pension amounts are increased for them or their families.

[Badurkin] Once again we have the equalizing process. Widows without children and those with large families will receive the same amount....

[Korolenko] Unfortunately, that is the way it is. We suggested that the government differentiate according to the number of dependents, but...

[Badurkin] Each year thousands of enlisted men and officers are discharged for reasons of health, who are not actually disabled. How is this taken into account in the government's decree?

[Korolenko] While officers, warrant officers and extended-duty personnel have been paid a sum of money in such cases, enlisted men discharged for the same reasons received nothing. They will now be paid 1,000 rubles each.

[Badurkin] What if the wound or maiming resulted from a crime? A self-inflicted wound, for example?

[Korolenko] If a court determines that there is evidence of a premeditated crime, the serviceman and his family are deprived of insurance.

[Badurkin] Are there provisions for the individuals or organizations to blame for a serviceman's death or loss of health to compensate for the insurance payment made?

[Korolenko] There is already such a provision. Servicemen or reservists called up for assemblies are responsible for a serviceman's death or loss of health make recompense for the insurance payment in accordance with state individual insurance by the procedure and in the amounts specified in the Statute on Material Liability of Servicemen for Losses to the State, which was

approved by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 13 January 1984.

From other citizens and legal persons to blame for the death or harm to the health of servicemen, which has resulted in the payment of insurance, the loss is recovered by the general civilian procedure. Such demands for payment will be submitted by the commanders of military units, and not Gosstrakh agencies.

[Badurkin] We know that there are servicemen not just in the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the railroad troops, but also in a number of other ministries and departments....

[Korolenko] That is true. In addition to the above-mentioned ministries and the committee, there are also considerable numbers of troops in other ministries and departments. Unfortunately, they have not yet responded to the presidential decree and have not established ties with Gosstrakh. They have in fact left their servicemen without social protection.

[Badurkin] The decree took effect on 1 January of this year. But what about the families of those who died or were disabled prior to that?

[Korolenko] When this matter was worked out in the government agencies, it proved not be as simple as it appeared at first glance.

In the first place, how far back should the decree extend? To the end of the Great Patriotic War? And what about the widows of those who died in the war? In the second place, there was the matter of the amounts to be paid. Representatives of the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers will agree to no less than 50,000 rubles. The total would come to more than just a single billion rubles....

And there are many such questions. The matter has therefore had to be more thoroughly worked out. By the appropriate commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet, among others. I believe that it too will be resolved in the near future, however.

85.2% Increase in Service Avoidance, AWOLs in 1990

91UM0237A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "Fugitives and Service Avoidance: Causes, Circumstances, Investigation"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] In the last two years, thousands and thousands of local militia offices located throughout our country are receiving the following kind of notice with increasing frequency: "Military conscripts in AWOL status are at large ..." According to data supplied by the Main Military Procuracy, in 11 months of 1990 compared with the same period of 1989, the number of crimes associated

with avoidance of service in the Soviet Army increased by 85.2 percent; in military construction detachments of "civilian" ministries and departments, by 43.3 percent; in internal troop units of the USSR MVD, by a factor greater than 3.

What is it that compels soldiers and seamen to break the oath, invite possible criminal liability for a military crime, and leave their units by going "on the run?"

In the Moscow garrison Military Procuracy, which has become more or less the main keeper of fugitives who either head for Moscow or travel through the city, I was afforded the opportunity of looking at dozens of files on persons listed as AWOL. I must say that even a superficial familiarity with them is sufficient to indicate a minimum of five causes—rather than a single cause—of the abrupt rise in service avoidance. To reduce everything to a reaction on the part of young people to the "terrors of the Army," as some are doing, is nothing short of folly.

Yes, indeed, dedovshchina remains as a major cause compelling soldiers and seamen to commit AWOL. I have notes to that effect in my journalist's notebook. There is the case of Private D. Khomyakov, stationed in Krasnoyarsk Kray. He got to the point where he could take no more abuse from Privates Sarkisyan and Parsyan and Junior Sergeant Bashyan, who had been in service longer. Fearing a beating threat on the part of men with longer military service, Baltic Fleet seaman G. Tokarev jumped ship to go home. Private O. Zhatkin, having received a beating by men of longer service, went from deep inside Buryatia to Moscow to seek justice.

"Until 1985, we saw a nearly universal rise in number of crimes related to nonregulation interpersonal conduct," stated Major General of Justice V. Godin, chief of a department in the Main Military Procuracy that deals with information and analysis of causes of violations committed in the USSR Armed Forces. "Subsequently, after a period of stabilization, we observed a decreasing trend."

Nevertheless, Vitaliy Petrovich pointed out that in 1989 there was an abrupt rise in service avoidance related to so-called political motives. This has to do with the position taken by certain union republics on service in the USSR Armed Forces and the clash between republic laws and the union legislation on USSR citizens' military service.

The military procurator of the Moscow garrison, Major General of Justice L. Obyektor, had the following to say:

"The Procuracy has accumulated quite a few of those cases, and the number is growing. However, we have been deprived of the possibility of applying the law, since to do so would require the cooperation of local authorities and law enforcement organs. It is they that are offering active opposition to enforcement of union law".

The following is an example of a criminal case, that of Private Gedryus Algirdovich Kryauchunas, a native of Kaunas. On 10 August he departed from his unit without authorization and headed for a neighboring village with the intention of meeting relatives who had come to visit him. He did not return to his unit. Investigation revealed that Kryauchunas was located at his residence in Kaunas. An inquiry signed by the post military procurator was sent to the chief of the Internal Affairs Department of the Kaunas Leninskiy Rayon Ispolkom. This is the reply received from militia Lieutenant Colonel B. Dotysus:

"I hereby inform you that, in accordance with the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Decree of 20 March 1990 on the Legal Status of Citizens Abandoning Military Units of the USSR Armed Forces, militia organs are not to carry out missions associated with republic citizens abandoning USSR Armed Forces units, nor are they to provide any related information."

Yes, hopeful signs have been seen in the struggle against nonregulation interpersonal conduct in the Army and Navy (even though it is too early to speak of any success), but the Armed Forces are of course in no position to

eliminate the cause of service avoidance based on political motives. That is beyond the scope of their jurisdiction and capabilities.

Nevertheless, there are causes with which the Ministry of Defense can cope, either independently, or with the assistance of other interested ministries and departments.

"A significant number of service avoidance cases is due to poor quality of selecting draftees," reasoned Major General of Justice L. Obyektorov. "The filter set up by military medical boards in callups is easily penetrated by persons suffering mental and nervous disorders, often of a hidden form. It is possible that under the fairly easy-going conditions of civilian life the illnesses would progress without noticeable acuteness; they may even remain completely undetected. However, they would tend to manifest themselves in an extreme situation."

It seems to me that Moscow garrison units have found a way to follow through for military medical boards on duty in callups. After the young soldier completes his initial training in the unit, he is subjected to re-examination by a medical board. The conscript should have adapted to the conditions

4 March 1991

AIR FORCE, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Kraskovskiy on Early-Warning Radar System's Importance

*91WC0052A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 90
(signed to press 30 Nov 90) pp 14-19*

[Interview with Col. Gen. Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy by Maj. A. Babakin under "Theory and Practice" rubric: "The Country's Security and Localistic Egoism: the Truth and Conjectures About Superradars"]

[Text] Today there is much dispute about questions in the reform of the armed forces and their optimum reduction. But how can one determine precisely what quantity of arms needs to be reduced so that our defense does not suffer? For decades, for example, a veil of secrecy shrouded the activities of the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS). Only a limited number of people had information on the purposes for which the extremely complicated radar complexes costing hundreds of millions of rubles were built. During the time of the "cold war," of course, such secrecy was quite justified. But individual leaders of some nationalistic and informal movements that are striving to earn for themselves political capital and authority through anti-army criticism did not hesitate to utilize the lack of full information on BMEWS. Under their leadership, there was an open attack against important defense facilities in the press and at mass meetings in some regions of the country. And the people, not understanding what kind of structures are found on their land, responded to the demagogic appeals and demands that they be closed. As a result, the construction of a radar facility in the region of the city of Mukachevo was frozen: the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet unilaterally declared a moratorium on the building of superpower radars anywhere in the territory of the Ukraine. Appeals are also being issued in other republics to eliminate analogous radar stations.

But will our state be able to get along without them at this time? What is the effect of radar stations on people and the environment? How will their elimination effect national security? The conversation of the journal's correspondent, Maj. A. Babakin, with Col. Gen. Volter Makarovich Kraskovskiy was about this and other problems having to do with the situation in the country with respect to the ballistic missile early warning system.

[Babakin] Volter Makarovich, there probably are not many people in the Soviet Union who know that we have ballistic missile early warning systems. Could you tell us about them briefly?

[Kraskovskiy] In the early 1960's in the United States, they began the massive deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles. So as not to permit a sudden attack with such a powerful weapon that would be fatal to our country, new arms systems were built—systems for warning against missile attack, antiballistic-missile defense, and the monitoring of space. The forces equipped with these systems became part of the country's air defense.

In the first stage, the ballistic missile early warning system had to detect the missile attack and provide information to the corresponding command centers for the making of a decision on counteractions. It was subsequently necessary to assess the scale of the strike and its intended targets and to determine the regions for the launching of missiles. In accordance with these tasks, primary attention in all stages of the establishment of the BMEWS was paid to the formation of a grouping of systems permitting the detection of missiles in all dangerous sectors and ensuring a high degree of reliability of the information being provided. For this purpose, it was necessary to have warning systems (meaning radar stations) capable of detecting ballistic missiles from a maximum distance immediately after launch. The places where such radar facilities are deployed have already been named in our press. They are Pechora, Murmansk, Mingechaur, Balkhash, and Irkutsk. If one looks at a map of the USSR and gets an approximate overview of these systems, then it turns out that they constitute a continuous radar field. This field has a small breach in the northeast sector, which the Krasnoyarsk Radar Station was supposed to close.

[Babakin] The story of this station was covered rather extensively in our press....

[Kraskovskiy] Quite right. Moreover the intensive conquering of space and the putting into orbit of artificial satellites for military purposes made it necessary to monitor them continuously as well. The primary mission of the system for the monitoring of space is to know the status of the objects in space. It operates not only for military purposes but also resolves important national tasks. The forces are equipped with expensive science-intensive complexes that operate automatically or semi-automatically. Without harming their performance of direct functions, logically maximum use should be made of such complexes (and certainly this position will be further developed in the scope of military reform) in the interests of the improvement of the combat possibilities of other systems.

[Babakin] Can you elucidate this idea?

[Kraskovskiy] In performing the task of detecting ballistic missiles, the systems for warning against a missile attack simultaneously track objects in space and transmit information on them to the command post of the system for the monitoring of space, which issues its information for the general needs of the forces. A high degree of reliability of data on air and space targets is achieved.

Thus, the forces that have the indicated systems are definitely defensive in nature. They are in a state of continuous combat readiness and here they have organized duty around the clock. The combat crews are well trained and are capable of performing their combat tasks independently and without reinforcements.

[Babakin] Are there similar forces in the United States and other countries? How are they similar to ours and how do they differ?

[Kraskovskiy] The United States, for example, possesses developed elements of such forces, above all systems to warn of a nuclear missile strike and to monitor space. The tasks to be resolved by these systems are identical here and there and the principles of their formation are also almost the same. In addition, the Americans, having deployed a number of information systems beyond the borders of their national territory (in England, Greenland, etc.), have the possibility of achieving better performance with respect to warning time and the completeness of the monitoring of missiles in space. The Pentagon links the prospects for the further development of these systems with the realization of the well-known SDI program. The USSR is elaborating an alternative version of the development of forces, the basis of which is the concept of counteracting the multilevel air defense of the United States.

At the present time, the United States has the most advanced resources of the system for defense against missiles in space. For the next 10 to 15 years, nonetheless, there are plans for an extensive program to modernize all components of this system aimed at improving their efficiency and the establishment of a unified system of defense on the basis of the latest achievements of science, engineering, and promising technologies.

[Babakin] But why was the construction of the radar station in the region of the city of Mukachevo frozen? What happened there?

[Kraskovskiy] Indeed, the construction of the radar station in the region of Mukachevo was stopped by order of the USSR Council of Ministers on 2 August 1990. Work is now under way to mothball the buildings and facilities.

Construction questions and site of the direct placement of radar elements were coordinated in advance with agencies at the union, republic, and local levels. The facility began to be built after the conclusion of a state study. All indications are that the station would be completely harmless to health. The question of water use was studied separately.

But various informal organizations of Zakarpatskaya Oblast with the support of local party and soviet agencies began active propaganda about the supposed negative impact of the radar station under construction on people's health and on the environment. Unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations were held and there were strikes at enterprises. The basic demand was for the closing of the radar station under construction and of another one already operating. So it is.

The fight against these radars is actually just a screen under the cover of which the leaders of a number of informal organizations are producing speculation and attracting to their side the population of the oblast for

the accomplishment of narrow nationalistic goals, the blowing up of anti-army and antisocialist attitudes, and the gaining of political power.

[Babakin] But for some reason people developed fears. So probably by no means everything has been done to prevent the developing campaign against the radar station under construction?

[Kraskovskiy] In July 1989, by order of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, an extradepartmental commission was appointed under the chairmanship of corresponding member of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences V. Shestopalov to assess the supposed harmful influence of the facility. The commission included prominent scientists and specialists, including from Zakarpatskaya Oblast. They were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the construction and the technical documentation. The result was the conclusion that the basic parameters of the radiation that may affect the health of people and the environment do not exceed the allowed limits. In addition, they rejected the idea of the existence of a nuclear reactor at the facility. This year, by a decision of the State Commission on Military-Industrial Questions of the USSR Council of Ministers, a commission chaired by Academician Ye. Velikhov worked at the facility. The results of its work also confirmed that the strength of the electromagnetic flow does not exceed the established standards and will not represent a danger to the health of people and that the water supply will not harm the sources of mineral and ground waters.

[Babakin] Thus, Volter Makarovich, the government and the Defense Ministry took the necessary steps to calm the public and to prevent the spread of false rumors?

[Kraskovskiy] But these measures were clearly inadequate, especially at the time when events were just developing. I think that if the state and national security require such systems, then their operation must be ensured through the appropriate legislation. Then it will not be necessary to make concessions to localistic attitudes.

[Babakin] Accordingly, it is necessary to understand that as a result of the closing of this facility a certain amount of harm has been done to our national security?

[Kraskovskiy] The radar station in the region of Mukachevo is one of nine analogous facilities of the ballistic missile early warning system allowed by the Soviet-American ABM Treaty and deployed in sectors in danger of missiles. In the case at hand, the stopping of the construction of the radar station will lead to the loss of control of the southwest sector in danger of missiles, because the radar station now operating in this region will soon have exhausted its service life.

I am convinced that the cessation of the work on the radar station in the region of Mukachevo has done substantial harm to our security and increased our lag in

the development of national warning and monitoring systems in comparison with analogous systems of the United States.

As for economic losses, 109 million rubles of 158.6 million rubles for capital construction has already been spent. Significant sums have also been spent on the manufacture of technological equipment.

[Babakin] Are the forces satisfied with the level of armament? How is its improvement seen in the course of the military reform?

[Kraskovskiy] Monopolism in some areas of production and the lack of healthy competition among enterprises and of competitive developments is in some cases holding back the creation of systems with the necessary combat specifications. We have to be satisfied with what industry offers. But even so, the tactical and technical performance of our systems is not inferior to that of the Americans but even exceeds them in some indicators. The production equipment is most advanced in our country.

At the same time, there are also problems here. And quite a few. Thus, deadlines for the building of facilities are often exceeded because of the poor project planning of engineering complexes, the slow pace of construction work, the irregularity of deliveries, and the assembly and adjustment of gear and equipment. By the time they are put into operation, a significant part of the resource is expended and the equipment itself becomes obsolete to some extent. And troop specialists are also employed irrationally. Moreover the imperfection of the basic elements of some of the systems and gear and the inadequate reliability of mechanical equipment require a redundancy of individual elements, which leads to a complication of equipment as a whole and to the maintenance of a large number of officers and junior specialists for the performance of the tasks of alert duty and the servicing of equipment. Unfortunately, this is not always considered by individual officials who in the course of the military reform resolve questions in the manning of our forces.

[Babakin] What measures, in your view, are necessary to raise the dependability of these forces?

[Kraskovskiy] To do this under current conditions, it seems to me that the main efforts should concentrate on the improvement of the ballistic missile early warning system with the objective of raising its viability and increasing the warning time and on the creation of new systems to monitor the work performed by the United States in the SDI program.

It is also extremely important to develop a system of combat control of forces and systems in such a way that it can guarantee the comprehensive combat employment of all forces and systems of the USSR Armed Forces capable of combating the ballistic missiles and space systems of the probable adversary.

[Babakin] But are these measures sufficient? Is it possible that substantial guarantees from the state are still required?

[Kraskovsky] Considering the importance and strategic significance of the missions being performed by these forces, it appears expedient to define the special status of their installations in the Law on Defense. Under the conditions of the transition of the national economy to cost accounting and a regulated market, it is necessary to provide for the centralized supply under a priority state order of large special facilities of the forces in funded as well as unfunded production. It is desirable to entrust the establishment of new facilities to a single contract organization capable of developing a technological unit and an engineering complex on a competitive basis and of building the facility under a unified project to the point where it is turned over for operation. It is probable that such an approach would generally correspond to the spirit of the military reform being carried out.

[Babakin] Is it your personal opinion that the billions spent on SDI are paying off?

[Kraskovskiy] It is the general opinion of Western analysts that the SDI program will be unprecedented in its total cost and that its expenditures will exceed the largest military and civilian programs of the United States. Thus, the landing of a man on the moon cost \$120 billion (in the prices of fiscal year 1987) and the war of the United States in Indochina in 1965-1972 cost \$300 billion. According to the estimates of the "Union of Concerned Scientists," SDI will cost more than \$1 trillion. The technical idea behind SDI in the form in which it is advertised (the establishment of an invulnerable shield) is dubious, to put it mildly. There are many ways to overcome this system. But individual elements of it such as the space information system, for example, could make a substantial contribution to raising the combat capabilities of national systems for warning and monitoring. Many directions of work on this program such as the development of anti-missile missiles in the interests of SDI are dead ends.

[Babakin] How many reconnaissance installations of the adversary are aimed at the USSR every year? Are they becoming more or less numerous? It is obvious that it is now extremely important for the Soviet people to talk about this so that they could have an idea of the disposition of forces in the world and could decide whether or not it is necessary to increase national security.

[Kraskovskiy] Surveillance of the territory of the USSR through the reconnaissance systems of the United States of America is accomplished with the help of different kinds of artificial satellites and radar stations.

The reconnaissance satellites of the United States are placed in orbits from 200 to 4,000 km high and equipped with photographic and movie cameras, with infrared and multispectral sensors, and with equipment for radio interception. They perform continuous day and night

reconnaissance over the territory of the USSR. With their help, objects are photographed, information in radio networks is monitored, and missile launches and nuclear blasts are detected.

The network of radar stations monitoring the territory of the USSR for the purpose of the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles includes the systems for warning of nuclear missile strikes BMEWS (three radar posts—in Greenland, Alaska, and Great Britain) and Pave Paws (four posts in the territory of the United States, two of which are aimed at the territory of the USSR), the radar station PAR [phased-array radar] of the former Safeguard air defense complex (in North Dakota), and the radar facility Cobra Dane (on the island of Shemya in the Pacific Ocean). Aircraft moving in the direction of the United States are detected through a system of 14 radars above the horizon and four radars beyond the horizon.

At the present time, 36 U.S. reconnaissance satellites with operational on-board equipment are aimed at the USSR. Low-orbit satellites are carrying out radar, optical-electronic, and radio and radio-engineering reconnaissance of the country's territory as well as radio-engineering reconnaissance of the likely sea and oceanic theaters of naval operations.

Low-orbit reconnaissance satellites make 42 passes over the territory of the USSR every day.

[Babakin] We are now hearing frequent critical comments in the press, radio, and television about the army, including the forces that you named, devouring the people's money "uselessly." What is your opinion in this regard?

[Kraskovskiy] I have already had the occasion to speak on this subject when I met with labor collectives in the Transcarpathian and Baltic districts. Some people are frankly in error when they think that in relations between states the efforts of our diplomacy have put an end to wars once and for all. Apparently the successes of diplomacy are not always illuminated objectively here. Everything is done to extol their own assessments and adequate consideration is not given to the assessments of the other side. Many people get the erroneous idea of the achievement of absolute security for our country and of the lack of need for powerful armed forces and expensive weapon systems. If I may put it this way, we are seeing a kind of self-disarmament syndrome. Hence the protests against military facilities.

And what is the result? The U.S. administration does not completely rule out the possibility under certain circumstances, of course, of a return to confrontation. It is strengthening its own armed forces and protecting all national defense systems. There they do not by any means have a situation in which they have ceased construction of facilities like our radar stations or in which harm has been done to some component of strategic offensive arms.

Here even the conclusions of the State Commission on the harmlessness of the radar station in the region of Mukachevo were not taken into account. This creates the false impression that the armed forces and the troops under consideration are "devouring" the people's money.

I assume that the reader will judge for himself who is right.

[Babakin] Today many criticize our armed forces for the low level of military discipline. Frequently this criticism is justified. But what is the state of discipline among those who serve in the forces that we are talking about here? For as we understand you, they have a particular degree of responsibility there.

[Kraskovskiy] I will say frankly that this question is quite acute. The unconstitutional decisions of the supreme soviets of several republics on military questions are pushing young people into crime. We have cases of the unauthorized abandonment of units by service personnel called up from Georgia, Armenia, and the Baltic republics. As a rule, parents take the Georgians and Armenians away from the units in private cars. Those from the Baltic republics have a different method. They send telegrams attested by physicians with the request that the soldier be dismissed to visit gravely ill relatives. We let them go and they do not return to the unit. A follow-up reveals that the requests are false.

And sometimes they resort to open slander. Thus, on 30 June of this year, a certain S. Chaykovskiy who was called up by the Babushkin Rayon Military Commissariat of the city of Dnepropetrovsk came to the troop receiver to perform his military service. By 5 July he came to the medical unit complaining of stomach pains. As it turned out later, this was gastritis. That same day the soldier calls his parents to the unit. After talking with her son, the mother informs her fellow workers at her enterprise about unstatutory relations in the unit and asks for help. And there, without giving it a lot of thought, they take action. They send a telegram that says the following: "To delegate of 28th CPSU Congress from Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Comrade G.G. Lobode and USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov. The collective of motor vehicle enterprise 0461 of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Gosstroy demands an immediate investigation in the current wildly criminal situation in the military unit. The debauchery of the 'old ways' has attained an incredible scope leading to two deaths. On 4 July, the son of our worker Chaykovsky was beaten and intimated to the point that if measures are not taken he will also kill himself. Immediately [give an] answer to the enterprise and by television to all mothers. Secretary of the party organization Tsalko."

[Babakin] What a slashing telegram!

[Kraskovskiy] Yes, you read these lines and it is bitter and insulting to you. How far they can go in their striving to defile the army! In July, a commission of representatives of the General Staff, main commissariat of the Air

Defense Forces, and medical institutions worked in the units. No signs of a beating were found in medical examinations. And S. Chaykovskiy did not complain to anyone about this. All of the soldiers in the unit declared that Chaykovskiy was being deceitful and they talked about his unwillingness to serve and his striving to avoid performing his service duties. Well, the result was the defiling of a good military collective, the collective of a motor vehicle enterprise was deceived, and officers, sergeants, and soldiers were offended.

It appears that this example can give food for thought. Is it not time to call to administrative and, in some cases, to criminal account for slandering the army? World practice shows that in many states they are very strict about attempts to defile service personnel. Substantial money fines have been introduced. It is probably time to resort to these measures here in our country as well.

Under the conditions at hand, it is necessary to seek new forms of explanatory and educational work with personnel. For help we bring in the people's deputies of the soviets and representatives of judicial bodies. But here it is necessary to do a great deal of work with people.

* * *

Let us be frank. Our armed forces are now living through a difficult time. Mass meetings are being held at the Defense Ministry building, the military commissariats are being blocked, and anti-army demonstrations are being organized in different military units. All of this is causing concern about the fate of the armed forces and our defense capability. And now it is still too early to say that the superradars can be retired. They will perform their difficult duty for many years to come. But now, under the conditions of military reform and the reduction of the armed forces, it has become necessary for interested persons and our government to maintain a very prudent attitude toward systems for ballistic missile early warning, the monitoring of space, and antiballistic-missile defense. For they were built at the price of the incredible efforts of the entire nation. Localistic egoism, manifestations of nationalism, and anti-army attitudes must not hinder the actions of our forces.

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Critique of Ministry Thesis on Military Doctrine

91UM0309A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Jan 91 First Edition, pp 1, 3

[Article, published under the heading "Military Reform: Political Notes" by Maj Gen (Ret) I. Vorobyev, doctor of military sciences, professor: "Has Everything Been Weighed Out in Our Doctrine?"]

[Text] Military doctrine is rightly considered to be the "holy of holies" in the state's defense system. Its main purpose is to set the optimum directions for preparing the nation and the Armed Forces to repel possible aggression. Naturally, mistakes are possible here. If tactics is in error, then regiments and divisions can suffer a defeat. Incorrect guidelines in strategy lie as a heavy burden on the shoulders of the entire army. An incorrect military doctrine exposes the nation to a strike in the event of a war.

On the eve of World War II, France, as is known, possessed great military potential. Its army was considered to be one of the best in Europe. Why was such a strong state defeated by Nazi Germany with lightning-like speed (over 40 days)? Charles de Gaulle considered one of the main reasons for the catastrophic defeat of France to be the fallibility of its military doctrine. "In the army notions prevailed," he wrote, "which had been maintained even before the end of World War I...."

I feel that now, when we are discussing the draft plans for a military reform and a document concerning our state's military doctrine, it is quite to the point to recall this.

It is worthy of note that the designated drafts were brought up for discussion, as they say, all in a bunch. This is particularly important under conditions where discussions are actively underway on the question of fundamental changes in the Army and Navy. Many of the arguments on this question found in the press suffer from one-sidedness and superficiality. This is largely explained by the fact, in my view, that the problems of the Armed Forces are viewed in isolation from the demands of military doctrine. Seemingly, people do not realize that the elaboration of correct doctrinal ideas facilitates the reforming of the army. Precisely a military doctrine based upon an assessment of the international situation, the threat of a military danger for the nation and forecasts of the nature of a possible war and the methods of waging it predetermines what the Armed Forces should be so that they can provide a dependable defense of the fatherland.

Let us recall the history of the development of our state and the founding of the Red Army. Even during the years of the Civil War on the pages of the journal VOYENNOYE DELO, the notion was persistently voiced that a new army could not be created and questions of a military technical policy resolved without having determined the doctrinal concepts. As soon as the war was over, the question of a unified Soviet military doctrine

was put at the center of attention of the nation's leadership. As a result, a doctrine appeared which, as we know, played a major role in carrying out the military reform in 1924-1925 and strengthening the defense capability of our state in the interwar period.

What can we say about the new draft of the document on USSR military doctrine published in a special issue of the journal VOYENNOYE MYSL at the end of last year? First of all, I would point out that its text has preserved a line of succession with the document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States" adopted in May 1987. We feel that this is a positive aspect. Certainly, over the past almost four years, many provisions of this document have been tested out in practice and have demonstrated their viability. The defensive military doctrine worked out on the basis of the new political thinking for the allied states has played an important role in lessening international tension. There can be no doubt that maintaining the general focus to the political aspect of the new Soviet military doctrine of preventing war in the future will help to strengthen collaboration and mutual trust between our country and other states.

As a whole, the military-technical aspect of the previously adopted doctrine has proven effective. The structure of our Armed Forces has been transformed in a defensive spirit, the number of military districts, armies and divisions has been reduced, there has been a fundamental change in the ratio of the offensive and defensive means of armed combat in favor of the latter, budget allocations for military requirements are being reduced and military production is being converted. But the draft of the new document sets out the essence of the military technical aspect of our doctrine in a fuller form. This is very positive because it is essential to clearly determine what sort of Armed Forces we require at the present stage and how they are to be readied for combat operations in the event of a war.

What does the document state on this question? Certainly, no one would dispute the initial premise that the Armed Forces must be prepared in such a manner that they could carry out their tasks with any variation of the unleashing of aggression against our country. The draft clearly states: "The troops and naval forces are to be prepared to repel an enemy attack under any situational condition." However, is it advisable in the doctrine to stipulate ahead of time, as has been done in the draft—regardless of how the conditions of the operational-strategic situation may develop at the outset of the war—how precisely and in what specific manner the Armed Forces should carry out the tasks of repelling aggression?

The document states that "with the start of aggression, the defensive is to be the main type of military operations." I feel that such rigidity is in no way justifiable. It turns out that under all circumstances we are ordered to act passively. But in any war, particularly a modern one, this is fraught with a loss of strategic initiative and

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JPRS-UMA-91-006
4 March 1991

unpredictable consequences for the army and the nation. One has merely to recall the lessons of 1941. The very perilous situation in which our state was at the start of the Great Patriotic War was largely caused by the fact that the Red Army had immediately lost the initiative.

Under present-day conditions the massed employment of new, more powerful, longer-range, high-precision and highly maneuverable weapons can have an immeasurably greater impact on achieving the goals of the first operations. This cannot help but be considered by military doctrine. Its main essence is that our state proclaims and legislatively assumes the obligation under no circumstances to be the first to commence military operations against any other state and not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. But if an aggressor all the same dares to attack us, war has its own harsh laws. In repelling an attack, we have the right to choose those methods of actions which will conform to the existing situation. Military doctrine cannot and should not make a routine of military art or assign it a unilateral focus for employing any one type of combat. On this question extremes are dangerous.

Too simple, it seems to me, is the thesis in the draft document that "the theory and practice of military art are to be developed on the basis of the concept of a 'defensive strategy'." The uniformity and concreteness of the recommendations on such a supercomplex phenomenon as armed combat are always fraught with major errors. For armies this has inevitably ended up with major losses. These lessons could only be relearned on the battlefield.

As is known, our prewar doctrine as expressed in the RKKA [Workers and Peasant Red Army] Field Manuals oriented the troops to conducting decisive offensive operations when they crossed into foreign territory. Was it not for this reason that our border formations, with the onset of the war, regardless of the complexity and uncertainty of the situation and the obvious enemy superiority, endeavored at whatever the cost to attack the enemy and as a consequence of which suffered decisive losses, were encircled and lost their combat capability?

I feel that at present it would be more correct in the document to include the following provision: "the development of the theory and practice of military art is carried out on the basis of the concept of a strategy of 'adequate response'." That is, the Armed Forces should choose and employ those forms and methods of conducting an operation and battle which correspond to the existing situation and ensure the achieving of decisive superiority over the enemy. Proceeding from such a premise in peacetime the troops should learn to conduct combat under any of their forms. The priorities in choosing the types of combat would not be defined ahead of time. The policy should not be locked directly in the tactics. As is known, the level of the combat skill of the troops is determined by the effectiveness of the diverse methods employed by them for conducting an operation

or battle depending upon what enemy they are facing, what capabilities they possess and how the balance of forces develops. It is not the function of military doctrine to delve into these internal processes of armed combat or "blinker" the specific decisions of the commanders in the abruptly and sharply changing situation.

Many forecasts and recommendations related to the elaboration of our defensive doctrine and the possible methods of conducting combat operations have been voiced on the pages of the press, including newspapers and magazines which are seemingly far removed from the military problems. In particular, this issue has been joined by the omnipresent KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. For example, take the article by A. Kalinin "...And Are Our Tanks Fast?" published on 27 May 1989.

I refer precisely to this material, although there have been many later publications on the military question since it, in my view, shows a particularly noticeable cast of pacifism. It is certainly no secret that the article in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was aimed at shaping public opinion and primarily among the youth. For this reason, it seems to me, we cannot overlook the judgments voiced by the author and which are far from incontestable.

Thus, having aimed at analyzing the concepts of "defensive military doctrine," "defensive strategy," "defensive sufficiency" and "nonoffensive defense," A. Kalinin concludes that "in our military potential...much has been superfluous for the purposes of defense." In principle such a conclusion is not devoid of validity. But what curious arguments are adduced for proof? In the opinion of the author, "defense capability" is primarily the ability to defend oneself, that is, to check the plans of the enemy, to demonstrate to it the unattainability and unrealisticness of the enemy's plans.... "Defense understood in this manner," he goes on to argue, "does not envisage either the crushing of the enemy, the capturing and holding of its territory or parts of it or the causing of unacceptable harm to the enemy...." And finally: "The aggressor should be expelled from the territory which he has invaded.... In the event of an attack, the enemy should be denied a victory. And only that."

I excuse myself for the long quote. But if I were to retell the idea of the article in my own words, the reader simply could not believe that the author had actually written such a thing. Certainly if we were to follow his logic, then a minimum of weapons is all that would be needed for the defense of the nation in order to merely "frighten off" or "intimidate" the aggressor. In "resolving" the problem of national security so easily and simply, the author has either forgotten or did not wish to remember that World War II drew into its orbit scores of states, it engulfed an enormous territory and lasted almost six years and carried off millions of human lives. The Soviet Union alone lost 27 million persons "to deny the enemy a victory."

It is lamentable that such scholastic arguments on security are conducted in a country which, it can be said, has still not recovered from the terrors of the last war. Particularly, as I have already said, as the author is aiming at young persons who are not sophisticated in military affairs. This is far from harmless. In this manner a psychology of nonchalance is formed and negative attitudes are created for the army.

Unfortunately, something like indications of pacifism are also present in the draft of the document reviewed on military doctrine. It does not clearly express the strict demand of the times on the need for constantly maintaining the combat readiness of the Armed Forces on a proper level. Clearly here one can feel the influence of those positive processes which are now occurring in the world. Undoubtedly, there is a feeling of profound satisfaction with the circumstance that the previously opposing countries more and more are opening up to one another and alienation is being replaced by trust. All the same, the realities of today are such that the conveyor belt of the arms race, although running more slowly, has not halted. The policy of "from a position of strength" has not been confined to the archives because of unsuitability.

Can we disregard all of this? At the same time, from the high parliamentary rostrums of the Union and republics optimistic (or more accurately, irresponsible) assertions can be heard from certain deputies such as: "No one is threatening us...." One must be blind and dumb not to notice that around the territory of the USSR along the entire perimeter of the frontiers, an enormous number of foreign military bases and facilities has been established and close to our southern frontiers the flames of a war called "Desert Storm" have already broken out. It is no secret that under present-day conditions an aggressor will endeavor in every possible way to employ the surprise factor, to do everything possible to dull the vigilance of the chosen victim, to disorient and disinform the enemy about one's plans. It goes without saying that a military doctrine should orient the Army and Navy at the necessity of constantly being on guard. A war does not forgive errors made in peacetime on questions of military preparedness. While in the past such errors could at least at the price of great sacrifice be somehow rectified, the development trends of military affairs are such that the start of a war will more and more predetermine its outcome.

As was already said, the falaciousness of the military doctrines of many states in the past was primarily that their provisions were based on an erroneous forecast of a future war. As a result, these doctrines often focused the armed forces on preparing not for a new war but in essence the previous war, naturally dooming them to failure. In history there has virtually never been a case when any general staff succeeded in working out ahead of time a precise scenario for a future war and anticipating all its nuances. At present, we are being convinced of this again by the "blitzkrieg" which has ground to a halt in the Near East.

Life has always made corrections in the most prophetic and inspired plans. Clearly this will be the case in the future. However, this in no way means that military science is impotent in objectively and reliably recreating the strategic appearance of a possible war. This can and must be done. On the basis of disclosing the trends and patterns of armed combat and on the basis of profound forecasts. In this manner, a firm foundation can be established for working out a farsighted military doctrine.

Initial Troop Reaction to Ministry Reform Plan

91UM0240A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Bedula under the "Military Reform: Problems and Suggestions" rubric: "A Part in the Law"]

[Text] The draft version of the military reform plan prepared by the USSR Ministry of Defense is being discussed in the Army and Navy. I would prefer to say that it is being discussed everywhere actively, constructively, and with interest, but as yet there is no basis to make that kind of positive statement. I arrived at that conclusion after having visited a number of units and subunits of the Volga-Ural Military District.

Why is the attitude of at least some servicemen incomensurate with the importance of this general program of changes in the state's military policy? It is a fact that this is actually a matter of the future of the Army.

"In part, that is because the document came to us in a nontraditional manner," Lieutenant Colonel S. Yermokhin, commander of a separate communications training battalion, said to me. "We learned of the Ministry of Defense's plan from press reports; we found out the most by reading the magazine VOYENNAYA MYSL, the newspapers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK, and the district newspaper ZA RODINU. But why not from guidance documents of the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, Main Political Directorate?"

Incidentally, I never could obtain an answer to this question in the district.

It is a good thing that the editorial office of the newspaper ZA RODINU decided on its own initiative to reprint the text of the plan from PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK (No 48). That did much to facilitate its study and dissemination among the troops.

A person could differ with Lieutenant Colonel Yermokhin, of course: Since he follows the press so closely, why must he require departmental publication of the draft document? However, in my conversations with people, I became quite convinced that there is a need to do so. Part of the reason is that any document that comes down to troops through military channels receives a different kind of reception than one, say, published in

the mass media. In addition, what we have here is a truly unique document, one that determines the future of the Armed Forces.

Many persons with whom I attempted to discuss the pros and cons of the draft plan said, "It has not gotten to us yet," or "I have not read it."

Major V. Pilipenko, unit executive officer, was more definite in his reply: "I have no time to read. Too much work."

However, it seems to me that this is not so much a matter of how busy a person is. I can recall how much working time was spent by hundreds and hundreds of district officers and warrant officers on discussing and writing suggestions for draft versions of such documents as the General Military Regulations, Instructions for CPSU Organizations in the Armed Forces, Statute on Military Political Organs, USSR Law on Defense, and others. The upshot was the center's not only not thanking anyone for the gigantic effort, but failure to provide information as to what part of the servicemen's collective creative work found its way into the guidance documents. Therefore, the present cool attitude on the part of certain officers and warrant officers toward the request to "discuss" and "offer suggestions" is not without foundation.

It would of course be untrue to say that the troops are underrating the value of the draft plan. In many directorates and departments of the District Staff the document was immediately duplicated and discussed at officer assemblies and service conferences. An effort is currently under way to systematize the ideas and suggestions. Every officer that works with troops is speaking to personnel on the subject. This today is the most widespread form of discussion: a dialogue, a conversation between an officer from the Staff or Political Directorate and officers and warrant officers. It is another matter that this particular talk is of a more general nature, one in which there are more questions than answers. For example, speakers from the Political Directorate are often asked the question: If the fourth Supreme Soviet session did not take a position on the military reform issue, postponing action pending conclusion of the Union Treaty, is there any purpose to working on it in primary Army structures? Are we not being hasty?

Lieutenant Colonel V. Usmanov, commander of a motorized rifle training regiment, was "assaulted" with questions which really should not be directed at him: Who exactly did participate in developing the plan? How realistic are social guarantees under conditions of an unpredictable market? Where do the political parties stand relative to the draft plan?

"I know that officers in other regiments are asking command authorities that kind of question," Lieutenant Colonel Usmanov told me. "Why can't representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff spend some time with the troops and appear on Central Television, radio, and in the press? We have more than a

passing interest in the opinions of the various parties, since their role in society should not be underestimated."

Yes, this is reality: The political situation in the country has an enormous effect on the making of decisions involving the Armed Forces. It became especially clear to me during discussion of the USSR Law on Defense. The District Staff received many suggestions and ideas from local soviets, laborers, the intelligentsia, and labor collectives. Although many suggestions were inclined to be declarative and did not always pertain squarely to the particular problems, the fact that the civilian sector is exhibiting a heightened interest in the Army is uncommon in itself.

This attention has lately even increased. This is understandable. Military reform presupposes reduction in the Army. For soviets of all levels, this means that additional concerns are on the way, concerns of a legal, social, and even psychological nature. How to resolve them? Representatives of local authorities and people's deputies propose that they set up a series of round table discussions with the military, based on the principle: military unit—village soviet, large unit—city and rayon soviets, District Staff—oblast and Supreme soviets of republics. Only in this way will the draft plan suggestions worked out in concert constitute a well-founded, constructive whole.

Taking everything into account, this approach is acceptable to all sides. However, that is not all, there is another problem: Is everyone in the military willing to participate in the discussion? This is not a rhetorical question. For example, Senior Warrant Officer V. Vyagin told me that the document is difficult to understand: "I really think that it should be rewritten so that it can be better understood." Vyagin is not alone here, it must be admitted. This means that it needs additional explanatory work, particularly with enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and civilians of the Soviet Army, and with servicemen's dependents.

In my view, organizational work involving study of the draft plan requires clarification. I had a talk with Lieutenant Colonel V. Akulov, communications regiment deputy commander for political affairs. Vladimir Aleksandrovich voiced the following complaint: "In accordance with instructions received from the Main Political Directorate, we are to carry out political sessions with officers to discuss problems dealing with Armed Forces reform in June, and with warrant officers, in March.

"The scheduling patently does not reflect the mood of the regiment's personnel. Discussion of the plan is already under way. However, there is nothing I can do to make any changes in the scheduling."

What kind of contribution will the Volga-Ural Military District make to improving the military reform plan? My question was answered by Colonel N. Krasnyy, District Political Directorate deputy chief:

"We operate on the principle that not a single serviceman should be ignored in the plan discussion. In addition, it does not matter if, say, the contribution made by communications personnel will differ from that of military builders, or if the summations drawn up by senior officers are more substantial than those submitted by junior officers. The main thing is that the work involve everyone, for the plan, which will later become law, will affect everyone without exception, from private to marshal."

**Explanation of Authorship of Ministry Draft
'Concept'**

*91UM0240B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Jan 91 First Edition p 4*

[Unattributed article: "Proposals Are Waiting in the General Staff"]

[Text] Editors: The newspapers have printed the draft of the military reform. I would like to know the name of the

draft's author and where I can send my suggestions for incorporation into the draft.

Colonel A. Kozlov

We have ascertained by querying the USSR Armed Forces General Staff that no single individual is responsible for writing the draft of the military reform concept. As explained by Major General A. Goloborodov, the draft was prepared by the General Staff, which considered the opinions submitted by military and political leaders, scholars, and persons who write about Army problems for the periodical press. Now the general Army and Navy community has its chance for input. For greater dissemination of information, the drafts of the military reform concept and USSR military doctrine have been published in a special edition of VOYEN-NAYA MYSL and a number of district newspapers.

It is planned to rework the results of the draft discussion by 20 March, after which they will be submitted to the President of the USSR.

Comments and suggestions may be sent to: 103160, Moscow, K-160, USSR Armed Forces General Staff.

Tula Workers Ready To Barter Arms for Food
91US0301A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by S. Bobrovskiy: "Delayed-Action Billions"]

[Text] "...peoples amuse themselves playing with governments until one day a taciturn battleship arrives in their waters and tells them: Don't you break your toys!" (O. Henry)

Political scientists pay so much attention in their predictions to the development of relations along the Gorbachev-Yeltsin axis that at times it appears that conflicts would die down, strikes would come to an end, and the country would fall silent in anticipation of forthcoming prosperity and welfare if these individuals embraced each other on TV. To be sure, it is disturbing that the contemporary history of our great country so interpreted bears a suspect resemblance to "The Tale of How Ivan Ivanovich and Ivan Nikiforovich Quarreled."

In general, nobody has yet refuted Lenin's concept that politics is a concentrated expression of economics. However, if this is the case, why is emotional politics, politics of sympathies and antipathies, so ubiquitous, and, finally, where is interest-driven politics? He who pays the piper calls the tune. Could it be that at present our economy is so sick that it has nothing to pay for the choices with?

We have stooped to barter. These words of the previous prime minister describe the attained level of collapse in the national economy quite accurately. Indeed, we have stooped, and indeed, we have stooped to barter. Of course, a natural economy does not look very decent at a time when the curtain is about to fall on the 20th century. However, economists have talked for so long about market mechanisms being natural, self-generating, and ineradicable that it makes sense to consider barter from this point of view as well.

Indeed, is not direct bartering of goods a real mode of self-defense by enterprises against two woes at once—the administrative command system and the cheap ruble? Labor collectives which have goods in demand (color TV sets, meat, cars, and cold-rolled steel) may procure everything they and their production facilities need (cars, TV sets, meat, and cold-rolled steel) without outside help.

Barter has already spawned commodity exchanges. This is like an announcement in the GUM department store: "Citizens who have lost each other should meet in front of the enquiry office." Very soon the exchanges will discover goods which are fit not only for immediate consumption but also as a means of payment in mutual settlements between sellers and buyers. We will be but a step away from exchange obligations and exchange money. This will almost amount to a market.

Of course, the spontaneous development of events is not the fastest way to overcome chaos. After all, it is easier

for an individual to be born by his own mother than "evolve" from an ape again. However, let us recall that it took humanity millennia to progress from a natural economy to an exchange; meanwhile, we "replicated" this path in half a year.

The main point is that the market has become a quite realistic and virtually palpable prospect due to highly undesirable barter. It is no longer some kind of a theoretical fact, it "really exists."

Is it advantageous for everyone? Obviously, it is not. Otherwise, we would not practice politics but would rather proceed confidently toward our common goal.

The administrative command system (AKS) stands to lose, but not all of it. There will be business left for ministry officials to attend to. Even the core of the administrative command system, the party apparatus, is slowly adjusting to new conditions: It is opening hard-currency hotels, investing money in small enterprises, and letting cooperative members use its printing plants. The party apparatus even has a good chance to control production through its participation in the banking system with a greater effect than before (almost everything necessary to this end is available—funds, structures, information, connections, and their own people in industry).

The military-industrial complex remains. It also stands to lose.

We assail the administrative command system a lot, and foolishly at times, for being an administrative system, for being a command-driven system, for failing to ensure the affluent life for us. Was it really designed to do this? No. The military-industrial complex was its alpha and omega. Having answered in the affirmative the question of whether it was possible to build socialism in one separate country, we made ours the situation of a fortress under siege from the very beginning. This preordained everything else inexorably.

A fortress is forced to rely only on its own resources; it cannot do without Uzbek cotton, Baku oil, Ukrainian ore, and so on. It is doomed to be an empire.

A fortress means readiness condition No. 1, orders are not subject to discussion, and a loud mouth is a godsend for a spy.

A fortress means that the main point is to endure; anything is better than nothing. It is not "more cotton prints for our female Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members" but rather more rail sidings and armored trains on them, and only later more cotton prints in order to boost the productivity of female labor. The administrative command system has accomplished its task well for decades: Everything for victory, everything for the military-industrial complex. The best tank, the best plane, the best hydrogen bomb, the first cosmonaut in orbit... No other system would have been able to evacuate its industry beyond the Urals

within months. Our system was able to; it was designed to. It was not designed "to provide for every family its own apartment."

Our military industrial complex is by its very nature an industry financed from the state budget and, for now, an anti-market industry. What is a cannon producer to do when a butter producer seeks refuge from the cheap ruble by means of barter?

Conversion is the only measure which may reconcile the military-industrial complex and the market, that is, broadly interpreted conversion: Not just shrinking "the defense industry" and changing its production lines to "civilian" ones, but a realistic, socially guaranteed program of implanting military production facilities in a competitive economy whereby a tank will have a normal price based on supply and demand rather than a list price set by a government official. However, for now conversion has bogged down. This is why the military-industrial complex is still armed and very dangerous.

The fondly remembered "500 days" program faded away without drawing serious criticism. Why? I quote: "...reductions will be implemented from the first day of the reform... and will primarily affect the following spheres of the national economy: 1. Military-industrial complex." End of quote; there is no need to continue it; this was the death warrant for the program.

Participants in the meeting of top producers of the military-industrial complex (the December meeting of managers of state enterprises) were the first to respond in winter to the reign of barter. The press interpreted many of their speeches as an ultimatum to the president.

...Colonel Alksnis from the Soyuz group of deputies was the first to frankly threaten Gorbachev with creating the Committee of Public Salvation.

...On 12 January of this year, several hours before the Vilnius events, a telegram was sent to the president from Tula:

"Moscow, the Kremlin. To President Gorbachev.

"The foodstuffs problem in Tula borders on a crisis which is due to the peculiarities of its industry. Dissatisfaction of workers at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex mounts. In addition, the once high wages at defense-industry plants are becoming some of the lowest in the city. The situation compels us to put forth an INITIATIVE TO SELL TULA ARMS TO OTHER REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY IN EXCHANGE FOR FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER GOODS. The workers hold the USSR Government and you personally solely responsible for the situation. Nikolay Matveyev, brigade leader of metal workers of the Arms Plant, deputy of the oblast soviet. Tula, Mira Street, 15."

...On 11 January, the USSR Supreme Soviet session confirmed defense expenditures amounting to 96 billion rubles—7 billion less than the Ministry of Defense had requested, 7,000,000,000 less...

...On 12 January, a self-appointed committee embarked on saving Lithuania.

If there is a gun hanging on the wall in the first act, it will be fired in the third act. In our country, in view of the size of the military-industrial complex, guns hang all over the stage. It is no wonder that they are fired non-stop.

They say that tanks fired blanks in Vilnius. However, in the course of it they laid direct fire on the president. Let us count "hits" in order to make sure that it was so: A threat of political strikes, demands to resign, and a Western semi-boycott. Whose position took more fire?

The widespread version is that the president has accumulated so much power that he may even have the tanks roll. What if he is not strong enough to stop the tanks?

Democracy or a Gorbachev dictatorship? This is how the issue is raised at present. A different scenario, a dictatorship instead of Gorbachev, and certainly instead of democracy, appears to be more realistic to me personally.

'Cossack 100's' to Aid in Pre-Draft Training

91UM0325A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by A. Bushev, KP correspondent: "The Kuban. The Cossacks."]

[Text] The chief [ataman] of the Kuban cossack assembly made the decision to form an officers' cossack "100" organization.

The Officers' Club is actually taking names of those wishing to become members of the cossack "100." Reserve officers, as well as officers still on active military duty, are being registered. As yet, there are no regulations governing the new organization, but it was proposed that the "100" become active within the organizational structure of the Kuban cossack assembly. The

commander of the "100" is an elective position, and military men from the ranks of senior officers will run in an election for this post.

One of the priority tasks that the future "100" is taking upon itself is the military-patriotic education of young men and their preparation for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army; that is, no politics, and sabers will remain in their scabbards, so promise the organizers.

But somehow, it is alarming. Especially, in the face of the latest cossack news. For example, from the Don. Here, in recent days a Great Circle of the Rostov cossacks took place. The essence of the majority of speeches: An alternative cossack power is necessary in the Don region.

Cossacks of the Kuban are preparing for a meeting, and are planning it for a week from now, on January 24th. On that day 72 years ago, secret instructions were signed, ordering the Red Army to annihilate to a man all cossacks, because they were inimical to the new society.

Round-Table on RSFSR Military Organization

91UM0224A Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 90 (Signed to press 13 Nov 90) pp 10-20

[Round-Table discussion moderated by VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Editor-in-Chief Major General V. Filatov with the following participants: Candidate of Historical Sciences Major General L. Ivashov, Doctor of Historical Sciences Colonel V. Zolotarev, and Candidate of Legal Sciences Colonel of Justice A. Yemelin, under the rubric "To Assist Those Studying Military History": "RSFSR Military Minister?"]

[Text] The April 26, 1990 Law of the USSR "On Delimitation of Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation" simply states that "the organization of defense, leadership of the USSR Armed Forces, border guards, and internal and railroad troops, and insurance of the USSR's state security" (Article 6, Paragraph 12) are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the person of its highest organs of state power and government.

However, on June 23, 1990, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Congress of People's Deputies, as the basis of the New Union Treaty, adopted a resolution "On Delimitation of the Government Functions of Organizations on the Territory of the RSFSR," Article 7 of which establishes "the designation of special representatives of the RSFSR with the rank of Ministers of the RSFSR for cooperation with enterprises and organizations of union departments on the territory of the RSFSR (the Ministry of Defense, KGB, Ministry of Civil Aviation, MPS [Ministry of Railroads], Ministry of the Merchant Fleet, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of the Nuclear Energy Industry.)"

The magazine's editors have received many letters in this regard. Our readers are asking us to explain if there is not an unauthorized contradiction of USSR and RSFSR laws in the articles cited, they ask if there is not anything similar in the history of our Homeland and what jurisdiction the RSFSR military representative under the USSR Ministry of Defense will have, and they are interested in the nature of mutual relations....

VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Editor-in-Chief Major General V. Filatov posed these and other questions on this timely topic to scholars. Those individuals who participated in the conversation are already well-known to you, dear readers, through previous round-tables: Candidate of Historical Sciences Major General L. Ivashov, Doctor of Historical Sciences Colonel V. Zolotarev, and Candidate of Legal Sciences Colonel of Justice A. Yemelin.

[Filatov] So, how do we begin the discussion of the questions that our readers have posed? Maybe you recall if there were similar government structures in the history

of our state. It will also be easier to examine contemporary problems while relying on the past.

[Ivashov] I propose limiting the historical excursion to the Soviet period. So we will find ourselves closer to understanding the situation that has developed and possible ways to resolve it when we consider the experience we already have.

[Filatov] I think our joint discussions of timely problems of native military history and the attempt to not simply discuss and express our thoughts but also to strictly argue our position, to present evidence from reliable sources, and to acquaint our readers with new documents and materials or to recall already well-known, but undeservedly forgotten or little-used documents have become a fine tradition.... I hope that we will also maintain the course taken during today's discussion.

[Yemelin] The January 15 (28), 1918 RSFSR Council of People's Commissars Decree on organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army [RKKA] laid the foundation for the structural development of the Soviet Armed Forces as a permanent army which was tasked to serve as the "bulwark of Soviet rule." The decree prescribed that strict centralization of the RKKA's leadership is one of the most important principles of its formation. The decree stated that "The Council of People's Commissars is the supreme ruling organ of the Worker's and Peasant's Red Army. Direct leadership and command and control of the army is concentrated in the Commissariat for Military Affairs and in the Special All-Russian Collegium created under it."

[Filatov] Russia was a multiethnic country and therefore naturally the question was immediately raised about taking into account the specific features and capabilities of individual ethnic regions in the unified process of the Soviet State's military structural development....

[Ivashov] It seems that the April 8, 1918 RSFSR Council of People's Commissars Decree on founding volost [small administrative unit], uyezd [district], guberniya [provincial], and okrug [district] commissariats for military affairs to a certain extent served to resolve possible contradictions. In particular, it stated that local military command and control organs had been established "to implement measures to register and conscript the fit population for military service and to form the Russian Soviet Republic's armed forces, train to a man all workers and peasants not exploiting other peoples' labor for the military profession, and administration of troops tasked to serve local needs, and to satisfy the material needs of military supply...."

[Zolotarev] I will continue the thought while analyzing individual provisions of the April 8, 1918 Leninist Decree which, in my opinion, best help to clarify the attitude of Soviet Russia's military political leadership toward the issue being discussed. It is no coincidence that, besides the Council of People's Commissars Chairman, the People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs also signed this legislative act. Volost, uyezd, and

guberniya military commissariats were formed by the appropriate Soviets in the form of two commissars for military affairs and one military instructor and the okrug voyenkomat [military commissariat]—the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs. At the same time, commissars and volost military commissariat military instructors were approved by the uyezd Soviet, the uyezd military commissariat by the guberniya Soviet, and the guberniya military commissariat by the People's Commissar for Military Affairs. The principle of vertical subordination of local military command and control organs was established: The volost commissar for military affairs was subordinate to the uyezd commissar for military affairs and the uyezd commissar for military affairs was subordinate to the guberniya commissar for military affairs, etc.

[Filatov] What were local military command and control organs specifically charged to do?

[Yemelin] The jurisdiction of local military command and control organs differed depending on their location in the military commissariat system. For example, the uyezd commissariat for military affairs unified and directed the activities of volost military commissariats; conducted registration of the population contingent that was fit for military service, equestrian, transportation, similar equipment, and forces in the uyezd that have been supplied by the population for military needs; collected and processed the comprehensive information needed to compile mobilization plans, and developed these for the uyezd; compiled lists of names of all individuals residing in the uyezd who have special military training; compiled lists of candidates from among the appropriate individuals in accordance with the provision on filling positions in the RKKA; distributed those individuals accepted into the service by branch of service; adopted measures to [establish] assembly and resettlement points for appropriate equipment within the uyezd; supplied the troops with everything necessary, including assets released to them for natural obligations, and supported the billeting of troops in apartments, carried out the duties of garrison commander and military commandant at the location of their stay with the exception of cities where special subunits [komendatura] were established; monitored the examinations of those individuals released from military service due to disease; registered all individuals arriving in the uyezd who were fit for military service and charged them with failure to fulfill registration regulations; were in charge of all military institutions, depots, and equipment reserves designated for the uyezd's military needs; monitored the condition, replenishment, and support of local depots, magazines, and equipment reserves; were responsible for preserving and maintaining guns, rounds, and projectile combat loads in operating condition which had not been issued to volost commissariats; organized recruitment points throughout the uyezd and managed the enlistment of volunteers, conducted agitation activities among the population, and were concerned about satisfying troops cultural and educational needs; formed combat units

from recruits in accordance with the approved plan; provided proper unit training by involving the appropriate regular cadre instructors; and, organized military training of the population, training assemblies, musters, and military field exercises in the uyezd. The uyezd military commissariat created appropriate organizational structures to carry out all of these tasks. Furthermore, it commanded all armed forces designated for the uyezd's military needs.

[Filatov] Using the example cited, I think that it is possible to become convinced that local military command and control organs of the first years of Soviet rule had a quite significant and unique competence which allowed them to play a notable role in military structural development. We all also know that nearly similar organizational processes occurred on the territory of other Soviet republics. However, this was a quite unique period of our history—the Civil War was already blazing and the Intervention was inexorably approaching....

[Ivashov] This is precisely why the military union of all Soviet republics that existed at that time was concluded on June 1, 1919 which caused the necessity to conduct close unification of the military organization and the military command authority, Soviets of the National Economy, railroad control and management, finances and Commissariats of Labor of the Soviet Socialist Republics—Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorus-sia, and Crimea—in order for the leadership of the indicated sectors to be concentrated into unified collectives. It is important to stress that the creation of a unified Soviet Armed Forces and a unified system of leadership and command and control organs for them was one of the decisive factors of the victory over the Interventionists and White Guards.

[Filatov] But the Civil War and Intervention had basically ended. What processes were begun in the area of general state structural development and management of defense?

[Zolotarev] I would characterize this phenomenon as the normalization of relations between the republics. Bilateral treaties began to be concluded for that purpose. I would like to cite as an example the "Union Workers' and Peasants' Treaty Between the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic" which, it seems to me, allows me to quite specifically answer your question:

"The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, on one hand, and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, on the other hand, while proceeding based on the great proletarian revolution which proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination, recognizing the independence and sovereignty of each of the treaty parties and realizing the need to unite their forces for the purpose of defense, and also in the interests of their economic structural development, have resolved to conclude this union workers and peasants treaty....

I

"The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic are entering into a military and economic union between themselves.

II

"Both States consider it necessary to announce that all common obligations which they henceforth assume with regard to other states can be brought about only through the commonality of interests of the workers and peasants who conclude this union treaty of the republics and that the very fact of the previous affiliation of the territory of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic to the former Russian Empire does not result in any obligations whatsoever for the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic with regard to anyone.

III

"For the best implementation of the goal cited in Paragraph 1, both governments announce the unification of the following commissariats: 1) Military and Naval Affairs, 2) The Supreme Soviet of the National Economy, 3) Foreign Trade, 4) Finance, 5) Labor, 6) Communications, and 7) Postal and Telegraph.

IV

"The unified people's commissariats of both republics are part of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars and have within the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic Council of People's Commissars their plenipotentiaries who have been approved and are controlled by the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the Congress of Soviets.

V

"The internal management procedures and form of the unified commissariats are prescribed by special agreements between both governments.

VI

"Management and control of the unified commissariats is carried out through the All-Russian Congresses of Soviets of Deputies Workers, Peasants, and Red Army Men, and also the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to which the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic sends its representatives based on All-Russian Congress of Soviets resolutions.

VII

"This treaty is subject to ratification of the appropriate highest legislative institutions of both republics.

"The original has been drawn up and signed in two copies in the Russian and Ukrainian languages at the city of Moscow on the 28th day of December, one thousand nine hundred twenty two." Identical treaties were concluded between the RSFSR and BSSR, Georgian and Armenian SSR's in 1921.

[Filatov] However, we soon transitioned from bilateral treaties between individual republics to the creation of a unified union state. As a result of the specific features of the moment that the country is living through right now and the acute urgency of the understanding and content of the proposed New Union Treaty, obviously we should clarify the reasons for which the republics decided on a new type of interstate relations and to recall the primary provisions of the documents that regulated and consolidated the formation of the USSR.

[Ivashov] On December 30, 1922, the 1st USSR Congress of Soviets, having approved for the most part the Declaration and Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, juridically formalized the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The causes and principles of unification of the four Soviet republics into a single state were characterized in the Declaration. In particular, it stated that since the time of the formation of the Soviet republics, world states had split into two camps: The capitalist camp and the socialist camp. Having just combined their efforts and resources, "the Soviet republics had managed to repulse the attack of the internal and foreign Imperialists of the entire world; they managed to successfully end the Civil War, to guarantee their existence, and to begin peaceful economic structural development thanks only to these circumstances. But the war years did not pass without a trace. Ruined fields, idled factories, destroyed production forces, and depleted economic resources that remained as a result of the war made the individual republics' separate efforts on economic structural development inadequate. Restoration of the national economy turned out to be impossible under the divided existence of the republics. On the other hand, the instability of the international situation and the threat of new attacks made the creation of a unified front of Soviet republics in the face of capitalist encirclement inevitable. Finally, the structure of Soviet rule itself which is international in its class nature prodded the working masses of the Soviet republics onto the path of unification into one socialist family. All of these circumstances peremptorily demanded the unification of the Soviet republics into one union state that was capable of guaranteeing both external security, domestic economic prosperity, and freedom of national development of the peoples.

[Yemelin] The Treaty defined the system of all-union highest organs of power and government and regulated the foundations of interrelations of the USSR and the union republics. In particular, with regard to the main theme of our conversation, I can say that Article 1 of the Treaty ascribed to the competence of the USSR in the person of its supreme organs "declaration of war and conclusions of peace (Paragraph "d.") and also "the establishment of the foundations of the organization of the Armed Forces of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics" (Paragraph "k.") along with other issues. According to the Treaty on the Formation of the USSR, the Congress of Soviets of the USSR, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (TsIK SSSR), the USSR

Central Executive Committee Presidium, and the USSR Council of People's Commissars were its highest organs of power and government. Similar organs of power and government existed in each union republic.

[Zolotarev] Incidentally, the subsequently adopted 1st All-Union Constitution—the USSR Constitution of 1924—did not contain provisions that specified competence in the sphere of defense of each of the USSR organs of power and government listed above. The USSR Soviet of Labor and Defense (STO) and the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs were specifically tasked to become involved with the issues of organizing the country's defense.

The USSR Soviet of Labor and Defense was founded under the Council of People's Commissars USSR. The Council of People's Commissars USSR Chairman was the USSR STO chairman and the USSR Sovnarkom [Commissar of the National Economy] personally designated its staff. So, on July 17, 1923, the Commissar of the National Economy was formed under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin, consisted of L.B. Kamenev, A.I. Rykov, A.D. Tsyurupa, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, G.M. Krzhizhanovskiy, L.D. Trotzkiy (and his replacement by E.M. Sklyanskiy), and approved the Provision on the USSR STO on August 21 of that same year.

[Yemelin] Permit me to point out that neither the Treaty on Formation of the USSR nor the Constitution of the USSR envisioned the creation of the Soviet of Labor and Defense which, as we have seen, had quite significant powers in the area of the country's defense.¹ The Treaty and the Constitution of the USSR envisioned the creation of all-union (unified) and combined (union-republic) people's commissariats for direct control of individual sectors of state rule. The USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was assigned to the all-union people's commissariats (Article 51).

On November 12, 1923, the USSR TsIK approved the first in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces Regulations on the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs which summarized the organizational experience accumulated throughout the years of the Civil War and the Intervention and the activities of the military department and on this basis defined the structure and competence of its central organs.

[Filatov] The impending military reform concept envisions the need to reorganize the currently existing USSR Armed Forces command and control structures. As a result, it would be good to characterize the main ideas of the 1923 Regulations from the point of view of modern interests and the topic of our conversation. Some problems that are already turning out to be complicated have already been successfully resolved in the past. Of course we are not talking about blind copying.

[Ivashov] Yes, of course. Knowledge of historical experience permits us to become better oriented to the

problem, to avoid repeating errors, and to utilize constructive finds [nakhoiki].... So, Article 1 of the Regulations indicated that the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs "which conducts structural development of all armed forces, their command and control, and supply throughout the entire territory of the USSR," is formed based on Articles 49 and 51 of the Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the USSR. The following tasks were specifically assigned to the People's Commissariat: Development of plans and measures for ground and maritime defense of the USSR; organization of ground and naval armed forces, also including territorial troops and their leadership; maintenance of the USSR Armed Forces at the appropriate and constant readiness; management of local military command and control organs; formation, manning, education, and training of army and navy units; supplying the RKKA and Navy with all types of allowances and materiel for peacetime and wartime; registration and conscription of the population for military training and for military service; training of command personnel and the political staff; political education of servicemen and cultural and educational work among them, etc.

[Zolotarev] The USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs headed the military department and was elected (and responded to) the USSR Central Executive Committee and was responsible to it and also to the USSR TsIK Presidium and the USSR Council of People's Commissars. The USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs obligation "in extraordinary circumstances that require an immediate decision and conduct of measures throughout the military or naval department that exceed the direct rights of USSR People's Commissars" to act under personal responsibility "to defend and protect the interests of the USSR using all accessible means while immediately informing the USSR Council of People's Commissars on adopted measures and the reasons to urgently conduct them through their order" (Article 5) were important specific features of the 1923 Regulations.

[Ivashov] The general orders of the People's Commissar and his only assistant were processed into final form by the orders of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council (SSSR RVS) which was the People's Commissariat's collegium. Besides the People's Commissar—the USSR Revolutionary Military Council Chairman, the USSR Revolutionary Military Council consisted of the USSR deputy people's commissar, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the USSR, and members of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council who were designated by the USSR Council of People's Commissars.

The following were directly subordinate to the USSR Revolutionary Military Council: The Commander-in-Chief, the deputy Commander-in-Chief for Naval Forces, and the USSR Naval Forces Commissar, RKKA Headquarters, RKKA commander-in-chief of Supply, RKKA Political Directorate, the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Air Fleet, commanders of

military districts (fronts) and separate armies, the appropriate Revolutionary Military Councils, and also fleet and flotilla Revolutionary Military Councils, the Inspectorate under the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, the USSR Revolutionary Military Council Administration of Affairs, the Military Financial Department, the supreme military editors council which had the task of centralizing and systematically regulating military literature and publishing matters, and also other organs.

Included within the competence of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council were issues of appointments to positions of the high command and political staff—the RKKA Headquarters commander and commissar, the deputy commander-in-chief and the commissar of USSR Naval Forces, chief of the RKKA Political Directorate, the RKKA commander-in-chief of Supply, military district commanders, etc.

[Filatov] The legal status of the commander-in-chief of all of the USSR Armed Forces is interesting from the point of view of studying and considering historical experience.

[Yemelin] The 1923 Regulations were unique in this context since they very clearly regulated the rights and obligations of the commander-in-chief and precisely defined his position within the system of military command and control organs. The commander-in-chief was the commander of all USSR ground and naval forces. He was assigned and relieved by the Council of People's Commissars. Within the directives of the highest organs of power and government of the USSR, obtained through the USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs or the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, the commander-in-chief enjoyed complete independence in all issues of an operational-strategic nature however, he was obliged to submit a report of his activities on these issues to the People's Commissar and to the USSR Revolutionary Military Council. Article 14 of the Regulations specially stressed that no governmental institution or person, besides the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and the USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, his deputy and the highest organs of power of the USSR, had the right to issue orders to the commander-in-chief or to demand a report from him.

The following personnel were subordinate to the commander-in-chief: Operationally subordinate—the assistant for naval affairs, directly subordinate—the assistant for cavalry, RKKA Headquarters, the Military Health Inspectorate under the Commander-in-Chief, the commander-in-chief of military educational institutions, the chief of artillery, the chief of the Main Military Engineering Directorate, and the chief of the Main Military Veterinary Directorate. Furthermore, all commanders of military districts (fronts) and separate armies, and the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Air Fleet were operationally subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief; the commanders of special units in all aspects

through the appropriate commanders of military districts, fronts, armies—fortresses and fortified areas on the entire territory of the USSR. The position of Commander-in-Chief was eliminated during the 1924-1928 military reform period.

[Filatov] And how did things turn out with taking into account specific ethnic features and the capabilities of each union republic while conducting the unified principles of military structural development in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics?

[Zolotarev] With this goal, the 1923 Regulations provided for the institute of the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs envoys under the union republic Councils of People's Commissars in accordance with Article 18 of the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In accordance with the General Regulations on USSR People's Commissariats, the USSR Council of People's Commissars designated the envoys of the all-union People's Commissariat under the union republic Councils of People's Commissars. However, union republic TsIK's prior approval was mandatory for the candidates nominated for the position of envoy. The envoys were part of the union republic government and were either non-voting or voting members at the discretion of the union republic TsIK or its Presidium. The envoys were obliged to inform the union republic TsIK, TsIK Presidium, or Councils of People's Commissars about People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs activities and to account for their work both to the appropriate union republic People's Commissar and also to the Councils of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee.

USSR People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs orders and instructions that were mandatorily executed throughout the entire territory of the USSR, as a rule, had to be conducted through the appropriate envoys under the union republic Councils of People's Commissars. In the event an envoy received a people's commissar's order that contradicted a USSR or union republic law, the envoy was obliged to immediately make a representation about it to the people's commissar and simultaneously report the order received to the union republic Council of People's Commissars.

[Filatov] It seems that we have arrived at the main topic. But how did the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and the institute of military department envoys under the union republic governments develop further?

[Yemelin] One of the tasks of the military reform of 1924-1928 was the reorganization of the military command and control system which required restructuring with regard to the peaceful conditions of life and activities of the troops and to the Soviet Armed Forces mixed manning system. "As for the military apparatus," thought M.V. Frunze, "then, based on the statewide program, it must take an organizational form that better

meets general state tasks and through further work create a durable unity of all the armed forces linked from top to bottom by the commonality of views both on the nature of the military missions themselves and also on the techniques to resolve them." Thus, the requirement arose to renew the 1923 Regulations. On January 30, 1929, the USSR TsIK and Council of People's Commissars approved the new Regulations on the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

The 1929 Regulations made the formula more precise that defines the subject of the authority of the People's Commissariat: "The organization and structural development of the USSR's ground, naval, and air armed forces, their leadership and efficient utilization during peacetime and wartime, development and improvement of all means of armed combat and the overall management of all mobilization work on the territory of the USSR" (Article 1). In this regard, the military department's tasks were broadened and made specific.

[Ivashov] The growth of the role of the People's Commissar as the one-man commander in the resolution of many RKKA structural development issues is a characteristic trait of the 1929 Regulations. Therefore, Article 4 of the Regulations received the following wording: "The People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs heads the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. He also heads all of the USSR Armed Forces which consist of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and is the Chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council." Here it specially stated that the interrelationships of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs with the United State Political Directorate and the USSR Armed Prisoner Escort Guard that are part of the RKKA are defined by special provisions which were issued based on the laws that were in force for the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs jointly with the Chairman of the OGPU [United State Political Administration] Collegium and the Chief of the USSR Armed Prisoner Escort Guard.

The People's Commissar began to prescribe precisely which central organs must be part of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, to approve the regulations about these organs, to also determine the required number of local military command and control organs, and to approve the provisions which provided for their structure, jurisdiction, and procedures for their activities. So, at the end of October 1929, the overall organizational scheme of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs central apparatus which consisted of RKKA Headquarters, RKKA Air Force Directorate, RKKA Naval Directorate, RKKA Supply Directorate, RKKA Inspectorate, RKKA Military Veterinary Directorate, Central Military Finance Directorate, People's Commissariat and USSR Revolutionary Military Council Administrative Affairs Directorate, and the Military Scientific Research Committee under the USSR Revolutionary Military Council.

[Filatov] It turns out that the role and the significance of the country's Revolutionary Military Council founded in Autumn 1918 as the supreme executive and management collective organ of military power was gradually reduced. Did I correctly define this trend?

[Yemelin] Yes, this is so. Only one article—Article 5—in the 1929 Regulations was devoted to the USSR Revolutionary Military Council which stated that the USSR Revolutionary Military Council is the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs which, besides the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, included deputy people's commissars (they are also the deputies to the Revolutionary Military Council Chairman) approved by the USSR TsIK Presidium and the members personally designated by the USSR Council of People's Commissars. On June 20, 1934, a USSR TsIK resolution completely eliminated the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and appropriate military district, fleet, individual army, and flotilla Revolutionary Military Councils and the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs was transformed into the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense. So, an attempt was made to elevate to an absolute level the principle of one-man command and to get by without collective organs in the highest elements of the military department's command and control structures. On November 22, 1934, the USSR TsIK and Council of People's Commissars approved the Regulations on the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense which established that "the USSR People's Commissar of Defense will head the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense. He will also head the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army" (Article 1); "The USSR People's Commissar of Defense has two deputies..." (Article 4); "The USSR People's Commissar of Defense issues orders to the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and to the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense..." (Article 6); "There is a military soviet which acts as a consultative organ under the USSR People's Commissar of Defense..." (Article 7); "With regard to command and control, the ground and naval forces of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are divided into military districts, armies, and fleets. The commanders of military districts, armies, and fleets are directly subordinate to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense" (Article 8); "The USSR People's Commissariat of Defense has its own local military command and control organs, subordinate to military district (army) commanders, to implement all measures associated with conscription of citizens for military service and conduct of military mobilization" (Article 9), etc. However, the practice of leadership and administration of the Soviet Armed Forces demonstrated the need to restore collective organs. This was done in the element of the military district, fleet, army, flotilla in May 1937, and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee and USSR Council of People's Commissars decided to found the RKKA Main Military Soviet as the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense Collegium in March 1938.

[Filatov] I think that if our readers are interested in the history and possible prospects of development of the USSR military department, we can conduct a special "round-table" but right now let us return to the institute of USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs envoys under the union republic governments.

[Zolotarev] The 1929 Regulations perhaps more precisely and thoroughly defined the legal status of this institute. The envoys were tasked with: a) representing a given union republic on all issues within the jurisdiction of the USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs; b) coordinating People's Commissariat orders with the appropriate organs of the given union republic that affected the jurisdiction of this republic's departments; c) at the direction of the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs, submitting to this republic's government draft resolutions that affected defense needs for review by the republic's legislative organs; d) observing the implementation of USSR military legislation and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs orders based on it on the territory of this republic and also complaining when necessary about the activities of the organs of power that impede defense interests; e) informing, when tasked by the people's commissar, the union republic government about People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs activities as a whole and about the state of defense matters on the territory of this republic. Here, People's Commissariat envoys did not enjoy the right to issue orders to military units or to local military command and control organs located on the territory of this union republic.

The 1934 Regulations already contained simply a reminder about the presence of USSR People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs envoys under the union republic Council of People's Commissars.

[Yemelin] From time to time this coincided with the transition from the mixed to regular Soviet Armed Forces manning system. A March 7, 1938 VKP(b) Central Committee and USSR Council of People's Commissars Resolution eliminated national military formations and established the extra-territorial manning principle for military units and formations. The USSR People's Commissariat for Defense institute of envoys under the union republic Councils of People's Commissars also ceased to exist.

[Zolotarev] However, as a result of the serious situation that developed on the Soviet-German Front during the first period of the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee made a decision which obliged union and autonomous republics to form units and formations for the USSR's active duty army from their own people and material resources and, on February 1, 1944, the USSR Supreme Soviet authorized union republics to have their own military formations and transformed the USSR People's Commissariat for Defense from a union to a union-republic commissariat which signified the capability to create same-name people's commissariats in the republics. I know that the UkrSSR, for example, created

its own military department but during the time period indicated it did not have the needed documents and materials that testify about the significant role republic military departments played in Soviet Armed Forces postwar structural development. They were eliminated at the beginning of the 1950's. Nevertheless, the right of union republics to have their own military formations and their appropriate leadership and command and control organs existed until the adoption of the Constitution of 1977.

[Filatov] We have basically sorted out the problems with history. Now I ask you to talk about contemporary problems. The readers are asking about a possible clash between the Law of the USSR "On Limitation of the Powers Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation" and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies Resolution "On Limitation of the Management Functions of Organizations on the Territory of the RSFSR" in the area of defense and leadership of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Yemelin] I think that there are grounds for concern. However, there are also positive factors. On one hand, the USSR leadership supports the idea on developing a New Union Treaty which is called on to eliminate built-up tension and, on the other hand, the RSFSR's supreme authorities do not object to the USSR Ministry of Defense carrying out, as before, the functions of direct command and control of the appropriate organizations, enterprises, and institutions on Russian territory (Article 2 of the Resolution "On Limitation of the Management Functions of Organizations on the Territory of the RSFSR").

As for the RSFSR representative under the USSR Ministry of Defense, the previously mentioned resolution directly tasks him with the obligation "to promote the consolidation of a unified infrastructure for the sake of the country's defense, conduct of far-reaching military reform, troop infrastructure formation, and realization of social programs" (Article 7).

[Ivashov] I think that the historical experience which we have talked about has the right to careful study and summarization and possibly also something for use under present conditions. In particular, the institute of USSR military department envoys under the union republic soviets of people's commissars that previously existed sparks some interest. Right now, when the issue has been raised about renewing our Union, the participation of the republics in the consolidation of the country's defense and in resolving issues associated with republic representatives performing military service can and must be more active and interested. Furthermore, the number of comprehensive issues and claims against the USSR Ministry of Defense by the leadership of individual republics and societies that cannot be resolved solely through reciprocal correspondence have recently dramatically increased. Harmonious joint work is needed. And right now maybe we ought to once again return to the institute of USSR Ministry of Defense

envoys in the union republics. Then problems associated with the deployment of troops on republic territory and their comprehensive support would certainly be more easily and rapidly resolved. The republics' contribution to the cause of the country's defense can also be increased through more active participation in the organization of pre-conscription training of youth, heroic-patriotic education of young people, and the consolidation of the foundations of inter-ethnicity. Yes and attention to servicemen of various nationalities and concern about their lifestyle from the republics during the period they are performing their military service will not be superfluous. The republics could also increase their participation in training and building up their trained military reserves, mobilization preparation of the national economy, and training of personnel for the unified USSR Armed Forces, etc. On the whole, the link between the army and the people and their unity must, in my opinion, be expressed in more specific organizational and legal forms. Therefore, the introduction of the institute of USSR Ministry of Defense envoys under union, and maybe, even autonomous republics organs of power and government is entirely logical. Although it is impossible to negate the possibility of a return link—representatives of union republics at the USSR Ministry of Defense. Other reasonable variations to resolve these issues are also entirely possible. The main thing must consist of the fact that this link will have been directed toward developing constructive interrelations and toward consolidating the security of the Homeland and not toward confronting each other and separating the USSR Armed Forces along ethnic lines.

Footnote

1. USSR STO was formed based on the RSFSR STO and the Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Defense—the highest extraordinary organ of power, which was created on November 30, 1918 during the critical moment of the Civil War and the Intervention—in turn served as the basis for the RSFSR STO—The Editor.

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Re-Debating Battle of Stalingrad

91UM0224B Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 90 pp 39-48

[Article by Colonel G.T. Khoroshilov, USSR State Prize Laureate, candidate of military sciences, and lecturer under the rubric: "How it was": "Worse than a Lie"]

[Text] Writer G.V. Klyucharev attempts to convince the reader and the audience in his articles and speeches that he is giving a "new interpretation to the Battle of Stalingrad." However, during a careful examination of the writer's claims "to truth and newness" in his vision of the great battle, it becomes clear that they are, putting it mildly, unfounded. Klyucharev simply inaccurately interprets the sources and exaggerates the significance of individual events in which he was a participant. The

identical articles in the March 8, 1989 issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and in VOPROSY Istorii No. 12 for that same year are in essence especially characteristic.

So, having prefaced his LITERATURNAYA GAZETA article "Beyond the Stalingrad 'Ring'" with an introduction that it turns out Lieutenant General M.M. Kiryan never wrote, Klyucharev announced the beginning of a "consistent struggle with historical stereotypes" that in principle would only have been welcomed. However, the outline of the writer's reasoning is "original." In order to impart greater weight to the December 14-19, 1942 episode of the struggle near Verkhne-Kumskiy Farm, he begins to look for the roots of the tactical event in the Supreme Commander's strategic miscalculations during November-December 1942 when the Supreme Commander allegedly stubbornly continued to ignore the opinions and suggestions of his closest aides—Deputy Supreme Commander G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevskiy.

Here sluggishness of thought probably caused the writer's downfall. Yes, Stalin's gross miscalculations in 1941 and during the first half of 1942 actually were the result of the fact he often acted against the opinions of his professional military leaders. However, since autumn 1942 this already was no longer the case as both the course of events at the fronts and the opinions of such eminent military leaders as Zhukov and Vasilevskiy testify. "And we need to point out that from this moment¹ Stalin nearly did not make the decisions on operational organization issues without conferring with me."² Vasilevskiy also spoke in that same context: "September 1942 was the turning point of the profound restructuring of Stalin as Supreme Commander.... Since that time, Stalin consulted and discussed a decision with the participation of his deputy who led General Staff workers before making a decision on some important issue for the conduct of armed combat...."

However, the stereotypes of Stalin's conduct during the first period of the war weigh on Klyucharev and he stubbornly forces them on the reader. Why? Probably in the writer's pursuit of "hot" news, criticism of Stalinism seems to be a very attractive way to draw the public's attention to himself.

And what is the essence of his criticism?

The writer uses his creative wrath in articles, letters, and speeches to attack Stalinism, thinking that the museum-panorama exposition "Battle of Stalingrad" will be penetrated by this spirit. For Klyucharev this is allegedly expressed by (Stalin-G.Kh.) "ignoring" Zhukov's and Vasilevskiy's persistent warnings about the need to create a reliable external front after surrounding von Paulus' troops near Stalingrad and by the fact that the Supreme Commander, despite the opinions of military leaders, "pressured" everyone while unsoundly seeking to more rapidly eliminate the encircled 300,000 man

enemy force. Klyucharev "exposes" the Supreme Commander for nearly deliberately dragging out the beginning of the second stage of the strategic counteroffensive (Operation Saturn) "for prestige and political goals"; he is not embarrassed when he "makes the discovery" about the allegedly "very serious disagreements within the Soviet command authority" that appeared or about the fact that the Soviet command authority suddenly unsoundly rejected an Operation Saturn variant and preferred to conduct Operation Malyy Saturn [Small Saturn] "contrary to the correct opinion of the German generals." He asserts, without evidence, that 2nd Guards Army was erroneously employed and dismisses Writer Yu. Bondarev's point of view that was expressed in his work "Goryachiy sneg" [Hot Snow]. And in his opinion 51st Army on the external front turns out to be not an army "but some sort of carelessly thrown together force."

We could continue the conversation about the writer's irrepressible fantasy that builds a pyramid of personnel notions about the battle's events that occurred in December 1942. However, we must begin thinking about why he, a participant in the six days of engagements near Verkhne-Kumskiy, demanded all of this?

Klyucharev thinks that someone, being an adherent of Stalinism, underestimates the role and significance of the heroic deeds of 4th Mechanized Corps' officers and men. That is why he had "to advance farfetched arguments" to [link] the tactical aspects of the battle to the strategic. So, does Klyucharev present everything objectively and truthfully? Let us examine it in sequence.

And so, the museum exposition in Volgograd became the first target of his "criticism." From the very beginning, the author, having consciously or unconsciously displaced the exposition's temporary framework, attempts to prove that the events that occurred on the November-December 1942 line engagements in the area of Verkhne-Kumskiy, in particular, are not reflected in it. Actually, the museum's "Great Victory near Stalingrad" section describes the events that occurred during the period from November 19, 1942 until February 2, 1943. By the way, weapons that were picked up on the battlefield near Verkhne-Kumskiy are also on display there.

The attempt to attribute the idea of "the most rapid annihilation of von Paulus' encircled force" to the Supreme Commander personally appears to be a typical half-truth. Zhukov and Vasilyevskiy set forth the idea in the developed and quite sound [Uranus] concept of operations—breaking through the enemy defense and encircling, splitting [rassecheniye], and rapidly annihilating the enemy force. Afterward, it was envisioned that the front of the strategic counteroffensive—Operation Saturn would be broadened to achieve the total defeat of Fascist bloc troops on the Stalingrad-Rostov Axis and to cut off (isolate) its "A" Group of Armies in the Caucasus.⁴ A.M. Vasilyevskiy repeatedly stressed this idea.⁵ G.K. Zhukov also adhered to this same point of view, having proposed to the Supreme Commander on

November 29 that Soviet troops cut the encircled force into two parts and afterward destroy first of all the weakest and then the stronger while at the same time repulsing possible enemy attempts to break the blockade.⁶

When the annihilation of the encircled troops was delayed, this problem riveted the attention not only of Stalin but first of all of Zhukov, Vasilyevskiy, and Front Commanders K.K. Rokossovskiy and A.I. Yeremenko since the encircled enemy diverted (tied down) a nearly half-million man Soviet troop force that was so necessary for operations on the external front of encirclement and we needed to exploit the absence of major enemy forces on the external front to rapidly annihilate von Paulus' forces before the latter could concentrate reserves and lift the blockade of the encircled forces. This was especially important if you considered the experience of the nearly thwarted annihilation of the encircled enemy due to the drawn out Demyansk Operation.

The annihilation of von Paulus' encircled troops was clearly being dragged out: An erroneous assessment of the encircled troops by front reconnaissance organs—there turned out to be over 300,000 men instead of the anticipated 80-90,000 men which resulted in the assignment of obviously backbreaking missions to Soviet troops; the Don Front's failures still during the first stage of the operation when it could not, as had been intended, isolate the so-called Sixth Army's "Don Group" troops,⁷ and as a result the inability to exploit the breach formed here to continue the attack from the west in the direction of the city, to split the strongest portion of the German force, and to rapidly destroy the enemy in detail. Thus, Soviet troops did not succeed in transforming the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and the encirclement and annihilation of the enemy into a single, uninterrupted process. Engagements on the internal front assumed, as we all know, a protracted nature.

Yes, impatience, rashness, and even nervousness were inherent to Stalin during preparations for and conduct of operations after the decision had been made⁸ but this was not so at the walls of Stalingrad in November-December 1942. Here the idea about the need for rapid annihilation belonged to both the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, and to the front commanders. And there was great strategic expediency in this. But, as often happens during the course of armed combat, reality makes its corrections and then you have to carry out missions with a multitude of unknowns. However, for the sake of justice and in anticipation of events, we need to point out that the Supreme High Command itself ordered the troop destruction operation to be temporarily delayed when the situation changed in the middle of December.

Furthermore, the writer makes an unsubstantiated assertion that the General Headquarter and, naturally, the General Staff allegedly ignored Zhukov's, Vasilyevskiy's, and Yeremenko's warnings about the need to reinforce the troops on the external front of the encirclement.

Here, he cites the November 29, 1942 suggestion by Zhukov who was located far from Stalingrad near Rzhev at this time and was commanding Operation Mars.⁹

The perceptions had the nature of an operational-strategic forecast. Zhukov proceeded based on what the Fascist command authority could in principle undertake to extract its encircled force and what [the Soviets] must undertake in response. Let us point out that the enemy did not have a stable defensive front or adequate forces on the external front of the encirclement from Nizhne-Chirskaya to Kotelnikovo at the end of November. Soviet troops also did not have superiority here because preparations had begun for a new operation on the Middle Don to launch an attack against Rostov. Therefore, the Supreme High Command reacted to Zhukov's proposal to the fullest extent possible.

The Supreme High Command decided to create a new 5th Strike Army reinforced by 7th Tank Corps on the Nizhne-Chirskaya Axis based on his proposal to "throw the enemy farther back to the west from Nizhne-Chirskaya and Kotelnikovo." The 4th Mechanized and 13th Tank Corps, three rifle divisions, and other units were redirected to the Kotelnikovo Sector. It was impossible to put more forces here at that moment.

The 2nd Guards Army and 6th Mechanized Corps which were advancing from the Supreme High Command reserve were redirected based on [Zhukov's] proposal to create two reserve tank forces in the depth in the event they had to ward off possible enemy attacks that had the goal of joining up with the encircled forces. It was simply impossible to do anything earlier because there were no forces available.

The recommendation to conduct surprise counterattacks from the north and south against the encircled enemy force to split it in two was far from reality: Neither the Don nor the Stalingrad Fronts had adequate offensive capabilities for this at the beginning of December.

When a threat appeared from the newly formed enemy Don Group of Armies commanded by E. Manstein, the Soviet Supreme High Command immediately changed its decision and found a retaliatory course: Operation Saturn was replaced by Operation Malyy Saturn. A powerful attack of Soviet forces from the area of the Middle Don into the flank and rear of the Don Group of Armies on an axis toward Morozovsk resulted not only in the total defeat of the armies of Germany's allies but also disrupted Manstein's plan to help von Paulus' Army to break out. Counterattacks by enemy forces "melted away to patch up breaches." The enemy lost the nearest airfields that were so necessary to him for the "air bridge" to effectively function and to supply the encircled troops.

The question arises: Is Klyucharev's "criticism" worthwhile?

Then the writer constructs a false version with regard to the Supreme Headquarter's postponement of the beginning of Operation Malyy Saturn. Yes, a postponement did occur although it was undesirable. However, Stalin resorted to this based on Supreme High Command Representative General N.N. Voronov's and also Southwestern Front Commander General N.F. Vatunin's insistent request because the troops were not ready. Shifting the beginning of the operation from December 10 to December 16 was quite rational and sound: RVGK [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] artillery, ammunition, etc., had not yet arrived.

Klyucharev judges the operations plan variants on the Middle Don in a biased manner. While assessing its initial variant, he states that it was as if Stalin did not at all understand its strategic importance (Operation Saturn). However, let us point out that here the writer's reference to page 25 of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL's issue 1 for 1966 does not confirm this. That Klyucharev's judgment is erroneous is obvious from the Supreme High Command's December 13 Directive where it explained why we had to abandon Operation Saturn and to limit variant Malyy Saturn in the changed situation.¹⁰

Here Klyucharev's attempt to use Manstein's opinion to counter the Supreme High Command's decision misses the mark. Having suffered defeat in December 1942, Manstein in hind sight pointed to a series of errors and omissions by the Soviet High Command, in particular, to the fact that it lost a real chance to split the entire German southern flank when it abandoned a deep strike on Rostov.¹¹ However, we need to consider that Manstein did not provide this "information" about the condition of his troops at the beginning of December to the Soviet High Command and naturally many things were unclear to the High Command under conditions of the highly dynamic and changing situation. Therefore, when major reserves appeared among the enemy, the Supreme High Command did not resort to an unsound risk.

Naturally, it appears that Klyucharev expresses his own impressions with regard to where he would have obtained the additional forces and where and when he would have sent them in order to support his own critical remarks with proof. But, unfortunately, the writer just complains about someone somewhere and inappropriately attempts to cast aspersions on the Supreme High Command and the General Staff. Of course, this is fashionable but unconvincing.

If we temporarily refrain from discussing Klyucharev and suggest that the forces directed to the Middle Don would be redirected, as he recommends, to the area of Kotelnikovo during the first half of December, then it would be easy to imagine that if they were late reaching the Middle Don then they would not manage to arrive on the Kotelnikovo axis even by the middle of December.

Railroad transport capabilities were too limited. We all know that the entire Stalingrad railroad junction was still in enemy hands. Railroad traffic capacity toward Stalingrad was low. Therefore, rapid movement of troops to the Middle Don area and conduct of Operation Maly Saturn was more realistic at that time, although its initiation was clearly late due to the untimely arrival of the required men and equipment.

The assertion "of a fighter with stereotypes" and about the "very serious disagreements within the Soviet command authority" that were allegedly manifested during the course of December's events also appears to be farfetched. He attempts to once again invoke Zhukov's perceptions of November 29 as confirmation of this false deduction but there are no such words there: "...to prevent von Paulus' Group from getting out of the encirclement is far from the most important thing at this stage". This is certainly Klyucharev's opinion but it does not prove anything. Maybe the sharp objections while discussing Supreme High Command issues with Zhukov, Vasilyevskiy, Voronov, and others trouble the writer, but these are not disagreements but the development of the optimum decision. Both Vasilyevskiy, Voronov, and Rokossovskiy wrote about such cases with regard to that period.¹²

The writer needed everything that has been discussed above to consciously exaggerate 4th Mechanized Corps' role in the engagements near Verkhne-Kumskiy Farm. The author served in 4th Mechanized Corps. Without any embarrassment at all, Klyucharev assures us that the engagements in the middle of December 1942 near the farm predetermined the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad and he cites Vasilyevskiy's statements. However, in the marshal's book while assessing events of the second half of December, he notes not only the role of 4th Mechanized (on the Verkhne-Kumskiy Axis) but also the role of 13th Tank Corps which operated on the Kruglyakov Axis. Here, the marshal did not dare assert that the six days of events on these two axes predetermined the battle's outcome.¹³

If we talk seriously, then a series of very important operations conducted by the Soviet Armed Forces during the period from July 17, 1942 through February 2, 1943 predetermined the victorious outcome of the battle that lasted six months and in which the enemy lost 1.5 million men. They include: Soviet troops' heroic defensive operations during July through November 1942 when the enemy was forced to become involved in debilitating engagements near Stalingrad and to essentially change his summer campaign plans while suffering enormous losses; the surprise destruction and encirclement of the enemy main force near the walls of the city during the course of the strategic counteroffensive; the skillful activities of Soviet commanders and troops as a result of a change in the operations plan on the Middle Don (November-December 1942); thwarting an enemy attempt to lift the blockade of von Paulus' army (December 1942) thanks to the high art and selflessness of the personnel of 51st and 2nd Guards Armies and aircraft of

8th Air Army; finally, the ultimate defeat during the course of Operation Koltso [Ring] of an encircled nearly 300,000 man enemy force (January-February 1943).


Now it is advisable to dwell in more detail on how the writer attempts to hyperbolize, in our opinion, 4th Mechanized Corps' role and at the same time does not wish to grasp the events in the broader context. The development of the December 12-23 1942 events on the Kotelnikovo Axis is depicted in the diagram in greater detail.

So, on December 12, 1942, Army Group Goth, not waiting to mass all of its troops, conducted a strong counterattack, however not as powerful as Klyucharev attempts to portray it. He assures us that the enemy force totaled up to 900 tanks and assault guns. Actually, there were nearly 500 of them but not more than 650 counting those that arrived during the course of the operation (but without considering losses suffered).¹⁴

Forces of 51st Army (Commander N.I. Trufanov), 302nd, 126th, and 91st Rifle Divisions, 4th Cavalry Corps, 13th and 254th Tank Brigades, and the 76th Fortified Area reinforced by six not fully equipped artillery regiments and supported by aircraft of the 8th Air Army, offered fierce resistance. It is true that the writer quite seriously asserts that it was not an army but some kind of operational group "haphazardly thrown together by Vasilyevskiy and Yeremenko." No one had previously arrived at such a "profound conclusion." The 51st Army as an operational force participated in the Battle of Stalingrad from the first until the last days. Actually, during the offensive, troops of all fronts endured losses, including 51st Army. At the same time, it conducted a separate operation to shove out the external front and to ascertain the enemy's intentions from November 28 until December 3. Its units even entered Kotelnikovo by force but were later forced to withdraw under pressure of superior enemy forces and go over to the defense on a broad front on the line Verkhne-Yablochnyy, Gremyachiy, and further to Nurga. The defense was improved for ten days. A system of infantry strongholds and antitank strongholds, each of which had from two to 14 guns, was the basis of the defense. The strongholds cut off the likely main tank approach routes. The lack of reserves and the weakness of air cover for its troops was the narrow point of the army's defense. Considering this, the front commander took steps to regroup his reserves in 51st Army's zone of action.¹⁵

The Fascist command authority attempted to ram the army's defense with units of the 6th and 23rd Tank Divisions and to break through from Kotelnikovo to Stalingrad in one breath. The sides' forces were too unequal and the enemy succeeded, despite losses, in breaking through to the Aksay River by the end of December 13 and his forward detachment even seized Verkhne-Kumskiy Farm. In the threatening situation that developed, Stalingrad Front Commander A.I. Yeremenko formed an operational group led by General G.F. Zakharov—4th Mechanized Corps, 87th Rifle

Diagram of How the December 12-23 [Army] Group Goth Counterattack Was Repulsed.



Division, 235th Flamethrower Tank Brigade, 234th Tank Regiment and 20th Tank Destroyer Brigade—to prevent an enemy breakthrough to the Myshkovo River on the Verkhne-Kumskiy Axis and to improve troop command and control for the 51st Army commander.¹⁶ At the same time, he reinforced 51st Army with 13th Tank Corps in the area of Kruglyakov.

Let us point out that, while considering the flat nature of the terrain, deep snow cover, frost, and an abundance of inaccessible ravines for tanks, the enemy was more often forced to operate along roads and to more rapidly seize and hold populated areas. This facilitated combating enemy forces. On December 14-15, Zakharov's group of forces advanced to Verkhne-Kumskiy and, supported by

air, staged a surprise counterattack on the move against enemy forward units in the area of the farm. Having utterly defeated the enemy, they beat back his remnants to the Aksay River. At the same time, units of 51st Army's 13th Tank Corps and 302nd Rifle Division on the Kruglyakov Axis, while displaying determination and aggressiveness, successfully held the enemy and created a threat from the flank to [Army] Group Goth's main force in the area of Verkhne-Kumskiy.

Despite severe frosts and blizzards, Zakharov's group organized an adequately stable defense south of the farm to 8th March Kolkhoz and Hill 146.0—Zagotskot line. On the main axis, 1378th Rifle Regiment (Commander M.S. Diasamidze) with reinforcements defended and 55th Independent Tank Regiment (Commander A.A. Aslanov) made up the main force reserve.

On December 15, the enemy, while preparing a new attack, began to bring up the arriving 17th Tank Division to assist 6th Tank Division. On December 16-18, the ferocity of the engagements increased in the area of Verkhne-Kumskiy. The forces of the defenders dwindled. On December 18, the enemy nevertheless succeeded in driving back 1378th Regiment's right-flank battalion. However, Aslanov's tankers managed to stop the enemy using a skillful counterattack.

We must direct the reader's attention to the fact that from December 18 all of the troops of Zakharov group became part of 2nd Guards Army (Commander R.Ya. Malinovskiy) which was advancing to Myshkovo River. The situation took shape from that day when Malinovskiy's army arrived at the Myshkovo River with the main force and repulsed an attack in the area of Verkhne-Kumskiy using resubordinated troops from Zakharov's former group.¹⁷ A 1378th Rifle Regiment 3rd Battalion rifle company commanded by Senior Lieutenant P.N. Naumov manifested unparalleled heroism during these engagements. While repulsing the enemy attack at Hill 137.2, the soldier-heroes destroyed nearly 300 Hitlerites and knocked out 18 tanks and assault guns. The enemy seized the hill only after the entire heroic company and its commander had died.

Gathering strength for an attack, the enemy succeeded in breaking through the combat forces of Soviet subunits and units to the west and east of Verkhne-Kumskiy on December 19. Contained by 55th Tank Regiment sub-units, enemy tanks and motorized infantry began to head for the Myshkovo River and seized small bridgeheads on its northern bank in the areas of Chernomorov, Ivanovka, and Vasilyevka. However, the enemy's success was limited to this. Having occupied defensive positions along the river, 2nd Guards Army's 98th and 3rd Guards Rifle Divisions, supported by air, fire, and counterattacks, ultimately stopped the enemy at the river line and 51st Army forces—on the Vasilyevka—Aksay line.

With the enemy seizure of Verkhne-Kumskiy, 1378th Rifle Regiment subunits with reinforcements found

themselves encircled south of the farm. After receiving the order to withdraw from the encirclement, the regiment, headed by its commander, suddenly attacked the enemy on the night of December 20 and breached [enemy lines] through Zagotskot toward Gromoslavka where it joined up with 98th Rifle Division units.

From December 20, 4th Mechanized Corps which now became 3rd Guards Corps was withdrawn into the second echelon of Malinovskiy's Army.¹⁸

So, Soviet troops near Verkhne-Kumskiy, while lagging behind the enemy in strength, displayed skill, exceptional steadfastness, bravery, and high moral qualities. They endured heavy losses but they also inflicted significant losses on the enemy. At the same time, not considering themselves defeated, they just destroyed no less than 60 enemy tanks, including Tiger tanks. Thanks to their heroic efforts, they managed to gain time to organize, beginning on December 19, an insurmountable defense for the enemy using 2nd Guards Army's main force and, in coordination with 51st Army, completely stopped a counterattack by Manstein's force. Many soldiers who distinguished themselves were decorated and two of them—Regimental Commanders Lieutenant Colonels Diasamidze and Aslanov were awarded the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union according to General Zakharov's petition dated December 20, 1942.¹⁹ The former 13th Tank Corps also became 4th Guards Mechanized Corps.

While assessing the events on the Verkhne-Kumskiy Axis, it is impossible to reduce everything, as Klyucharev does, to just the actions of 4th Guards Mechanized Corps "under the command of General Volskiy who has been forgotten by history" as the writer asserts because first of all in Zakharov's group besides 4th Mechanized Corps (50-70 tanks and 2,000 soldiers) were 87th Rifle Division, a tank brigade, a tank regiment, a tank destroyer brigade, and others (over 2,000 soldiers, 50 tanks, and artillery), and although the corps was an important force, it was far from the only one in the six days of engagements near Verkhne-Kumskiy and, second, the skillful and heroic actions of 13th Tank Corps and 302nd Rifle Division in the area of Kruglyakov and Zhutov also substantially influenced events on the Verkhne-Kumskiy Axis.

The writer's assertion that history has forgotten the valor of 4th Mechanized Corps and its commander also seems trivial. Many works, even including the work "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945] (Vol 6, pp 67-68), have written about this. We can "secretly" remind Klyucharev that history has recorded the many sides of Corps Commander General V.T. Volskiy's activities and even the fact that a letter signed by Stalin was sent to him on the eve of the counteroffensive. A.M. Vasilyevskiy could have paid a high price to get this letter in those times. But just his thorough knowledge of the situation and firm confidence in the operations plan's reality permitted the

chief of the General Staff to prove the unsoundness of Volskiy's doubts about the [operation's] success to the Supreme Commander.²⁰

While subjecting 2nd Guards Army to "verbal attacks", Klyucharev decisively rejects its important role in the complete failure of the [Army] Group Goth counterattack and as a result criticizes Writer Yu. Bondarev.

The fallacy of rejecting the role of Malinovskiy's army during the events in the second half of December 1942 on the Kotelnikovo Axis has already been demonstrated above. We must also add to this that this Army was the main force from December 24 when Stalingrad Front troops resumed the counteroffensive and essentially completed the defeat of Army Group Goth.

Klyucharev's criticism that is directed at Bondarev's "Goryachiy sneg" [Hot Snow] also misses the mark. The attempts to base his criticism on Academician A.M. Samsonov's reputation are also in vain. Bondarev had all of the grounds to lay at the foundation of the subject the operations of both 51st and 2nd Guards Armies. He turned toward Malinovskiy's army and did not permit anything contradictory because this army had been involved in a bloody defensive battle since December 18, had stopped the enemy at the Myshkovo River, and later defeated the enemy in concert with 51st Army. And if it had not reached the Myshkovo by December 19, it is hard to predict how events would have developed. Unfortunately, Klyucharev prefers to remain silent about this.

While exaggerating the events near Verkhne-Kumskiy, the writer does not even stop to cite the words of German Memoirs Author Mellentine that allegedly the events that occurred on the bank of the obscure Aksay River resulted in the crisis of the Third Reich. The assertion is strong. However two inaccuracies have been permitted. First, we all know that the beginning of the crisis of the Third Reich was born through the victorious outcome of the six-month-long Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943 and was marked by the tolling of bells throughout Germany from February 3-6, 1943 and also by Hitler's announcement of total mobilization. Second, Mellentine did not express his own point of view but just restated the mood of some German General Staff officer in his text.²¹ If he said it or from whom he heard it are not the same thing! In this case, Klyucharev's emotions won out.

A quotation by the writer of what the Front commander said also turned out to be inaccurate when he wrote: "Engagements in the area of Zhutov and in particular in the area of Verkhne-Kumskiy are the clearest example of courage...." etc.²² Klyucharev for some reason quotes Yeremenko but at the same time for some reason he omits the words "in the area of Zhutov", that is, he is silent on the assessment of the events on the Kruglyakov Axis, and thus emphasizes just Verkhne-Kumskiy and of course 4th Mechanized Corps. As a result, he did not avoid a half truth even in this.

Klyucharev loves to discuss the topic, did we need to maintain so many troops on the internal front of the encirclement if, according to his representation, the cauldron was a crowd of dystrophy sufferers, a camp of armed prisoners of war, and others. Here we have evidence of the writer's profound confusion. Marshal Vasilyevskiy dethroned this assessment in his time. He categorically refuted the assertion that von Paulus' army was a "hare on a tether" and along with this the idea of certain people that it was sufficient to just limit it to a blockade using small forces.²³

Maybe, the marshal was mistaken in his assessment of the cauldron? Maybe how to act was more apparent to Battle of Stalingrad Participant Klyucharev? In order to reach a decision on this issue, let us offer a chance to speak to Battle of Stalingrad Participants General P.A. Batov and General-Field Marshal von Paulus for their assessment of the condition of the 300,000 man enemy force.

While assessing his own army before January 10, 1943, von Paulus rejected the humane Soviet ultimatum on the grounds that at that time he considered the Sixth Army to be quite combat capable and reliably led in all elements, although certain difficulties were being noted under the conditions of the blockade.²⁴

While assessing the moral state of the encircled troops, 65th Army Commander P.A. Batov pointed out that the breakdown of their spiritual strength had just appeared in the latter days of January 1943 under Soviet Army attacks,²⁵ and not in November and December 1942 as the author thinks.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that Klyucharev's loud but inadequately professionally based appeals to write the truth about the Battle of Stalingrad sooner approaches the search for half truths which certainly suits him better.

Footnotes

1. I have in mind Zhukov's appointment as Deputy Supreme Commander at the end of August 1942.
2. PRAVDA, January 20, 1989.
3. Vasilyevskiy, A., "Delo svoey zhizni" [My Life's Cause], Moscow, Politizdat [Publishing House of Political Literature], 1975, p 543.
4. TsAMO SSSR [USSR Ministry of Defense Central Archives], F 132-A, op 2642, d 32, ll 211-214.
5. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., pp 252-253.
6. Zhukov, G.K., "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1969, p 447.
7. Rokossovskiy, K.K., "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty], Moscow, Voyenizdat [Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense], 1968, p 159.

8. "Marshal Zhukov, Kakim my ego pomnim" [Marshal Zhukov, How We Remember Him], Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, p 244.
9. Zhukov, G.K., op. cit., pp 446-447.
10. TsAMO, F 132-A, op 2642, d 32, ll 211-214.
11. Wieder, Joachim, "Katastrofa na Volge: Vospomnaniya ofitsera-razvedchika 6-y armii Paulyusa" [Catastrophe on the Volga: Recollections of a von Paulus' Sixth Army Intelligence Officer], translated from the German, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1965, p 190.
12. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., pp 270-271; Voronov, N.N., "Na sluzhbe voyennoy" [In Military Service], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1963, pp 311-312.
13. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., p 275.
14. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., p 269; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], Vol 6, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p 64.
15. Yeremenko, A.I., "Stalingrad" [Stalingrad], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1961, pp 395-396; "Sovetskaya artilleriya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voynie 1941-1945" [Soviet Artillery in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1960, p 170.
16. Yeremenko, A.I., op. cit., p 402.
17. TsAMO, F 320, op 455, d 35, ll 134-135.
18. Ibid, F 3, gv mk op 420575, d 1, ll 9-10.
19. Ibid, F 220, op 455, d 11, l 447.
20. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., pp 249-250.
21. Mellentine, F., "Tankovyye srazheniya" [Tank Battles], translated from the German, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1957, pp 170-171.
22. Yeremenko, A.I., op. cit., p 406.
23. Vasilyevskiy, A., op. cit., p 265.
24. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1960, No 2, p 89.
25. Batov, P.A., "V pokhodakh i boyakh" [On Marches and in Engagements], Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1984, p 224.

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KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 'Secret Documents' on Entry Into Afghanistan

91UM0212A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 27 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by D. Muratov: "Afghanistan"]

[Text]Drama as depicted in top-secret documents, reports and encoded messages on events preceding introduction of troops into DRA. Published here for first time.

Characters!

L.I. Brezhnev: Prominent figure in CPSU, Soviet state and international communist and workers' movement, MSU, four-time Hero of the Soviet Union; L.I. Brezhnev deserves much credit for development of national defense theory and praxis; general secretary, chairman of USSR Defense Council 1979; died 1982.

D.F. Ustinov: Prominent Soviet party, state and military figure; MSU; member of Politburo of CPSU Central Committee 1979; died 1984.

H. Amin: Prime minister of Republic of Afghanistan; minister of foreign affairs 1 May 78 to 28 Jul 79; died during introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan; according to unconfirmed reports, killed by grenade accidentally tossed into his office during seizure of palace....

A.A. Gromyko: Member of Politburo of CPSU Central Committee, USSR minister of foreign affairs 1979; died 1989.

B.N. Ponomarev: Candidate member of Politburo of CPSU Central Committee; one of organizers of partisan movement during war; Supreme Soviet deputy; chairman of Foreign Affairs Commission of Council of Nationalities of USSR Supreme Soviet from 1974.

Comrade Gorelov: Lt Gen; at that time senior member of group of military specialists in DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan].

Comrade Puzanov: USSR ambassador to DRA at that time; presently retired.

Comrade Ivanov: KGB agent at Soviet embassy in DRA.

_____ : USSR KGB agent.

N. Taraki: Chairman of Revolutionary Council of Republic of Afghanistan; chairman of Supreme Defense Council; brutally killed September 1979.

Valeriy Ochirov: Col; Hero of Soviet Union; people's deputy of USSR; served in helicopter squadron of composite air regiment in Afghanistan; provided editors with these unique—we repeat, unique—documents....

ACT I. In which it becomes clear who provided what information from Kabul to the Center and how it led to tragedy.

List of Requests From Afghan Leadership for Introduction of Contingents of Soviet Forces Into DRA

14 April—Send 15-20 Soviet combat helicopters and crews to DRA.

MILITARY HISTORY

16 June—Send Soviet crews for tanks and infantry combat vehicles to DRA to guard government, Bahram and Shindand airports.

11 July—Move several Soviet special groups of up to a battalion each into Kabul.

19 July—Move up to two divisions into Afghanistan.

20 July—Move airborne division into Kabul.

21 July—Send 8-10 Soviet Mi-25 helicopters with Soviet crews to DRA.

24 July. Move three army subunits into Kabul.

12 August—Soviet subunits needed in Kabul as soon as possible.

12 August—Send three Soviet special subunits and transport helicopters with crews to Kabul.

21 August—Send 1,500-2,000 Soviet airborne troops to Kabul; replace Afghan crews of antiaircraft weapons with Soviet crews.

25 August—Move Soviet troops into Kabul.

2 October, 17 November, 20 November—Send special battalion to serve as Amin's personal guard.

2 December—Move reinforced regiment into Badakhshan Province.

3 December—Move Soviet militia subunits into northern areas of Afghanistan.

12 December, 17 December—Deploy Soviet garrisons in northern part of Afghanistan, assume protection of DRA roads.

ACT II.

List of Proposals From Soviet Representatives in Kabul for Introduction of Soviet Subunits into DRA

Should the situation further exacerbate, it would apparently be expedient to consider some sort of participation, under an appropriate pretext, by our military units in the protection of installations and important facilities with which the Soviet Union is assisting. Among other things, consideration might be given to sending in subunits of Soviet troops:

a) to the Bahram military airfield under the guise of technical specialists, using as a cover the planned restructuring of the repair facility;

b) to the Kabul airport under the pretext of restructuring it, particularly since an international agreement has been concluded on this matter, a fact reported in the press.

Should the situation become further complicated, the presence of these support points would provide certain options and make it possible to secure the evacuation of Soviet citizens, should this become necessary.

Puzanov, Ivanov, 19 Mar 79

It would be expedient to consider the possibility of establishing a common training center for the People's Armed Forces of the DRA in Kabul (patterned after the training brigade in Cuba).

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 6 May 79

(The same proposal was sent to the Center with the signatures of Puzanov, Gorelov, Neshumov (chief of staff of PGV [not further identified]), and Bogdanov (new KGB agent) on 7 June 1979).

A second meeting with N.M. Taraki was held on 19 July.

Taraki returned to the matter of increasing military support from the Soviet Union, stating that in an emergency it would be crucial to land an airborne division in Kabul.

Our position was set forth once again in response, stressing the fact that the Soviet Union could not agree to such steps....

B. Ponomarev, 20 Jul 79

It would appear expedient:

7. to consider sending a flight (detachment) of Soviet helicopters to the DRA's Shindand air base in order to set up the emergency training of Afghan helicopter crews. This helicopter subunit could also conduct reconnaissance along the border with Iran.

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 12 Jul 79

From an operational report:

Amin again raised the issue of deploying three Soviet army subunits in Kabul in case an emergency should arise in the capital. He believes that they could be secretly stationed at the military club, the Soviet embassy and the area of Tane-Tajbek, where the residence of the head of government is to be moved at the end of the year and where there are barracks. Amin said that Comrade Taraki expects a Soviet battalion to arrive on the territory of the military club soon.—KGB agent, 24 Jul 79

From an operational report:

On 21 July H. Amin summoned the Soviet ambassador and, citing instructions from N.M. Taraki, requested that the following appeal be transmitted to the Soviet leadership:

...It is requested that 8-10 helicopters with Soviet crews be provided immediately for the Afghan air force, which will fly sorties.

I told H. Amin that the Soviet side cannot agree for Soviet military personnel to take part in combat operations, a fact repeatedly stated by Soviet leaders and underscored by B.N. Ponomarev during recent talks in Kabul.

Puzanov, 21 Jul 79

From an operational report:

...The DRA leadership is making serious preparations for new clashes with the counterrevolution, but it is counting to a great extent on direct assistance from the USSR in case of a crisis.

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 12 Jul 79

From an operational report:

11 July. Taraki also expressed the thought that it would be a good thing for the Soviet side to make the decision secretly to deploy several Soviet special military groups of up to a battalion each in Kabul in case the situation in the capital should worsen drastically.

KGB agent, 11 Jul 79

ACT III. In which it becomes clear that despite its "agents" in Kabul, the Center is attempting to distance itself as far as possible from any adventures....

Coded Message to Soviet Agents in Kabul

1. Considering the actual state of affairs presently developing in Afghanistan, it is deemed expedient not to refuse to deal with Amin and the government he heads. In the process everything possible must be done to restrain Amin from engaging in repression against Taraki's supporters and other individuals who do not suit him but are not enemies of the revolution. We must at the same time take advantage of contacts with Amin to further reveal his political nature and his intentions.

2. It has also been deemed expedient for our military advisers in the Afghan forces and advisers with security and internal affairs agencies to remain at their stations. They must carry out their direct functions of preparing for and conducting combat operations against rebel formations and other counterrevolutionary forces. Naturally, they must not take any part whatsoever in repressive actions against individuals who do not suit Amin, should the units or subunits in which our advisers are located become involved in such actions.

Gromyko, 15 Sep 79

ACT IV. From which it becomes clear that pressure on Moscow by the Afghan leadership and our Kabul "agents" was growing despite the objections of Comrade Ponomarev....

And Despite This....

During the discussion Amin repeated his request that a battalion of Soviet servicemen be sent to Kabul to serve as his personal guard at the new residence, into which he plans to move after 15 October of this year.

KGB agent, 2 Oct 79

Note: Amin repeated this request on 17 and 20 November. Reports on the matter arrived on 18 and 21 November 1979.

Both Taraki and Amin have repeatedly returned to the matter of enlarging the Soviet presence in the nation.

They raised the issue of moving approximately two divisions into the DRA in an emergency "at the request of the legitimate government of Afghanistan."

It was announced in response to the request that the Soviet Union could not agree to this....

Ponomarev, 19 Jul 79

...in view of possible stepped-up activity by the rebel formations in August and September... it is essential to respond affirmatively to the request from the Afghan friends and to send a special brigade to Kabul in the immediate future.

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 1 Aug 79

...we would consider it expedient to send one special battalion to Kabul within the immediate future... as well as transport helicopters and Soviet crews.

We also request that you consider sending two additional special battalions to the DRA, one to reinforce the guard at the air base at Bahram and the Bala-Ghisar fortress on the edge of Kabul.

Puzanov, Ivanov, Gorelov, 12 Aug 79

The KGB agent met with H. Amin on 12 and 17 December. Of what Amin said, the following deserves attention.

Amin persistently pursued the idea that it is essential for the Soviet Union to participate directly in restraining the bands formed in the northern areas of the DRA. His reasoning was the following:

—the present Afghan leadership will welcome the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces at a number of strategically important locations in the northern provinces of the DRA....

Amin stated that the forms and methods of military assistance should be determined by the Soviets:

—the USSR may have military garrisons at locations of their choice;
—the USSR may assume the protection of all joint Afghan-Soviet projects...

KGB agents, 17 Dec 79

ACT V. From which it becomes clear that the doctrine of "international aid," reinforced with information from Kabul set the troops into motion. This was not reported in Soviet newspapers....

List of Instructions for Establishing the Grouping of Forces in the Turkestan Military District (issued by the general staff in ORAL ORDERS from the USSR Minister of Defense in December 1979)

14 December—Transfer a regiment of fighter-bombers from Transcaucasus Military District to Mari and place it under command of Turkestan Military District.

16 December—Put field headquarters of 40th Army into state of total readiness; put motorized rifle regiment and tank regiment of one other division of Turkestan Military District into state of total readiness.

MILITARY HISTORY

19 December—Move motorized rifle and tank regiments whose readiness level was raised on 16 December to area of Takhta-Bazar (Kushka sector) by end of 21 December; put communications units of 40th Army into state of total readiness

23 December—Put motorized rifle division of Central Asian Military District into state of total readiness.

24 December—USSR Minister of Defense conducted conference of top personnel in Ministry of Defense, at which he announced that a decision had been made to move troops into Afghanistan. Conference attended by deputy ministers of defense and chiefs of main and central directorates; Lt Gen Yu.V. Tukharinov instructed to meet with Lt Gen Babajan, chief of Operations Directorate of DRA General, and discuss with him matters of deploying Soviet forces in Afghanistan; minister of defense signed decree on introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan and sent it, encoded, to forces; time for crossing state border set at 15:00 on 25 December.

25 December—Put artillery and antiaircraft units of 40th Army into state of total readiness; put aircraft of Turkestan Military District into state of total readiness; put additional motorized rifle division of Central Asian Military District into state of total readiness.

26 December—Send motorized rifle division of Central Asian Military District placed into state of readiness on 25 December to jurisdiction of Turkestan Military District; send all units of motorized rifle division of Turkestan Military District placed into state of readiness on 23 December to area of Takhta-Bazar.

27 December—Put ponton bridge regiment of Turkestan Military District into state of total readiness.

Without postscripts...

This is the documentary prehistory, still classified today, of the tragic war which took more than 13,000 lives and left thousands and thousands of people disabled. We would not want to draw any banal conclusions, but would only underscore the explosive potential of the information on which the extraordinary decisions were made. Remember that war is brewing in the Persian Gulf area....

Angolan Defense Minister On Cease-Fire, Future Of Soviet Aid

91UM0330A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Angolan Defense Minister Pedro Maria Tonha interviewed by M. Pavlov, I. Bulanov: "How The Angolan Peace Talks Are Going: Predictions Of The 'Black Rooster'"]

[Text] Luanda—Right before each new round of talks between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)-Party of Labor and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the situation is exacerbated by stepped-up terrorist activity by the antigovernment group and by the growing demands that it puts forward at the meetings themselves—demands that are setting back peace in Angola.

People in Luanda are saying that the sixth round of talks, which the UNITA radio station "Black Rooster" reports are slated for January 28, might not be held as scheduled on account of USA preoccupation with events in the Persian Gulf. We asked People's Republic of Angola Defense Minister Colonel General Pedro Maria Tonha to tell about the situation in the country and about the prospects for reaching a cease-fire agreement.

[Tonha] We have now held five rounds of meetings with UNITA and are preparing for a sixth round, on which we are pinning considerable hopes. We believe that despite the existing difficulties, the meeting will be held on schedule. How the negotiations themselves are proceeding is another matter. For the problem is that UNITA, after agreeing to the proposed principles, proceeded to reject them and is now making new far-reaching demands. This has also happened recently—in particular following the meeting in Washington between Savimbi and the foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, and Portugal and a special political adviser to the PRA President, Lopu du Nasimentu. After the meeting UNITA stepped up its combat operations, thereby exacerbating the situation in the country. The enemy is destroying the infrastructure and civilian installations and attacking villages. He has set off a number of explosions in Luanda and other cities and is obstructing UN humanitarian aid to the drought-stricken population. The group continues to receive assistance from the United States and South Africa. The Americans have also enlisted the Zaireans in this, who are making their territory available for the training of fighters and whose ports and military bases are serving as transit points for arms deliveries.

[Pavlov, Bulanov] Doesn't it seem paradoxical to you that UNITA is making similar statements as it steps up

military operations? And how do you view Savimbi's intention to hold a congress of his group in Luanda this summer?

[Tonha] The aim of UNITA and Savimbi himself is obvious: to seize power by force of arms. This is why the war continues unabated. And he is holding the talks in order to gain time. That is how we assess their actions. An analysis of the situation in Angola shows that on this score, UNITA is receiving corresponding instructions from the United States and South Africa. But we can end the war in Angola only at the negotiating table, to which there is no alternative.

[Pavlov, Bulanov] Is it realistic to expect concrete results from the sixth round, and does the PRA government intend to meet UNITA's demand that South Africa take part in the talks?

[Tonha] If all the previously agreed-upon principles are accepted by UNITA, progress and positive results will be achieved. Otherwise, there will be a delay, and we will have to discuss various positions once again. As for South Africa, this country carries considerable weight in the region. And therefore UNITA is trying to use it in its own interests. On the other hand, Pretoria is prepared to develop economic ties with Luanda, to which we too have agreed, though apartheid remains a constraining factor in this process. Nevertheless, we proceed from the premise that if the United States, which aids UNITA, is an observer at the talks, then why not solve in a positive fashion the question of South Africa's participation in them as well, if such a need arises.

[Pavlov, Bulanov] What are the prospects for cooperation between the USSR and Angola in the military sphere?

[Tonha] We are grateful to the Soviet people for the help they have given us and are giving us in developing our armed forces. Our cooperation began from the outset of the MPLA's creation. The Soviet Union's assistance was especially tangible following Angola's proclamation of independence. And were it not for the USSR and the Cuban internationalists, the MPLA would have disappeared in 1975. Today many Soviet officers are working together with us, although their numbers have declined of late, since they have helped train a skilled contingent of Angolans to relieve them. But cooperation cannot disappear overnight, even with the creation of a unified army. I think that we will continue to cooperate successfully with the USSR, since for all practical purposes all our military hardware is Soviet-made. We are now shifting to new forms of relations in which we will have to pay for equipment, arms, and the dispatch of Soviet specialists to Angola. It cannot be ruled out that under these same terms, military specialists from other countries, including the United States and South Africa, could appear in the country, should the needs of a unified army require this. But even in that case we will hardly manage without our Soviet friends.

GSP Tracked Self-Propelled Ferries Offered for Sale

91UM0422A Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE
in Russian No 11, Nov 90 (Signed to press 15 Nov 90)
p 21

[Unattributed advertisement: "GSP Tracked Self-Propelled Ferries: Consisting of Two Half-Ferry Units".]

[Text] High mobility floating transport equipment, able to transport freight to a total mass of up to 52 tons across water obstacles of any width and [having] the most disadvantageous bottom and shore conditions.

Equipped with a highly reliable hydraulic system.

Thanks to its simple design it may be used easily to fulfill a variety of civilian economic tasks.

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Profit from Sale of Kiev MD Equipment

91UM0422B Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 13 Dec 90 p 1

[TASS and POSTFAKTUM: "The Country's Day: Events, Facts".]

[Excerpt] KIEV—As a result of the sale of obsolete military equipment the Kiev military district has earned around 4 million rubles in this year.

Ural Defense Enterprise Managers Discuss Conversion Problems

914A0266A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 52, Dec 90 p 8

[Article by EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN staff correspondents G. Saitov and V. Semenov under the rubric: "Conversion:" "The Local Version, or How They Are Beating Swords Into Plowshares in the Urals"]

[Text] *The gray Urals forge victory... Everyone is familiar with the wartime picture with that name. A striking canvas, it cannot be denied—a gray-eyed and gray-haired old man (the Urals, in the idea of the creator) with a sword in one hand, lying on edge on an anvil, and in the other a hammer poised to strike.*

The history of this ancient region was written under the symbols of the sword and shield for many years. The stereotypes of the cold war that held mankind in its harsh fetters, however, have clearly been receding into the past in recent years.

The role of the Urals—one of the country's leading arsenals—is also changing under these conditions. The

problem of converting the defense industries—their conversion to the output of civilian products—is moving onto the agenda. The very same products that are so scarce on the shelves of our stores.

A Panacea Found?

A session of the President's Council of the USSR chaired by M.S. Gorbachev was held at the end of September. The state program of conversion of the defense industry for the period to 1995, as is well known, was considered at it. Recall that it envisaged bringing the output of consumer goods to 270 billion rubles in the coming five-year plan. That is almost twice as much as the 12th Five-Year Plan.

It must be said that the Urals are being called upon to shoulder no small portion of that total. The last year was the first of real conversion for it. It was then that more than thirty enterprises of Sverdlovsk Oblast completed their plans on that theme. They were analyzed by specialists from the Institute of Economics of the Urals Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. And what the scholars found was that the organization of the output of consumer goods without substantial changes in the production profiles of the plants lies at the heart of the plans. It was ascertained in passing that despite the planned high rate of increase in the output of civilian products, their increase in 1990 will not make up for the reduction in the amounts of the special defense products. The majority of the enterprises, in short, were not able to formulate a line of consumer goods that would provide for the receipt of profits in the pre-conversion period. It was estimated that losses would total 122 million rubles at just 13 of the enterprises in the first two years of conversion.

The situation is similar in Chelyabinsk Oblast as well. The head of a department at the party obkom, Yu. Karavanskiy, describes it this way: "The increase in consumer goods in the defense sector of industry in Chelyabinsk Oblast in 1990 should comprise 130 percent of the level of the prior year. They will not, however, be able to cover the decrease of 15-20 percent in defense-product output at a number of enterprises. The labor expenditures will remain as before."

The reason for this is concealed in the varying cost expressions of the standard-hour for civilian and military products. This situation entails a worsening of the economic condition of the enterprises under the conditions of economic accountability [*khozrashchet*] and self-financing.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the country essentially has no thorough conceptual scientific framework for the emergence and development of conversion. This is while the mechanism for its implementation has been worked out, for example, in the United States. And that is understandable—they have been profoundly occupied with the problems of conversion overseas, after all, since the 1960s. Columbia University professor S. Melman has established, in particular, that a

minimum of two years is required in order to plan the conversion of an enterprise, determine product lines, establish contacts with dealers and prepare production. A minimum! And that, you will note, is under the industrial conditions of the United States, the good organization of which needs no recommendation.

We are not reminding our readers of foreign experience for nothing. It is no secret, after all, that the impression is still current in public opinion that the enterprises in the defense complex need only get on with conversion, and the scarcity of goods will vanish instantaneously. Far from it, especially if you take into account that the first steps on that thorn-filled path have been distinguished by empty bustling, shallow thinking and, frequently, passivity.

Games for Adults

A business-problem game was held at one of the enterprises in the defense complex of Sverdlovsk Oblast at the initiative of the Institute of Economics of the Urals Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It envisaged uncovering the opinion of specialists that are professionally engaged in preparing and carrying out conversion in particular.

And to what did the results testify? It was ascertained that only two thirds of those polled were familiar with the conversion program of their own enterprise, and many specialists had no information whatsoever.

An expert evaluation of the circumstances hindering the launching of conversion was done using a five-point system. The lack of preparedness of production for the mass output of civilian products was valued at 4.6 points. A lack of determination by the administration received 4 points. Ministry subsidies—which, in the opinion of the specialists, immobilized the labor collective's search for ways of getting by—were also evaluated negatively by the specialists.

Many of the defense-industry people of Chelyabinsk Oblast, meanwhile, adhere to the same opinion. We cite a portion of a roundtable discussion that was held by the Chelyabinsk party obkom in this regard:

V. Kochnev, director of the Plastmass plant (city of Kopeysk): "We received a subsidy in 1990 as the result of the removal of the special products. What do I need that for? If we are going into the market, we should set our price and sell the goods like all other normal countries. Work up some profitability..."

Yu. Karavanskiy: "That's it—'work it up!'"

V. Kochnev: "But within reasonable limits."

Yu. Karavanskiy: "If they let you..."

The business-problem game also researched such a topical issue as where to put the personnel that are freed up in the course of conversion. There is, by the way, a

prediction on this score: the decrease in labor expenditures for the output of military hardware will lead to the release of almost 13,000 workers in the basic professions at more than thirty defense enterprises in the Central Urals in 1995.

Defense-industry people feel that the long-term conversion program should have a section on the movement of workers within the enterprise and their training for new product lines. Everything is not that simple, however. And one of the roundtable participants at the Chelyabinsk party obkom, the general director of the Signal Production Association, N. Vikhorev, was pointing that out: "The people who were putting out the special products will not always be able to make good refrigerators or good furniture. We even have a pyrotechnical expert. You could build a monument to him while he's still alive, but he will never be a good furniture maker. And if full conversion signifies the complete replacement of people, then we will get a most ordinary and commonplace enterprise as a result..."

A gloomy prospect, it cannot be denied. But be that as it may, we must find a way out of the current situation. The retraining of workers and managers is, in reality, one of the chief problems of conversion. The acquisition of the new thinking by the latter, in the opinion of the deputy director of the Institute of Economics of the Urals Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economic Sciences V. Zadorozhnyy, should lead to the formation of a "critical mass" of innovators.

Why is it needed?

"Because the authoritarian and order-giving style of management had become firmly established at the defense enterprises by virtue of their specific features. The move to conversion, meanwhile, forces executives to make decisions based on variations, frequently without any pointers from above.

"What path do we take here? Training one-by-one is inefficient. For the simple reason that, when returning after their schooling, they will fall into an atmosphere of administrative stereotypes, and will thus be unable change the routine style of management. This also testifies to the fact that the retraining of management personnel is most expediently accomplished in 'modules.' Imagine if, say, the head of a major subdivision, the industrial engineer, the economist, the norm-setter etc. obtain the special knowledge at the same time. This core of like thinkers will become an energetic force, able to topple management stereotypes. It has also been proven by experience that the innovators can gain a 'critical mass' when at least a tenth of the specialists come over to the new thinking."

Plus Commerce

It cannot be denied that conversion has posed complex tasks for many enterprises of the defense complex. Now, after all, they have to assess independently the technological feasibility, economic expediency and commercial

stability of new orders in the civilian field. The enterprises of the military-industrial complex, meanwhile, did not know these problems before. And this, to put it in all candor, is one of the most vulnerable spots in the domestic defense industry, the greater portion of which, as they say, is tied up with the output of special products.

This is at the same time as only four enterprises in the United States had a proportionate share of military production over 80 percent at the beginning of the 1980s. The remaining firms—the subcontractors in the military-industrial complex—were and are putting out a broad line of civilian products along with the military hardware. Our defense industry disregarded this experience. That means that it is itself condemned to cut the tangled knot of conversion problems. How?

The Institute of Economics is proposing "two-tiered" economics for the enterprises being converted. The first tier is work on the traditional terms of the existing system, aimed at ensuring the special deliveries and civilian products. The prices, subsidies and overhead should remain at the pre-conversion level of 1988.

The second tier is work according to market laws. All products that are produced under the conversion program are sold at market prices. The additional products should moreover be taxed according to favorable standards. The enterprises, obtaining profits from this setup, will have an opportunity to direct them toward accelerating conversion.

All of this, in the opinion of the Urals scholars, will make it possible to stabilize the operations, social climate and morale of the enterprises being converted. The output of consumer goods will increase and the standard of living will rise as a result, both from the increase in wages and from the opportunity for additional "things to buy." And, what is especially substantial, experience will be obtained in the functioning of the economy under the conditions of its self-regulation.

However well the conversion has moved along at an enterprise taken separately, however, its true success depends largely on coordinating the efforts of the defense industry at the all-union and regional levels. But that is just what is lacking today. Here is what the chief engineer of Uralgiprotyazhmash [Ural State Institute for the Planning of Heavy Machinery] (city of Sverdlovsk), B. Kozin, says on that score: "It gives one pause that many executives are beginning to sing the age-old song that now they have to develop the documentation for the most modern of devices, and only then send it off into production. But tell me, why do they have to invent the same vacuum cleaner? A pretty good vacuum cleaner, in my opinion, has long been produced by Uralelektrotyazhmash [Ural Heavy Electrical Machinery Plant] in Sverdlovsk. There is even a new model now—the Ural-3. It is so much easier to buy the finished documentation, technology and experience and chase the products out, to the delight of the consumers. That will, after all, accelerate its appearance on the shelves by one or two

years. And when an ordinary vacuum cleaner ceases to be a marvel, we can think about a robot vacuum and even compete a little with America itself..."

Just so. But that is only one side of the problem of a lack of coordination of efforts among the Urals defense plants; the other is reduced to the fact that they often do not inform each other of their intentions. Here is an example. Three enterprises in Sverdlovsk Oblast have now launched preparations at once for the production of household washing machines, 120,000-125,000 a year each. It must be taken into account herein that Uralmash is already putting out half a million of them, and intends to double its capacity. And now the hitch arises—the demand for washing machines has not even been studied in the Urals, never mind the whole country. How can there not be an overstock with that kind of distribution? That is not yet threatened, true, but we must think about the future as well, after all.

The conversion of enterprises must consequently be pursued in close interaction in order not to reinvent the bicycle and not to over-saturate the market with two-wheeled vehicles. One might ask, in this case, why we do not create a Urals center to assist in conversion, an association of the enterprises being converted? That is the variation being proposed by the scholars of the Institute of Economics.

A marketing center, a training center, a brokerage firm for contacts with the representatives of foreign firms, a database of the scientific and technical achievements of the enterprises being converted, a database on production capacity that has been freed up and a base of orders for defense enterprises could all be created as part of the association.

Also under consideration is the idea of creating a trading hall in the association where auctions of scientific and technical developments by enterprises in the defense complex, competitions for orders from civilian sectors and trading organizations, business negotiations with the representatives of foreign firms, the training of managers and consulting and servicing support for the adoption of scientific and technical developments by the enterprises in the association could all take place.

We thus have the right to note, in integrating the considerations of the scholars and the specialists on the ways of converting the defense enterprises to the output of civilian products, that a Urals version of conversion exists! A state program of conversion, however, is needed nonetheless in order for it to be realized more successfully.

USSR Atomic Energy Minister Visits Conversion Projects

*914A0386A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 91
Second Edition p 3*

[Article by special correspondent I. Mosin: "A Journey Into Conversion: What's Going On Where Quite Recently the Work Was Solely in Support of the Country's Defense"]

[Text] It was a rare opportunity. Going with Minister of Atomic Power and Industry V. Konovalov on a tour of several dozen enterprises of the sector working for defense needs. Let me recall that the current Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry is the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building. This is important to our discussion. The goal of the trip was to get a practical look at how conversion is going. Summarizing almost two weeks of impressions, let me say right away that there are plenty of problems, but on the whole, conversion is proceeding dynamically, thoughtfully and flexibly in the sector. I might venture the prediction that if no one sabotages the efforts of medium machine builders, and if they get help when they need it, in two or three years we will sense the real fruits of this conversion, still so incomprehensible to most of the population. What conclusions can we make from this journey into conversion?

The first thing that comes to mind is that money and resources must be given to the strong. We are too poor to distribute our meager wealth to everyone equally. We need to invest it in those who are able to give a larger return faster.

Let me say frankly that if I were a man of means, it would be into medium machine building that I would invest my modest savings. Why? Because the people here are working wisely, purposefully, energetically. Let me paint a few still lifes of conversion.

The Kazakh settlement of Aksuyek has a population of 6,000. Practically all of it had been involved in uranium mining. Now the uranium mine is closed. The people were left without work. There are steppes as far as the eye could see. But the miners didn't fall apart. They prospected some granite deposits not far from the settlement. We saw the first huge blocks of granite they wrested out. A. Yezhov, director of the Yuzhpolimetall Combine, of which the mine is a part, explained:

"A block of unworked granite is valued from 190 to 300 rubles. If the granite is cut into slabs, they could now be sold for thousands. Do you see the difference?

"There was a hang-up, however—where to get a granite slab cutting line. We don't have enough of them here in the country, and the quality of even those that are available leave something to be desired. The world's best—an Italian line—costs a million in hard currency. Where is such money to be had? Nowhere, for now. We found a simple solution—we decided to make one ourselves."

"Wasn't it hard to begin everything from scratch?" I asked the director.

Anatoliy Pavlovich fell silent for a little while, and then he began his answer in a roundabout way. I could sense that he had a lot that he wanted to get off his chest:

"Wherever you go, everyone is talking about stagnation. What do they think, that the country's been lying on the beach all of these years, working on a suntan? Who, then,

built the plants, smelted the steel and mined the uranium? We never witnessed this stagnation. As soon as we develop a deposit and get the town working, we are transferred to a new place. We've gotten used to starting from scratch. If only they'd let us get into full swing without tying our hands with all kinds of restrictions and arbitrary regulations."

Producing high quality granite and marble facing slabs is but one of the aspects of the conversion process in Yuzhpolimetall. Following that wise principle of business, they're not placing all their eggs into one basket here. The combine is also able to produce crushed rock and mine borite, a necessary component for drillers and oilmen.

The combine's main plant in the city of Kara-Balta is making preparations to receive gold ore for processing using capacities that had formerly been employed in uranium processing. Concurrently, the combine's other plants have already begun putting out electric motors, meat cooking pots and collapsible athletic exercise bars. Capacities producing oxalic acid, lubricant and even chewing gum are now being prepared. It must be admitted that such diversity was somewhat mind-boggling at first. On one hand because people got things moving so energetically, and on the other hand because our market is so hungry for goods. No matter what project the combine initiated, everything seemed to work out.

We saw and felt everything the director talked about firsthand. I saw good cause for anger. Take for example the collapsible athletic exercise bar—a work of jeweler's precision. It costs only 28 rubles. But in Moscow, it'll go for 300. Understandably, the people are just pricing the market, checking it out. But it hurts to see how hard they have to work in order to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. Even so, the exercise bar is an insignificant problem compared to some. For example, cutting granite, mining minerals and processing ore require tens and hundreds of millions of rubles, equipment and construction materials. What is the most surprising is that medium machine building industry is getting nothing of this today: It embarked upon conversion entirely on its own, at its own risk. Does it have enough strength in reserve to carry it through?

Thoughts of the minister:

Our sector is having a difficult time of it today. Reduction of the defense program naturally resulted in a notable decrease in production of military equipment, special articles and electronic systems. We have practically stopped production of highly concentrated uranium for military purposes. On the other side of it, the review of the country's energy program is not going in favor of nuclear fuel at all. As a result the volume of our traditional product has dropped by 40 percent, and a number of enterprises need to be retooled for completely different products. All of this will doubtlessly cause an increase in

economic and social stress at a certain stage. But unfortunately, in a number of cases we are left to our own devices in solving these problems.

We have not gone any further than simply announcing the objective of converting military industry. When it comes to some sort of foundation beneath it, and economic primarily, there is nothing there. Let me recall that in the West, assets freed as a result of reduction of expenditures on military needs are being channeled into reconversion. But in our country, we are more concerned with how to take these assets away from defense workers and give them to someone else. We continue to emphasize dividing everything up. But when it comes to saturating the market with goods, few are giving any thought to how this can be done faster. Our life possesses one amazing property—when something is taken away from some, for some reason others don't see any increase in what they get. Let me emphasize that capital investments into conversion are one of the most acute problems today. If we find a reasonable solution to it, goods will make their appearance. But if we don't, the goods will not appear, and we will undermine our defense potential. Such is the dilemma.

I must admit that the medium machine builders amazed me not only by their good business sense but also by the quality and dependability of their products—something that was forgotten and lost by civilian sectors long ago. For example, in Navoy I acquainted myself with operation of mini-dairies. They are easily loaded on trailers, driven to their place of work, and set up and started up in just a few hours. Make anything you want out of the milk—sour cream, cottage cheese, kefir, thin sour cream. And so-called aseptic shops presently being planned make it possible to produce 6,000 containers of milk with a storage life of five months hourly. If each village and town had such a shop, the country would have been swimming in milk long ago. But what is most impressive is the design of these shops, the excellence of their construction. Steel and nickel surfaces please the style-conscious eye: Everything glistens and sparkles like in the best commercials.

L. Kuznetsov, director of the Uralsk Electrical Machinery Plant, summarized the quality of the work of medium machine builders very well:

"Right from the start, quality was the main objective of our military production. Absolute dependability, precision and quality were valued above economy in our sector."

It can probably be said that in this case, medium machine builders profited well from their isolation, their separation from civilian sectors. The negative processes civilian industry suffered had little effect on them. This is why they were able to automatically transfer their requirements on military equipment to consumer goods. Contrary as it may appear in our times, it seemed to me that they are incapable of working poorly here.

The second thing that comes to mind is the old but currently meaningful notion that all that glitters is not gold. An acquaintance with medium machine building encourages thoughts which might be termed seditionary in today's thinking. While it has been denounced to such a great extent, the authoritarian administrative system can be effective in relation to certain goals. It possesses undoubted advantages which by our long-standing Russian habit we are unable to see, but which we will necessarily remember the next time our wagon breaks down.

It has allowed us to concentrate enormous human and material resources to reach a posed objective. Recall cosmonautics, the nuclear shield, creation of powerful defense industry, atomic power engineering, and of course the Great Patriotic War. No matter what we say, in these areas we are still holding on at the world level. It is precisely in relation to major state objectives that the authoritarian administrative system reveals its better qualities. As was aptly put by V. Krotkov, chief of one of the medium machine building main administrations and a professional of the good old mold, before dismantling the old, we need to know for certain that the new will be better.

This is probably why the minister never tired of emphasizing the following in all of his statements, no matter what the profile of the plant he was talking about: "We must strive for world-class production in the area in which we are professionals. First acquire a firm stand in some one thing. Then you can 'diversify'."

It seemed to me that medium machine builders absolutely lack any sort of defense industry snobbism. We used to mine uranium and manufacture missiles, they say, and now we're being asked to produce all kinds of consumer goods. The impression is that the people have been waiting all their lives to demonstrate their business sense, resourcefulness and knack, and now such a possibility has afforded itself. M. Kucherskiy, director of the Navoy Mining and Metallurgical Combine, explained what was unique about this psychological phenomenon:

"Medium machine builders have been educated in such a way that they have gotten used to taking and carrying out orders. The main thing is to pose the objective to them correctly. Then it would be simply impossible for them not to reach it."

By the way, in all of the years of its existence the sector had never failed a state plan a single time. And even today, despite how hard it is for them, they are reaching all of their targets. I find this do-or-die attitude toward work very commendable. Even in the presence of a market economy, there will be no shortage of plans. And those who are capable of carrying them out will always be in scarce supply.

However, despite the fact that medium machine builders are already producing hundreds of different articles for

the national economy—from leather jackets and spinning wheels to rare-earth metals and laser video players—they are conducting this massive economic expansion selectively. I was told at that same Uralsk Electrical Machinery Plant that they had an opportunity not long ago to begin mass production of irons. Highly scarce goods today. They rejected the idea. I spent a long time trying to find out from them what was so bad about irons.

"What we're afraid of," they explained to me, "is that in manufacturing such products, we ourselves might turn into irons."

As they say, it's always easier to roll downhill than to fight your way up.

The impression I arrived at from my acquaintance with conversion in medium machine building is that the foundations of many production operations are being laid today, ones which will offer very strong competition to similar civilian enterprises. Isn't this the way to create and form a market? Medium machine building is now regrouping, it is accumulating the strength it needs to launch itself into the peaceful future.

After this journey into conversion, I am especially gratified by the fact that through their work and their attitude toward it, the people with whom I acquainted myself completely dispel the myth of our supposed disarray, our inability to solve a crisis on our own. They still have fight in them. They still retain that strong foundation of statehood that the rest of our society loses so catastrophically quickly—structure, discipline and respect for authority. They are still capable of carrying out any tasks.

But what we need to do today is to quite clearly see and understand the difficulties they have encountered in the course of conversion. Desire and experience alone are not enough. Nor will the habit of subordination be any salvation. You can't make something out of nothing. And the transition of the sector—I think this pertains to all defense industry as well—to production of peaceful goods is proceeding with extreme difficulty.

And the more complex the production, the more painful is the process. Strange as it may seem, there is a very great difference between manufacturing pots and building tanks. Unfortunately, it is only recently that we have begun understanding this simple truth. But we have already made some mistakes.

Conversion is proceeding much faster than expected. The enterprises are having a hard time keeping up. Defense industry is getting no social or financial support from the state. Many military articles are being removed from production randomly, and no one is regulating this process. If anything happens, who is going to be held responsible for the consequences? Everything seems to be progressing of its own accord. With social consciousness stirring itself awake, people are beginning to violate

technological and production discipline. Controllability of the enterprises is decreasing.

But most importantly, people in defense industry are beginning to feel unneeded. Hence the lack of confidence in tomorrow, the feelings of anxiety and defenselessness, and the drain of the most highly skilled personnel into cooperatives. All of this is dulling and weakening the potential of defense industry. Solution of these problems depends primarily on state policy in relation to the military-industrial complex.

Thoughts of the minister:

I feel certain that many of our present political, ethnic and social problems could have been avoided by giving closer attention to the economy.

Instead, negative processes are gathering strength in our economy. In a time when tendencies toward closer planned economic cooperation are intensifying throughout the world, in our country we see a growing tendency toward religious isolation, which is itself based on economic difficulties as well.

It is time we understood that real cost accounting knows no boundaries. It is saddening and disappointing to see long-standing production ties and relations being broken due to political and ethnic causes. It seems to me that everything about today's situation persuasively demonstrates that we can solve the crisis only by working together. Perestroyka is of course necessary. I am in favor of sensible redistribution of profit. If we mine gold on the territory of Uzbekistan, why are neither the combine, nor the sector, nor the republic getting hardly anything from its sale?

Except for that part of profit which remains in their possession, the profit of the enterprises should be transferred completely—let me emphasize completely—to the local budget, and it is from the latter that higher executive bodies of Soviet government should be funded in accordance with established standards. It is under such conditions that local soviets would be able to control their environment, and would not need to come begging. This is in the economic interest of the rayon, the city, and in general, the republic and country. Once the economy gets going, many of the problems will disappear.

The third thing that comes to mind is something we should well remember—it is always harder to build something than to break it down. In view of certain historical conditions, a huge work force and a powerful economic potential have been created in certain oblasts in the state. The paramount question is what we do with it now. Do we take the path of destroying this self-adjusting, excellently organized structure together with its extremely great human, productive and intellectual potential, or will we find a way to utilize it effectively? In view of its special importance to the state, the country's nuclear complex could not allow any interruptions in its service no matter what sort of upheavals the entire system might experience. This is why it was conceived

from the very beginning as a self-organizing, self-adjusting system. Something to which we are currently hoping to transform our present society. In my opinion the founders of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building completed this task brilliantly. This conception, which was built into the sector right from the start, is one of the main reasons for its stability. The moment we take even one link out, the entire system will collapse. This is why the main concern of the ministry is to preserve the present structure of the sector, and its potential. This structure is strong in its monolithic nature, in its internal ties, in its people, and in its traditions. By allowing it to fall apart, we would lose everything that the country invested into this structure and the latter used so wisely. This would be not only an economic but a political mistake. And haven't we made enough of those?

Medium machine building has essentially concentrated our society's intellectual, engineering and business elite. It would be better not to squander it, it would be better to keep the little that we have today. Good fruit, after all, comes only from good seeds. And that's a law of nature.

In trying to make sense of what is going on today, one comes to a bitter conclusion. Considering how things stand today overall, what we are doing is presiding over the disintegration of statehood. Practically no social institution and no profession has escaped injury or insult. The army, the MVD, the KGB, the ministries and departments, the party, the intelligentsia, the workers and peasants—did I leave anyone out?—have all been under the fire of criticism. We are being told that all of these years we have worked, lived and thought completely wrong. Is there even a single ray of light in this kingdom of darkness? The press, alas, can shed no light.

We doubtlessly need to learn to live and work better. But as long as the state exists, its institutions of enforcement, administration and defense will continue to exist. Could it be that we have whipped and belittled ourselves before the entire world enough? If a person does not respect himself, who is going to respect him?

One other thing. Citizens of the country just like the rest of us are working in the military-industrial complex. Just like us, they suffer and are saddened by the fate of our fatherland. But they have a much better chance of traveling the path of perestroika faster, and of becoming a unique catalyst of all economic processes. With the help of conversion, we will be able to solve many of our problems. But we may also kill the potential in which we rightfully take pride. And so we need to provide this possibility to them, we need to help them. Hope is always placed upon the strong.

Plant To Convert From Tanks to Railcars

91UM0382A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by I. Taburyanskaya: "Electric Trains Instead of Tanks"]

[Text] From January next year the tank repair plant located in the settlement of Strelna near Leningrad will not be producing a single combat vehicle. By a decision agreed between the Moscow Railroad and the Leningrad Soviet, this enterprise will become a railway car construction plant.

This example of cooperation between military and civilian organizations promises tempting prospects because it will help resolve a question that is very acute for transportation workers, namely, the construction of new cars for suburban trains.

At present there is one single plant in the country, in Riga, and it is unable to satisfy all the demands from the railroads. Thus, the annual demand for cars is 1,800, but output is only 460. At the same time the service life of almost one-third of the fleet of railway cars of suburban trains exceeds the norm of 28 years and should be written off or undergo capital repairs.

The military plant near Leningrad was not selected for conversion by chance. It is located next to the Oktyabrskiy Railroad, which has an acute need to replace its old cars.

The new car construction plant is planned as a joint enterprise of four Union departments—the Ministry of Defense, the Moscow Railroad, the Ministry of Heavy, Power, and Transport Machine Building, and the Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry and Instrument Making. A major role in its activity has been assigned to the Association of Enterprises in the Leningrad Region. For at the plant it is planned to introduce new technology for assembling cars. Previously a complete metal body was fabricated and then the internal parts were "inserted" through the windows and doors. Now, however, all large parts (the walls and ceiling) will be prefabricated, which will, of course, significantly facilitate the work. And the necessary parts and spare parts will be produced mainly at enterprises in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast.

Conversion of the defense plant will take several years. By 1993 railway transport will have received 60 new cars, then 150, and after a new shop comes on line, annual output will be 250 cars. In addition, the plant will do some repairs on old cars, and will produce tractors for the Moscow Railroad, and also consumer goods.

Already this year, the first cars should arrive at Strelna and work started on their assembly and repair. The labor collective at the tank repair plant must already start getting used to its new business.

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